INSPECTION OF VIETNAMESE REFUGEE CAMPS ON GUAM-AUGUST 4, 1975

En route to the Philippines, the delegation stopped in Guam to make an inspection of the current progress in the resettlement program.

In addition to inspection of the camps, it provided a unique opportunity to discuss first-hand the conditions which surrounded the downfall of South Vietnam and the refugees' expectations for the future.

Retired General James A. Herbert who heads the entire refugee program briefed the delegation on current progress on resettlement and problems surrounding the return of the repatriates. It was his opinion that the refugees could be relocated by December 1975.

In general, the camp facilities, while primitive by our standards were clean, livable and provided most adequate surroundings during the refugees' transitional period.

During a visit to the repatriate campe we interviewed some of the 1,500 Vietnamese who wish to return to their homeland.

When asked why they desired to return to South Vietnam, we were told that they were homesick and wished to be reunited with their families. It was obvious that most of them had panicked during the evacuation out of fear for their safety and well-being.

A most confusing situation exists over who is to blame for the delay in returning the repatriates to their homeland. Many of the Vietnamese felt that the American government was deliberately preventing their return. Most of them refused to believe that the new government in South Vietnam was responsible for the difficulty and refused to accept them.

The official response by our government is that the authorities in South Vietnam have thus far not been receptive to the acceptance of the repatriates. The issue is distorted by the refusal of the PRC to either communicate with us regarding repatriation or even to indicate a willingness to accept their people back.

U.S. has committed itself to providing transportation for those desiring repatriation and will continue to provide basic subsistence until arrangements with the new government can be agreed upon.

We were informed that a number of disturbances had occurred, some of them violent. Just prior to our departure, a large number of repatriates gathered to demonstrate holding posters and banners stating their desire to return home. They made it clear to us that the protests would continue until they are allowed to leave. Although the demonstration was peaceful, it proved how intense their desire to return to their homeland.

In these discussions it was first revealed that 13 repatriates were illegally drugged and forced to evacuate to Guam against their will by retreating American forces. According to statements made by the 13 refugees during our inspection, they had fled to Thailand during the evacuation of Vietnam, but changed their minds and asked to be returned to their homeland. Allegedly, they were threatened by military forces who insisted that they flee to Guam. Refusing to submit, the Vietnamese were drugged and evacuated against their will. We were unable to confirm the validity of these accusations at that time but a request for investigation by the authorities was made.

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APPENDIX 4

MATERIAL RELATING TO STUDY MISSION FROM GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

A. Letter From Philippine Ambassador to Congressman Lester L. Wolff

Hon. LESTER WOLFF,

U.S. House of Representatives,

Washington, D.C.

WASHINGTON, D.C., August 19, 1975.

SIR: In compliance with the instructions of President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy each of:

1. The remarks of President Marcos delivered before your congressional group when you visited with him in Manila on August 5, 1975, and

2. An Aide Memoire prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila which outlines the matters taken up during the question-and-answer period which followed President Marcos' remarks.

With warm regards.

Sincerely yours,

EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ,

Ambassador.

B. Remarks of President Ferdinand E. Marcos During the Luncheon in Honor of the U.S. Congressmen, State Dining Room, August 5, 1975

Because of the unusual circumstances beyond my control in the Philippines, I seldom have the opportunity to address members of the United States Congress such as the distinguished group we have with us today. I think I will open the discussion with a statement and then request the chairman, Congressman Lester Wolff, to respond later before the questions are asked.

First of all, allow me to extend formally to you the greetings of the Republic of the Philippines and our people, as well as mine personally. Also, I wish to express my regrets that the First Lady is not here. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, like many of the older generation, know how to make the younger generation work. So she is out representing the country on the 150th anniversary of the independence of Bolivia. She is bound for other countries in South America and I presume she will also visit the United States.

Needless to say, I am very happy to be able to meet with the members of Congress, especially since this group represents committees which have to do with what is of utmost and vital concern to every leader in Asia-and that is American policy in Asia.

The impression conveyed to many countries is that the series of events in Indochina has triggered changes in the policies of the countries of Asia and especially of the Philippines which happens to be in the vortex of these profound and far-reaching changes. Indeed, the realities in this part of the world have altered.

However, let me state that the negotiations between our two countries on security and the military bases in particular, as well as on economic relations, started many years ago. When I first became President, renegotiations were already in progress. In fact, former Secretary of Foreign Affairs Narciso Ramos met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk on my state visit to the United States in September 1966, and this led to the signing of an amendment to the security arrangements between the Philippines and the United States.

Our mutual security arrangements are governed by three treaties. These are the military bases agreement, the mutual defense pact and the military assistance pact. The military bases agreement is receiving great emphasis today because of the fact that Thailand and the Philippines seem to be following a parallel course. This course has been interpreted that we want, as in that old ery, the Yankee to go home. "We don't need you. We don't want you."

I don't need to say that this is not an accurate reflection of the position of the Philippines, the Filipino people, its political leadership and myself, personally. I did tell Congressman Wolff that perhaps it is necessary for me to repeat what I have stated in the past to the distinguished American ambassador to the Philippines, Ambassador Sullivan; to the Assistant Secretary of State, Secretary Habib; and to Admiral Gaylor when he came here.

Admiral Gaylor, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific, impressed us with his view that if there is stability in our region, the Southeast Asian region, it is because of the fact that American forces are here in the Western Pacific. He felt strongly that whatever happens America should be allowed to play this role of a countervailing force, at the very least, against any other Power which may tilt the delicate balance of forces in Asia. He believed that this equilibrium has been the basis of peace and stability in the region.

We accept this thesis.

But before this, American leaders were alarmed by the statement that we had asked for the removal of American bases in the Philippines, more specifically the two principal bases, Clark Air Force Base, which is the home base of the 13th U.S. Air Force; and Subic Naval Base, the home base of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

The statements that were issued from the Philippine Government were to the effect that now it is time for the Philippines to control these bases. Unfortunately, this is only half of the story. What was not reported was the position of the Philippines with respect to the continuance of the use of these facilities by American forces.

It has always been our position that the developments in South Vietnam, in the rest of Indochina, and in Southeast Asia indicate one thing, and that is, a strong revival of nationalism. However you may view it, it is a force that cannot be discounted and indeed has to be heeded.

As I had indicated to various American representatives who had seen me previously, I feel that before this force pushes us into an untenable situation and when I say us, I mean both the American and Philippine leadership-a situation in which the Philippines begins to look like a puppet of America and therefore, incapable of articulating and reflecting the popular sentiments of our people, it would be a compelling necessity for us to take steps to reassure the world that the Philippines is in full control of its territory and is independent, and thus properly represents the popular sentiments of the Filipino people.

The Vietnam debacle has a lesson which is important to all Asians, and that is, if peoples can not depend on themselves, no power on earth can give them the strength of will and initiative not only to protect themselves but to help their allies. We would be useless to America if we ended up as another South Vietnam.

Another lesson is that no army, no armed force in the world is as powerful as an idea that has come of age. And this idea many countries are now demonstrating to the world-their capability to stand on their own, and acquiring dignity and respect for themselves. In so doing, we also deprive the enemies of our administrations, of our regimes, of the democratic ideal itself, of the false weapons which allege puppetry and dependence in their efforts to weaken the political leadership. It became necessary therefore, as I have repeatedly said, to demonstrate to the world that we are in full control of our territory. This being the case, it means that the Philippines, in granting the American people the facilities to maintain their present positions in the sea lanes and the air lanes in the Western Pacific would do so voluntarily and in full recognition of the urgent need to maintain the present balance and equilibrium among the world powers and create the strong foundation for peace and stability in the area.

This I would emphasize once more. As a sovereign nation, the Philippines will grant you what it believes necessary to the maintenance of the stability of Asia and the Western Pacific, and we would do this out of our own volition because it is in our common interest and not because we are pressured against our will.

What had been repeatedly stated was that we were driving the Americans out. The more important element was left out. What was not reported was that we have offered to America the facilities it may need, that the offer is made, and we offer it as an independent, dignified country and people.

We accept and recognize the thesis that every country has a responsibility for world peace. In our own small way, in our own modest way, we are prepared to contribute to world peace. If this requires giving to America the facilities needed to maintain the equilibrium of forces in Asia, then I repeat to you— the policy makers of America, the American foreign policy makers specificallythat the Philippines will be ready to extend to the United States the facilities it may require.

I repeat, however, that in the same way, we understand you, we hope that you will understand us. We fought as your allies in wars past. The reason we are in such a state, economically, was because in the last World War we fought a common enemy to the bitter end. Perhaps we are the only country which had an effective underground against Japan in Asia, not including those in the Asian Mainland. But in Southeast Asia the Philippines suffered one million casualties. Manila suffered destruction second only to Warsaw, according to General Eisenhower, when he passed through Manila on his way back to the States. And notwithstanding the devastation, the collapse of our economy, since we had agreed that independence would follow in 1946 we pushed through this project of independence. And your flag you voluntarily hauled down and we became the first independent Republic in the whole world after the Second World War. In short, America made untenable the colonial system throughout the world because of the Philippine example.

And immediately thereafter, we fought a full-blown Communist rebellion. Many of us who fought in the last World War had to go back to the colors because, as always after a war, the younger men returned to civilian positions, and the older professional soldiers took over. But the younger men had been the frontline leaders, the men who knew the mountains and the jungles. The older people were incapable of pushing the communists from the plains towards the mountains and from the mountains out of the country. It was necessary for the younger people to go back. And so we fought.

You have heard of what happened when the younger members of Congressand as I look around me I see that the younger members of the Congress of the United States seem to be around and engaged in the same thing-the younger members of the Philippine Congress to which I belong (I was chairman of the Novato bloc)-the young members insisted on a reorganization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. We asked for a change of the Secretary of National Defense. We asked for the younger officers to be held responsible for the fighting in the provincial areas, in the zones, in the mountains, and we ourselves went back to the mountains where we had our guerrilla and underground headquarters. We fought on, and in the cold war we took sides with you. We were on your side everytime that there was a crisis, whether it was in the deliberations in the United Nations or in actual armed combat in Korea. You went into Korea and you asked for our support. We went into Korea notwithstanding the fact that we were fighting our own war here in the Philippines. And when you needed support too in Vietnam, when your distinguished President indicated that there was need that we show that America was not alone, I called a meeting of all the states who were interested in Vietnam, here, right here in this State Dining Room, and we met. Of course we sent our troops in Vietnam.

When you changed position we changed position too and we pulled back our troops. In short, whether fortunately or unfortunately, we have been branded as following your line and more and more we were under attack not only from our neighbor countries but under attack by our own people. That they were attacking us as an independent race, as an independent nation. Slowly we were becoming useless to you as an ally. I presume that many of the things which would be considered as an advantage in having the Philippines as an ally is that we have entered into Asian political circles. We were slowly losing this qualification. Distrust was being sown among our neighbor countries, not because we were supporting America but because we were a puppet and that therefore our voice was

not the voice of an independent thinker and operator but the voice of America. And rather than talk to us, they talked to America.

And therefore it is my proposition that it is to the advantage of both countries, the United States and the Philippines, that we now adopt this position that I have proposed-and that is that the military bases of the United States in the Philippines be under the control of the Philippines but that the facilities that you need, that America needs in order to maintain its position in the Western Pacific, sea and air lanes, be placed at your disposal voluntarily by the Philippines at the proper negotiations with your government. We are in the middle of negotiations now and the two panels are due to meet.

There are some questions which your Chief of Staff and your defense people have asked us and we are moving to answer them in detail and as specifically

as we can.

But I wanted you, the policy-makers of America to know that our hearts are on your side, that we are sincere when we say that we have fought with you, we have died beside you, we have bled with you in many a battlefield, and we believe in the same principle that you believe in. And that when it comes to the ultimate reckoning you will find the Filipinos your staunchest ally. I say this as one who knows the Filipino and who fought beside the American soldiers for four years.

It is therefore necessary to look into whatever your ties there may be between our two countries. I presume that when you come to us you want to know what our reactions are to existing American policies. Let me outline some of the basic principles that guide us in our present policy.

There are three basic problems that confront countries like the Philippines today. They are the establishment of truly independent, self-reliant and viable societies among the small and independent countries in Southeast Asia. That sounds simple, but it is our principal problem. For security is but the other side of economic development; our principal problem still is internal subversion. We expect there will be no external attack from any other country outside of the Philippines in the next five or ten years, but we know that within that same period we will be threatened if our society does not modernize, does not reform and does not grant to every citizen a minimum of his aspirations, his dreams, his ideals.

The second problem is the development of the spirit of interdependence among the nations here in Southeast Asia. Having been colonized by different countries-England, Spain and the United States, the Dutch, the French-our basic affinities were obscured; instead distrust arose among the small nations of Southeast Asia. The lines between Manila and Washington were clearer and certainly faster than the lines between here and Kuala Lumpur, between here and Jakarta, between here and Rangoon. The same thing is true the other way around. You go to Jakarta; they are closer to the Dutch than to the Philippines. This is, fortunately, no longer true, because we now know the meaning of interdependence. And this interdependence is necessary because there are many objectives-national objectives-that can only be attained by cooperative action among the small nations of this area.

The third is how to make accommodations gracefully with the realities of the post-Vietnam period. These are realities; we cannot change them. Many of us, or some of us, began to reassess our positions.

Some people feel that the recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was a result of the Indochinese experience. This is not so. We had scheduled the normalization of relations between our two countries, the People's Republic of China and the Philippines, a long time ago. We have been studying this problem since 1967 and 1968. We are due to normalize relations with Soviet Russia. We are diversifying our markets and our contacts as we are diversifying our economy.

As we do so, as we open our windows and our doors to the Socialist countries, again I am concerned that the instant critics or observers may claim, as they have claimed, that this means that we are discarding our friends, our old dependable friends.

I hasten to add that this is not so. On the contrary we are trying to strengthen the ties with the United States and, at the same time, of course strengthen the ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for the reasons I have already stated. Interdependence is necessary if we are to survive in Southeast Asia. Self-reliance is still the key word and the foundation of all our plans.