I. PAPERS AND SUMMARIES OF DISCUSSIONS

Monday, April 14, 1975

A. OPENING PLENARY SESSION: SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL EVENTS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1974

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(Working documents: Mr. P. Kirk and Mr. P. Findley) 1

Mr. Cousté opening the general political discussion at 9:50 a.m. by welcoming the U.S. Delegation and by thanking the authorities of the Bavarian Parliament for their kindness in placing meeting rooms and facilities at the disposal of the two Delegations.

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

Mr. Kirk introduced his working paper: "Some political aspects of United States/European relations" (see below, p. 5). He first outlined recent developments within the Nine, touching on the institutionalization of the meeting of heads of government (the "Super-Council" or "European Council") and referred to the "renegotiation" by the British Government of its terms of membership of the community.

He moved on to East-West relations, analysing the progress made both in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR). Discussing the Middle East he posed the question of a revival of the Geneva Conference. Passing on to security questions he commented, in turn, on (a) security in the Mediterranean as a whole; (b) the effects of the defense cuts made by the British Government on naval surveillance in the Mediterranean; and, in particular, stressed, (c) the new significance of the role of Congress in American foreign policy during recent months. Finally, he introduced the topic of Spain, pointing to the problems that would arise following the death of the Caudillo. In conclusion Mr. Kirk suggested that one of the main points that could usefully be discussed in the general debate was that of the role of the U.S. Congress in determining American foreign policy.

CSCE SUMMIT OPPOSED

Mr. Findley introduced his paper on: "Political developments in United States/European relations since September 1974," (see below, p. 10). Referring to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe he opposed the holding of a summit phase in view of the very scant results obtained in the conference so far. Nonetheless, the conference had provided NATO with an opportunity, which it had successfully taken, of exercising allied consultation and coordination. On the other hand the holding of a NATO summit during the spring of 1975 could be useful, if it considered substantive matters and were not just held to prepare a European security conference summit. As far as the Mediterranean was concerned, Mr. Rosenthal might perhaps explain his position concerning the congressional attitude to arms supplies to Turkey. In his view, NATO countries should do more to coordinate their attitude to the Middle East and to the problems of the Mediterranean which affected the Alliance directly. He emphasized President Ford's continuing interest in NATO and pointed to his long voting record in favor of the Alliance and in favor of the development of new weapons systems.

Turning to Southeast Asia, he noted that some European countries were starting to question the U.S. commitment to the defense of Western Europe in the light of recent events in Vietnam. In his view a firm show of U.S. policy concerning NATO was required. He believed that both the administration and Congress con1 See pp. 5 and 10.

sidered the maintenance of NATO to be a prime objective of U.S. foreign policy. In his view feelings in the House of Representatives were not anti-NATO. Any pressures for troop reductions were based purely on financial and burden-sharing motives and not on political ones. It should be remembered that every U.S. citizen spent $1 a day in taxes on defense.

In the purely military field NATO needed a new strategy. NATO was dangerously preoccupied by questions of troop and tank levels. It should move away from this preoccupation in order to examine the opportunities provided by new weapons and technology. Rather than concentrating exclusively on MBFR, NATO countries should negotiate between themselves the levels of forces and weapons they considered necessary for their defense. If these levels involved reductions, the Warsaw Pact might well be interested in making comparable reductions on its side. He hoped that NATO would agree to a 5-year compact concerning force levels and weapons as proposed in his report.

U.S. WAR POWERS LEGISLATION

Mr. Ryan said that the concern of the United States to help countries which were attacked by an aggressor was the basis for NATO and for past U.S. intervention in South Korea and later South Vietnam. It should be remembered that under new war powers legislation the President of the United States had only 60 days in which to operate any American military involvement in a conflict situation before Congress was required to decide whether it supported or vetoed such action. This could lead to a very dangerous situation.

The younger generation in the United States did not remember the Second World War and it was not very concerned about the lessons that the older generations had learned during the War. In his view the U.S. Government could often spend money more profitably in increasing much needed food resources and in developing marginal or desert land into farming land than spending on defense. Fighting world hunger was a top priority. The United States could help the world's problems by making a greater food effort more perhaps than by military means. This would not mean that it was isolationist.

Mr. Jahn expressed his agreement with the analysis made by Mr. Kirk of CSCE and MBFR. He recalled that in the recent debate on CSCE in the European Parliament the conclusion had been that CSCE had not produced the results that had been hoped for by the West. It should be emphasized that the Nine had been extremely successful in concerting their policies in all three committees of CSCE. Much more needed to be achieved before a third stage summit was held. Europeans had been deeply concerned about recent events in Vietnam and Cambodia and deeply concerned also by Soviet rearmament over the past 2 to 3 years. As far as the Mediterranean and Middle East was concerned, there had been European anxiety about the U.S. congressional role over arms supplies to Turkey. This led to worries about Turkey's future relationship with NATO. It could be dangerous to weaken further NATO in the Mediterranean area. He did not agree with Mr. Findley's 5-year compact. He concluded by stressing the need to maintain the North Atlantic Alliance and the U.S. military presence in Western Europe.

CSCE SUMMIT A CERTAINTY

Mr. Radoux recalled that CSCE had its origins in the 1967 Karlovy Vary Declaration of the Warsaw Pact which set out 14 specific points as being the aim of the Eastern European countries concerning a security conference. One of the main points was the recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe. In exchange, the possibility of peacefully changing frontiers was a sine qua non for the West. Whatever people might think about the desirability of a third summit phase of CSCE, such a summit would certainly be held. This was clear from recent bilateral and multilateral communiques. There would inevitably be some kind of followup to CSCE, institutionalized or not. He personally would prefer some form of conventional followup in a permanent and institutionalized form. The West should not make the mistake of washing its hands of CSCE leaving many problems unsolved and many potential contacts undeveloped. He made a plea for the United States not to change its policy toward Europe. If the United States were to weaken its commitment to Western Europe the balance between communism and freedom in the world would suffer.

As far as Mr. Findley's West-West negotiations on arms levels were concerned, he was not convinced, particularly since we were already involved in a commit

ment to MBFR. He concluded by making a formal proposal to the Chair and to the two delegations that in the future an extra day should be added to the meetings held in Europe which would enable the American delegates to meet together with European party political leaders, who could be invited to come to the town where the meeting was held.

Mr. Cousté said that he would note this most interesting suggestion which should be discussed between members of the two delegations.

ATTITUDES OF THE YOUNG

Mr. Fraser said that he welcomed Mr. Radoux's proposal about an extra day on the program, This idea would have to be examined by members of the delegations. He concentrated, first, on the attitude of young people in the United States as analysed by Harris, the well known pollster, Harris tried to demonstrate that young people were interested in an overseas commitment by the United States, but in a humanistic not a military way. Young people opposed the U.S. Government supporting juntas or dictatorships or repressive governments. This attitude should be borne in mind when politicians had to explain and defend the meaning of the NATO alliance. It was not possible to tell, as yet, how the new Congress would vote on force reductions. About a quarter of the Members of the House of Representatives were new. If Congress insisted on force reductions it could well call for cuts in Okinawa and in the Pacific rather than in Europe. As far as the U.S. commitment to European defense was concerned, whereas the countries of Southeast Asia were only of "marginal importance in the balance of power" Western Europe was of course central to the power balance. Finally, referring to the congressional role in foreign policy, it would be difficult for the United States to achieve a coherent policy in the present political situation until the beginning of 1977 following the Presidential and congressional elections.

ECONOMIC BASIS OF NATO

Mr. Lange observed that he hoped that there would not be a totally negative situation in U.S. policy and in the U.S. world role until the beginning of 1977. Congress must maintain its traditional attitude to Europe until the new Presidential and congressional elections. Congressmen had the responsibility not to put NATO in jeopardy. More than ever before we had to concentrate on the economic basis of the alliance. If it were not possible to safeguard the economie basis of the alliance, NATO could not last. As far as Mr. Findley's proposed compact was concerned, a fruitless "Year of Europe" should not be followed by an even more fruitless "Atlantic Year." If article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty were to be given some real meaning, action had to be taken on both sides of the Atlantic. The NATO Council should be encouraged to do something about this. It had never done so up till now. As far as force reduction negotiations were concerned, the West should insure that it should maintain its striking capability during the course of the MBFR negotiations. West-West negotiations could usefully be held on this point outside MBFR, as Mr. Findley had suggested, but overall the NATO partners had to maintain their military strength vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact.

UNDERSTANDING SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. Gibbons referred to the uneasiness expressed by the European members concerning the implications of recent events in Southeast Asia. It just had to be recognized that Southeast Asia could not be rebuilt in the image of the United States or of Europe. The American attempt to do this in Southeast Asia had failed. He hoped that Congress would not act irresponsibly over U.S. force levels in Europe. Europe was the first line of defense of the United States. But it had to be admitted that it was difficult to rally popular support, in the States, for maintaining the American military commitment to Europe. Europe itself could help. For instance if France were to return to NATO this would be a very useful step. Standardization of equipment was an urgent priority in the alliance.

Mr. Rosenthal said that the motives which led Congress to consider legislation cutting troop levels resulted from the past situation in which it was only through measures of this kind that Congress was able to change U.S. foreign policy commitments. This provided a mechanism to force the hand of the administration. Under the new political circumstances, and in the light of the conclusion of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, Congress might exert more direct influence on the White House and the administration in foreign policy, in which case it could feel less need to use backdoor mechanisms such as forcing force reductions.

NEW U.S. FORCE POSTURE

Mr. Findley said that the United States was already developing a new force posture in Europe. Before 1976 there would be two new U.S. combat brigades stationed in Europe. Replying to Mr. Radoux on MBFR he said that the United States hoped to achieve agreement with the U.S.S.R. on onsite inspection but there had been no indication of Soviet readiness to accept onsite controls so far. Mr. Lagorce, replying to Mr. Gibbons on the French relationship to NATO said that the French Parliament had reproached the French Government, only last week, in a debate, for what seemed to it to be French reintegration into NATO. The government had denied this. Thus France's attitude to NATO was still far from clear. On Southeast Asia, did Chairman Mao really want to take over Taiwan? What would be the United States reaction to such a move? Would the United States intervene militarily to help Taiwan?

Mr. Ryan said that there had been a significant change in the attitude of Americans concerning their overseas commitments. They were now starting to realize that the European Community was responsible for 40 percent of world trade. This had political and military implications. The United States did not see itself now as the world power it had considered itself 10 years ago. The European Community was now seen as being a major force in world politics. If there were a new military conflict in Korea, people in California would not necessarily support U.S. involvement in a land war there.

UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN

Mr. Fraser, replying to the point made by Mr. Lagorce on Taiwan, considered that the United States probably would intervene if there were an attempt by mainland China to take over Taiwan. The United States had a mutual security pact with Taiwan. It was probable, however, that U.S. military intervention would take the form of naval and air commitments only. Unfortunately the Nationalist Government of Taiwan did not really represent the people of Taiwan. The U.S. Congress would feel happier if the Taiwan people had a genuine voice of their own in the government of Taiwan.

Mr. Cousté concluded the debate, thanking all those who had taken part in the discussion. Adding to what Mr. Lagorce had said on France's attitude to NATO he assured both delegations that France would not make a smaller contribution to European defense in the future than it had in the past.

SOME POLITICAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES/EUROPEAN

RELATIONS

Paper by Peter Kirk

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INTRODUCTION

1. I have been asked to submit a discussion paper dealing with: political developments within the European Communities; East-West relations; security problems; and Spain.

2. As far as the community is concerned this paper touches on the two Summit meetings of the Heads of Government of the Nine held since the last Washington meeting of our two delegations in the fall of 1974. It also looks briefly at the question of renegotiation and the forthcoming referendum in Britain. The section on East-West relations discusses two current negotiations-the conference on security and cooperation in Europe and the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations. A short chapter raises some security questions, and finally there are some brief remarks on Spain. In a paper of this kind it does not seem necessary to set out conclusions.

II

DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

(A) THE PARIS AND DUBLIN SUMMITS

3. Since our two delegations last met in Washington in the fall of 1974 the main developments within the European Community have been the Paris Summit of December 1974 and the Dublin Summit of March 1975, on the one hand, and the conclusion of the "renegotiation" on the other. First the summits.

4. The main interest of the Paris Summit was the long-awaited agreement to activate the regional fund under which the less prosperous areas in the community will receive community aid in support of national regional development programs.

5. At Paris it was also decided that summit meetings of heads of government would be held regularly three times a year. This decision crystallises a highly significant institutional development of the Council of Ministers, since it brings into being what is in effect a new community instituton-a kind of "SuperCouncil", commonly known as the European Council. It is hoped that this "Super-Council" will help to break the logjam in the community decisionmaking process, but it poses major problems of institutional balance and of political accountability. The European Parliament is already actively studying the political and institutional implications of this development.

6. Also at Paris a major concession was made by the Eight to the British Government in its "renegotiation" of its terms of membership of EEC. This took the form of agreement to introduce a "correcting mechanism" by which no member country of the community would be obliged to make a greater financial contribution to the community budget than was fair.

7. The Dublin Summit of Heads of Government was held in March 1975. This summit was essentially about "renegotiation". At the summit the last outstanding points involved in "renegotiation" were settled and the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, returned from the summit to recommend continued membership of EEC to his Cabinet and then to the British Parliament.

(B) RENEGOTIATION

8. The renegotiation exercise itself has now been completed and, as already mentioned, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, has recommended that