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The cliché "Korea is a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan," has certainly surfaced again in the minds of the Japanese. The Japanese make it clear that they are counting on the United States to keep peace in Korea. It does appear Japan would be willing to undertake new diplomatic initiatives to obtain peace. Foreign Minister Miyazawa explained that Prime Minister Miki is of the opinion that contact with North Korea must be developed if a long-term solution to tensions on the Korean Peninsula is to be possible. Though he doubts Japan could play a productive role alone, it might be able to join others.

An aspect of our relationship with Japan that cannot be overlooked is the importance of economic cooperation. On the question of energy, Prime Minister Miki stressed the importance of avoiding another outbreak of war in the Middle East. He believes that the Middle East conflict and oil are inseparable as an issue.

Prime Minister Miki outlined three areas of United States-Japan cooperation in the field of energy: (1) exploration of new sources of oil; (2) expansion of research and development for new sources of energy; (3) and improvement of conservation measures. He urged that both countries mobilize greater financial and manpower resources in support of the research and development program. It should be noted that Japan imports 99 percent of their oil with 75 percent coming from the Middle East.

On the question of terrorism, Prime Minister Miki condemned such incidents which recently occurred in Kuala Lumpur in which 5 Japanese Red Army guerrillas seized 50 hostages and obtained the release of 5 radicals from Japanese prisons. He felt that efforts should be made to conclude an international convention denying safe haven by any country to terrorists. He suggested that discussions regarding this proposal might best be undertaken with the United Nations.

In response to this serious problem I am introducing a measure stating that it is the sense of the Congress that the President actively seek an international convention which has as its goal a multilateral treaty to deny sanctuary to international terrorists. One of the purposes of my legislation is to show the strong support of the U.S. Congress for such a treaty.

In our meetings one point surfaced that is important. Japanese leaders' efforts to avert an outbreak of war between North and South Korea and support for United States backing of Korea is in part due to the fear that North Korea will attempt to "take out" (destroy) U.S. bases and aircraft in Japan if a war erupts and thus Japan would immediately be drawn into the war. It is felt North Korea remembering that the role of American aid saved South Korea originally from total destruction would attack Japan to neutralize our airpower.

INDIVIDUAL REPORTS BY OTHER MEMBERS OF STUDY MISSION

REPORT OF HON. GUS YATRON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

One of the most outstanding points about the study mission findings, for me, was the universal agreement about the need for continued American presence in Indochina and Korea. In our conversations with officials from Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, I felt that confirmation was repeatedly given concerning the need for our country to provide material and moral assistance to these nations, whose internal affairs have been strained by world economic problems, and the psychological aftermath of Vietnam.

While American aid and support were sought, however, I believe it is important to recognize, from our dialogs, that both the form and the intent of that aid must be modified. Simply stated, it was my strong impression that the United States must "sensitize" its foreign policy in the future, to ensure that national pride and integrity are not sacrificed. Too often in the past, we have taken a great white father or big brother posture with smaller nations, humiliating them by giving handouts instead of real help, or by attaching demands on our assistance. Future foreign policy, I was made to understand, might benefit from a more constructive and gentle approach.

A particular point in this respect was a conversation with President Marcos of the Philippines, who noted that the United States might consider allowing more liberal trade arrangements in the future rather than giving funds outright, or providing low-interest loans. President Marcos pointed out that American import duties on Philippine wood are restrictively high, a factor which hinders their economic development. This is just one example of many similar comments I heard from Asian leaders. They are perhaps obvious suggestions, but ones we have not considered enough.

The question of American policy in South Korea is one of most delicate and complex we encountered during the Asian mission. Again, I received a definite impression-perhaps I should say convictionthat U.S. presence in South Korea is essential now and in the foreseeable future. Through meetings with U.S. General Stilwell and President Park, it was clear that the Republic of Korea is calling for American steadfastness, in the face of continued belligerence on the part of North Korea.

I speak of the delicacy and complexity of the situation in Korea because I feel that it differs from the other Asian nations we visited. More so than in the others, I felt that the needs for the psychological support of American presence in Korea was great. While the current military and political situation remains so unstable, it would seem unwise for the United States to make a unilateral withdrawal, leaving

the tensions between North and South unresolved and perhaps worsened by this negative action on our part.

In speaking with General Stilwell, I asked the question of whether or not he could project some timetable according to which South Korea would be strong enough to deter northern aggression. His firm response was that the question was dependent upon political developments, i.e., that the military strength could not be calculated apart from the political at this time, and that more stability was a prerequisite for any improvement. The stability, I believe, must come from us. General Stilwell also made the point that he personally advocates general military assistance to South Korea, if not in the form of ground forces, at least in the form of naval and air forces.

It was my feeling, from speaking with Korean leaders, that a graqual understanding between North and South, through means of a quid pro quo arrangement, might be the most realistic at this time. in this way, perhaps American troops could be reduced as tensions abated between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Should you wish to have more information on my reactions, please let me know and I will be very glad to provide whatever answers I can. Again, thank you for giving me an opportunity to outline these thoughts on the August Asian study mission.

REPORT OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Traveling throughout Asia in August is a little bit like going to a sauna in Death Valley at high noon. But the heat and humidity notwithstanding, I felt that the mission was a highly productive one in terms of giving us a better understanding of the problems and politics of the Far East.

Now that the war in Vietnam is over, I think it is necessary to take a close look at the situation in the western Pacific precisely because of the need to avoid another Vietnam in the future. Too often in the past our foreign policy has been shaped by events rather than events by our foreign policy. And the fact is that while the insurgency in Indochina has ended, the prospects for peace in the Far East are by no means assured.

The Korean situation, in particular, is a tense one. With 42,000 American troops still in South Korea, the hard fact is that the possibility for a new American involvement in a war on the Asian mainland remains high.

In an effort to determine what needs to be done to prevent both the outbreak of war in Asia, as well as American participation in such a conflict should it begin, we met at length with President Marcos of the Philippines, President Suharto of Indochina, President Park of South Korea, Prime Minister Miki of Japan and a wide variety of other public officials and private citizens in each of the countries we visited. I came away from these talks convinced that we must change our policy concerning Korea lest we inadvertently get involved in another war on the Asian mainland-a war which could have catastrophic consequences not only for Korea but for our own country as well.

Under present circumstances, it would probably be impossible for South Korea to successfully stave off a North Korean invasion without substantial American air support and logistical assistance. The ROK Army has only a few weeks of ammunition in reserve. Its Air Force is substantially inferior to the North's in both planes and personnel. And its coastal defense is largely dependent on our own naval capacity in the surrounding seas.

This military imbalance is due to the fact that the North Koreans have spent more than twice as much on their military budget as South Korea since the early 1960's. The government in Seoul, content to rely on the American defense commitment, saw no need to divert its resources from economic development to military preparedness. Now that the Thieu regime in Vietnam has fallen, however, the South Koreans have had second thoughts about the wisdom of relying so heavily on the United States for their own defense, and they are determined to develop, as soon as possible, the military capacity to thwart a potential invasion from the North on their own.

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In view of the fact that South Korea has more than twice the population of North Korea, and a much greater gross national product. there is no reason why the South Koreans shouldn't be able to defend themselves, if they are attacked by the North, without the active assistance of our own Armed Forces. Indeed, the South Koreans presently have 50 percent more men under arms than the North Koreanswhich means, as President Park told us himself, there should be no need for American ground forces to come to their defense if war does break out.

I believe, therefore, that we should begin the process of withdrawing our troops from South Korea. We should also move the 2d Division south of Seoul. Right now, the 25,000 American troops which comprise this fighting force are right near the frontline north of Seoul, and they almost necessarily would be engaged in hostilities in the event of a surprise attack. Unless they are pulled back from their present position, there will continue to be a real possibility that we could get enmeshed in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula in the same way that we were in Vietnam. At the same time, I also think we should accelerate the modernization of South Korea's air and armored capacityareas where the North does have a substantial advantage over the South-in order to enable them not only to effectively deter an attack but to successfully resist it if it should come anyway.

This is an important point because the real key to our foreign policy in the Far East lies not so much with Korea as with Japan. It is, in the final analysis, our relationship with Japan which provides the basis for stability in Asia. Japan, after all, has the third largest economy in the world and its willingness to forgo an extensive rearmament in exchange for a mutual security treaty with the United States has contributed significantly to a reduction of tensions in the Far East. Should Japan lose faith in the credibility of the American defense commitment-which it probably would if South Korea were overwhelmed by North Korea--it would be strongly tempted to rearm and possibly even to develop a nuclear capacity as well.

Such a development would have a tremendously destabilizing effect on the existing equilibrium in the western Pacific. It would create consternation throughout Southeast Asia where there are still bitter memories of the Japanese occupation during World War II. Both China and the Soviet Union would probably feel obligated to increase their own defense budgets thereby forcing us to increase ours as well. Perhaps worst of all, it would make it even more difficult to put the genie of nuclear proliferation back in the bottle of nuclear control. Indeed, if Japan really lost faith in the American alliance, it is even possible that it might, at some point in the future, seek to make common cause with China or Russia. Needless to say, were the economic might of Japan harnessed to the population of China or the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union, it would have seriously adverse consequences for the balance of power throughout the world.

To the extent that Japan views "the security of South Korea as essential to the security of Japan," as Prime Minister Miki told us when we saw him in Tokyo, it is important to prevent an outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula. There is reason to believe, however, that the most serious threat to South Korea may be from an insur

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