PAPERS

THE EUROPEAN SCENE IN THE YEAR AFTER HELSINKI

Paper by Hans Edgar Jahn

I. INTRODUCTION

1. First of all Congressman Johnson and Congressman Karth are to be warmly thanked for preparing two stimulating papers, for discussion in Dublin, both with the same title: "Is détente dead?"

2. In the light of the reassessment of East-West relations which has been under way at the governmental, parliamentary and media levels in most recent months, it is hoped that the form adopted by your draftsman for this paper will help to stimulate a lively debate. Following the introduction there is, first, a section of brief comments on some of the outstanding developments in East-West relations over the past few months. Next there is a brief Conclusion setting out some personal views of your draftsman. Finally, Appendix I is a section on some current Western views on détente.

II. SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

A. Followup to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 3. What practical results have come out of the CSCE since the Summit held at Helsinki in August of last year?

4. As far as military manoeuvres are concerned (a point covered by Committee I of CSCE), 21 days notice was given, in accordance with the agreement at Helsinki, by the Soviet Union to NATO and other Western Governments of Soviet Army and air maneuvers held near the Turkish frontier in January 1976. Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia took up the invitation addressed to them by the Soviet Union to send observers to these military manoeuvres. No notice was given by the Soviet Union of its autumn manoeuvres held late last year, though these may have been arranged in such a way that the exercises involved less than 25,000 men and did not take place within 250 kilometres of a frontier, in which case there was no breach of the Helsinki terms. It is interesting to note that, quoting the official texts of Helsinki, three members of the 1968 Czech Parliament signed an open letter to the Czech Federal Assembly on 25 November calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia and the extension of full human rights to all Czech citizens.

CSCE COMMITTEE II

5. As far as followup Committee H of CSCE is concerned, the Soviet Union has proposed, in statements made by Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko, the calling of a series of pan-European conferences on energy, transport and environmental problems. This proposal has been rejected by the United States Government. 6. There have been a number of developments concerning Committee III of CSCE, TASS declared in January that during 1976, 18 Western papers would go on sale in the USSR. Only time will tell how far this promise will become reality and who will be allowed to buy these papers. As far as foreign journalists are concerned, restrictions in Moscow on their activities have become less from 1 March of this year. They are now given about the same degree of freedom as diplomats (i.e., not very much). The Soviet Government has also confirmed a promise it made at Helsinki that journalists will be given multiple entry visas instead of having to apply for exit re-entry permits every time they leave and return to the USSR. In January TASS stated that rules governing exit permits from Russia for Soviet citizens had been simplified. It appears that the fee for exit permits has been reduced from 400 roubles to 300. But it seems that

applicants for exit permits are still liable to be dismissed from their jobs, thrown out of their homes, and subject to special surveillance by the political police.

7. It should be noted that a "review conference" on followup to CSCE will be held in Belgrade next year.

B. MBFR

8. Although the Western Governments involved in the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations at Vienna made a concession in December 1975 by offering to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Western Europe (out of a total of around 7,000) together with some Phantom aircraft and Pershing missiles, in exchange for the withdrawal of a Soviet tank army, thus responding to Soviet demands for the inclusion of air and nuclear forces in the Vienna talks, the negotiations have remained in deadlock. There is no compromise between the two sides on the cental point. This is that whereas the West insists that the reductions should be "balanced", that is that the final totals of forces on each side, in the reduction area, should be approximately the same, the Soviet Union rejects this approach, insisting that reductions should be made on a one-for-one basis, which would still leave the USSR and the Warsaw Pact with a considerable advantage over the NATO forces after cuts had been completed. Most Western observers feel that the West must continue to insist on its basic position in this respect, othewise the resulting ageement is bound to be a bad one, and a bad agreement would worsen rather than improve the existing situation.

9. Some, but far from all, Western military observers consider that the NATO offer to negotiate a reduction of tactical nuclear warheads stored in Western Europe was a grave error. They argue that it is primarily through the tactical nuclear deterrent that Western Europe can redress its conventional inferiority to the Soviet Union and that, therefore, whatever the technical reasons underlying the offer (age of warheads, over-sufficiency of stocks, etc.) this was a negotiating error.

C. The COMECON approach to the EEC

10. On 16 February Mr. Weiss, Deputy Prime Minister of East Germany and Vice-President of COMECON, visited Luxembourg and lodged the text of a draft ECC/COMECON agreement with the President-in-Office of the Council of the European Communities, Mr. Thorn. The text of the COMECON note has been summarised in the press (notably by the "Agence Europe") but has not been made available to members of the European Parliament by the Council or the Commission, so it is difficult to analyse the COMECON proposals or to comment on them.

11. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to raise a number of questions. First there is the important political and institutional question of whether the deposing of a note by COMECON with the President-in-Office of the Council respects the primary competence of the Commission in external relations. Following earlier soundings by Mr. Fedeyev, Secretary-General of COMECON, with the then Danish President-in-office of the Council, COMECON was informed, through the Danish Ambassador in Moscow, that any formal approach by COMECON to the Communities must be made to the Commission. It is essential, as far as members of the European Parliament are concerned, that it should be the Commission which should represent the Community in talks and negotiations with COMECON. If, as reported by the press the COMECON note proposes a trade agreement, including a most favoured nation clause, the abolition of barriers to trade and the prohibition of restrictions on imports and exports, negotiations could involve the granting of major concessions to the Soviet Union and its partners. The question then arises of whether purely economic and commercial concessions on the part of the Soviet Union would provide an adequate exchange for privileges granted by the Community? In particular, it might be asked whether the Western Governments involved should require parallel concessions in other fields, such as human rights and disarmament negotiations, before the EEC concedes rich trade prizes to COMECON? These are just a few of some of the questions which immediately spring to mind in this context.

D. Angola

12. As far as Western Europeans are concerned it is the events in Angola which have done most, in recent months, to create disillusionment and scepticism about détente. There is no need here to rehearse once again, the events which

led to the triumph of the MPLA. It is also too late, and therefore useless, to ask what the United States or Western Europe might or might not have done in Angola. But we must now face the question of the implications of Cuban military operations on the African mainland and the massive injection of Soviet arms. There have been hints and rumours of further Cuban intervention in Africa. Thus the communiqué of the meeting held at Conakry, capital of Guinea, on 14 March, between Fidel Castro and a number of African leaders warned that "the destiny of the people of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa” was involved in the Angolan struggle. The main question is how far the Soviet Union is willing, or even able, to restrain Castro in his African adventures. How can the West stop the USSR and Cuba from military intervention, direct or indirect, in Mozambique and Rhodesia if not South Africa?

13. Secretary of State Kissinger has stated that: "The United States will not accept further Cuban military intervention abroad." He has referred to the Soviet-backed Cuban operations in Angola as an "unacceptable precedent" and he has also stated that: "We cannot permit the Soviet Union or its surrogates to become the world's policeman." The British Government also warned Mr. Gromyko concerning Soviet intervention in Africa during the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to London at the end of March. Mr. Gromyko denied that the Soviet Union planned to intervene in Rhodesia or South-West Africa. "Do not believe in fairy tales about the Soviet Union having anything to do with Rhodesia or Namibia," Mr. Gromyko stated at a press conference. On the same occasion he added that a Moscow deal with the West on Angola was "in the making". But the acting Soviet representative to the United Nations Security Council, Mikhail Kharlamov, stated, on 31 March, that the USSR would continue to help all national and social liberation movements.

14. American and British warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union are fine, as declarations of intent. But declarations of intent must be translated into action to be effective. What sanctions can the US or Western Europe apply in this context?

E. Human freedoms

15. Although the specific follow-up to the work of the Cultural Committee (Basket III) of CSCE is discussed separately in this paper, the whole question of the rights of individuals within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe requires separate treatment. Indeed, as far as Western Europeans are concerned the histories of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov have probably influenced public opinion in its thinking about détente almost as much as Angola.

16. Views in Western Europe concerning Solzhenitsyn are very much divided on account of the fact that he has not only criticised Soviet repression of human rights, but also many aspects of Western European society, and particularly Western reactions-or lack of reactions-to actions of the Soviet régime. But Sakharov, also, although more moderately, has made it clear that he considers Western firmness essential for dealing with the USSR.

17. It is interesting to note that the dissident Soviet historian, Roy Medvedev, has criticised, from within the Soviet Union, the stance taken by Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov as reinforcing "the most reactionary circles, sentiments and institutions" in the Kremlin. Medvedev's views illustrate the diversity of opinion amongst Russian dissenters. He has been criticised, by other dissidents, for weakening their common effort, but he has rejected this criticism: "It is not for us who seek the truth to introduce self-criticism into our midst and forbid ourselves debate."

18. An important part of the significance of Solzhenitsyn lies in his historical works, which inform Soviet citizens, especially the younger generation, of many things about their country which they cannot have known before-especially the part played by Lenin and Stalin in setting the Soviet Union on a course of repression. It should be noted, however, that there have been many criticisms of what has been called Solzhenitsyn's "simplistic" approach to many complex Western problems and it has been suggested that he has not fully understood the pluralistic nature of Western society and its institutions.

19. Whatever one's personal views about the arguments of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov might be, there is no doubt that they have sparked off a fundamental and fascinating debate about the nature of Soviet Government and Communism, and the way in which the West should deal with Moscow and the Eastern European countries.

F. Security of Western Europe and the U.S. defense commitment

20. On 15 March the London "Times" published the conclusions of a study carried out by a senior officer at the NATO Defense College in Rome. The basic point of this study is that, in view of the imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact could result in Pact forces crossing the Rhine within 48 hours. The advance of Soviet forces could be so rapid, according to the Report, that NATO's 7000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe might never be used, in view of the probable delays in reaching a political decision to escalate Western defence to the nuclear level. Whereas some leading Western military specialists, notably General Steinhoff, have tended to confirm this analysis, other leading experts, including Dr. Christoph Bertram, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, have challenged this pessimistic conclusion as "pretending that the Soviets are ten feet tall, which they are not, and by emphasising only Soviet strengths and only Western weaknesses." Whatever the facts may be--and perhaps we are here dealing with hypotheses rather than with fact-the continuing Warsaw Pact military build-up and the great advantage given to Pact forces by the use of standardised equipment, provides in itself a good reason for serious reconsideration by members of the Alliance of their capability of holding a Warsaw Pact assault. This problem is, of course, especially important for Germany, particularly in view of the doubts that have been expressed, over the years, about the effectiveness of NATO's strategy of "forward defense". In the United States the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, has warned that if the West continues to allow its military strength to be eroded a situation could develop in which "our chief rival has the ability to threaten or intimidate much of the world, and in which we do not possess the capabilities to withstand that coercion."

21. Although the Europeans have been doing more to assume their fair share of the Western defense burden since the creation of the Eurogroup in 1968, it is clearly US Government decisions, whether these be at the conventional or nuclear level, on which the security of Western Europe will primarily depend in the event of Soviet aggression. Although even a small possibiilty of the West unleashing nuclear weapons in order to defend themselves might be sufficient to deter the USSR from attack, Western Europeans, on their side, will only feel secure if they can continue to believe in the full and immediate commitment of American armed might in the event of aggression. In particular Western Europeans need to be reassured about the timing of American decisions, especially the streamlining of the necessary procedures to release tactical nuclear weapons. It would be most interesting to have the views of American Congressmen concerning this point at the Dublin meeting.

G. The Sonnenfeldt doctrine

22. At the end of March the European press displayed considerable interest in the alleged remarks made by Secretary of State Kissinger's prominent adviser, Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, in London last December to the effect that the “inorganic, unnatural relationship" between the USSR and Eastern Europe, based on Soviet military might, threatens world peace and "so it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one." Mr. Sonnenfeldt is reported as having stated: "The Soviets' inability to acquire loyalty in Eastern Europe is an unfortunate historic failure because Eastern Europe is within their scope and area of natural interest. It is doubly tragic that in its area of natural interest and crucial importance it has not been possible for the Soviet Union to establish roots of interest that go beyond sheer power."

23. Mr. Kissinger has stated that Mr. Sonnenfeldt's briefing of U.S. Ambassadors to European countries has been misquoted. Mr. Ron Nessen, the White House Press Secretary, has said: "There is no 'Sonnenfeldt doctrine'. There is a Ford policy and that opposes Soviet domination of Eastern Europe."

24. Despite the back-pedalling from Washington, Mr. Sonnenfeldt's alleged thesis has caused grave disquiet in Western European political circles, particularly as regards its implications for countries such as Romania and Yugoslavia. 25. It would be most interesting to have the views of the U.S. Delegation on this point.