challenged any existing alliances. In view of Secretary Kissinger's complimentary statements regarding Social Democrats, he asked whether or not there was some kind of anti-Communist alliance between the U.S. and European Social Democrats. Mr. Fraser replied there is no reason to believe any such alliance existed, but that Americans were concerned as to whether the recent changes in French Communist Party doctrine were changes of expediency or not. He noted. that democratic freedoms had disappeared in countries where the Communist party was in control. Although the U.S. had criticized the French Communist Party it should be noted also that Moscow had criticized the French Communists. CHANGE THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS Mr. Corona (Italy) said that if the French and Italians wanted change they had the right to make changes through free elections. Mr. Faure (France) declared that the shared concept of liberty was the most important tie binding the Atlantic alliance together. The nonCommunist left in France wanted freedom and if the Communists were to break the commitment to freedom then the coalition of Communist and non-Communist left forces would collapse since liberty must be the foundation of the Atlantic alliance. Mr. Corterier (Germany) observed that the Communist Party made its greatest gains in countries where the governments had not. made enough social reforms. In West Germany, social reform had made Communist advances impossible. Mr. Pisoni (Italy) said that although the U.S. should judge whether or not a government was an acceptable ally, it might be counter productive for the U.S. to voice alarm at this early stage-in fact such statements of alarm could actually serve the purpose of the forces that the U.S. opposed. Questions from the American Delegation: DEVELOPMENT AID POLICIES 1. Does the Community believe that a closer coordination of U.S. and EEC development aid policies is possible, and, if so, by which mechanisms? Mr. Kavanagh (Ireland) recommended that at a future meeting a full session be devoted to this subject. The European Community would consider it useful to cooperate more closely with the U.S. on development aid policies. The European Community and the USA should elaborate common guidelines particularly in regard to raw materials, energy, industrialization, and trade and aid for the poorest countries. It is regrettable that the goal of 0.7 percent of GNP for development aid was still not achieved and that most industrialized countries were well below that mark. U.S.-E.C. coordination at the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly was reasonably productive but there was no question that coordination should be made more effective. The U.S. and E.C. should set up groups of experts for this purpose at the Paris Conference and the UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi. 73-026-762 U.S. COMPLAINT ON TRADE 2. While the Members of the U.S. Delegation are sensitive to the fears of Europeans about a new round of protectionism, it is difficult for some U.S. Members to work against restrictive tendencies, especially when the Community, in the agricultural field, seems itself to set a bad example. To illustrate, why did the Community promulgate regulations effective on 1 April, which will severely damage American oilseed producers, by requiring that all animal feed be mixed with 5 percent nonfat milk which the Community has in surplus. This means that there will be a 5 percent reduction in U.S. oilseed exports. Even though this regulation is effective for only seven months, does it not violate GATT, and is it not a bad example to U.S. interests also seeking protection? Mr. Vetrone (Italy) explained that the European Community was faced with the problem of reducing a one million two hundred ton surplus of skim milk powder. The objective was to reduce the stockpile not to restrict imports of American soybeans. In order to reduce the surplus, the European Community has required that animal feed produced in the EC must contain a 2 percent volume, not 5 percent of skim milk powder. The reduction of the stockpile, so the European Community hoped, would have a less negative effect on U.S. soybean sales than the imposition of levies. Mr. Normanton (United Kingdom) raised the question of the Concorde supersonic airliner and suggested that the U.S. attitude toward purchasing the plane represented a non-tariff barrier to trade. Mr. Ryan replied that in his Congressional District, which included the San Francisco International Airport, people had an intense feeling against the significant increase in noise level that they anticipated if the Concorde were allowed to land. Mr. Badillo added that the American Congressional resistance to the Concorde was not against trade with Europe since Congress several years ago rejected government support for manufacturing an SST in the U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLE IN INDUSTRY 3. The pattern in Europe is for a generally higher government role in ownership and management of basic industries than true of the United States. Does this factor not restrict the ability and the desire of European governments to regulate MNEs, for example, and in general to deal evenhandedly with other countries on restrictive trade. practices when government owned industries are involved? Mr. Corterier (Germany) reported that the record showed that government ownership and management of basic industries was actually decreasing in the European Community. It now stood at about 8 percent of industrial production. Wednesday, April 21, 1976, Afternoon SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION SESSION II-DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS (Working Documents: Mr. Jahn, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Karth)1 Mr. Johnson and Mr. Karth from the U.S. Congress introduced their papers "Is Détente Dead?" and Mr. Jahn (Germany) from the European Parliament introduced his paper "The European Scene in the Year After Helsinki". Responding to the three papers on détente, Mr. Bordu (France) said that the changes now underway in the world were irreversable. The concept of the cold war is outdated for the present stage of world history. The arms race is a negative factor for solution of the problems of world peace and a diversion from social reform. The opposition of the two systems of government is an obstacle to the fulfillment of human needs and must be remedied by those who governed. The world needed détente now because of great new demands on the world economy and the democratic thrust in the world based on interdependence. The problem of interdependence must be dealt with because integration had not yet proven itself to be possible. ROLE OF FRENCH COMMUNISTS French Communists would defend freedom in the same way whether they were addressing Moscow or West Germany, for example. Helsinki showed amazing success by reaching agreement among a large number of very different countries. The ensuing policy of governments did not directly reflect the agreements signed but French Communists strongly favoured full implementation of the Helsinki Agreements. Peaceful coexistence was essential; if the balance of power was a determinant of peaceful coexistence, then balance of power policies must strive to avoid the use of force. Mr. Fraser saw little merit in discussion of the overall term "détente" as such, since each of the specific acts taken together by the U.S. and the USSR should be considered sperarately. Mr. Corterier (West Germany) observed that in Germany, there has been only minimal concentration on "détente" as a term. Aside from the nuclear area, the process called détente seemed to mean efforts to resolve certain specific problems in Europe, like Berlin. In order to continue the process, an equilibrium between East and West must be maintained. The equilibrium was now jeopardized by a variety of crises in the West, not necessarily caused by the Soviet Union-such as economic problems, Portugal, the Greece-Turkey conflict, and lack of 1 See pp. 9, 16, and 19, respectively. Western European unity. To continue détente, Western institutions must be strengthened. Since the USSR clearly wished to avoid a nuclear war, it was premature to conclude that it was reverting to cold war policies; the progress of MBFR would be an important indicator in this regard. U.S. COMMITMENTS CLEAR Mr. Solarz stated there was no alternative to seeking to avoid nuclear war. Some believed that Angola revealed the weakness of détente, and that the USSR took advantage of situations where the U.S. avoided involvement. But, he emphasized, the U.S. must be careful not to just "jump in" and intervene everywhere. Vietnam showed that such conduct was not always vital to U.S. interests, but in the current foreign policy debate in the United States, it was clear that the American people were firmly committed to defend democratic nations in Western Europe, the Middle East and Japan. Regarding suspicions of a trend towards isolationism in the U.S., he reported that the House of Representatives had recently authorized more money for defense than the President had requested, and had also rejected a proposal to reduce troop levels overseas. He characterized NATO's viability as supremely important to the U.S. and cited two threats it faced: (1) possible Communist participation in the French and Italian governments and (2) the comparatively unfavourable balance of conventional forces in Central Europe. On the former, he was pessimistic about American ability to prevent Communist participation and regarded as unproductive the flow of alarmed pronouncements by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. On the latter point, he stressed the need for NATO to increase its conventional capacity so as to raise the nuclear threshold. STRENGTH OF WEST VITAL Agreeing with Mr. Solarz, Mr. Scott-Hopkins (United Kingdom) said the USSR remained fully dedicated to overthrowing the West by whatever means possible. Détente could be meaningful only if negotiated from a position of comparative strength. Although the nuclear balance was favourable, the situation with conventional forces was not satisfactory. He urged a worldwide U.S. commitment because the Soviet Union would take advantage of any potential weak spot in the world. He had reservations concerning MBFR since there could be no reliable way of monitoring Warsaw Pact promises to cut back forces. Mr. Prescott (United Kingdom) stressed the importance of détente as a basis for hope that the division of Europe would not be permanent. He rejected the notion that NATO was a democratic shield: rather it was simply a military alliance with purely military objectives and as such an unsuitable instrument for relaxation of tensions. Expressing interest in the efforts of the U.S. Congress to gain more control over foreign policy, he said it could be a constructive development if Congress fully recognized the reality of the inter-dependence in the world, particularly between the two superpowers and between the industrialized and developing nations. COMMUNISM MIGHT CHANGE Mr. Corona (Italy) said that Western perceptions of the Communist world were not always accurate, and that changes were underway which might prove beneficial to the world: the Communist world was so divided that China could not be regarded as enhancing Soviet power; détente, too, had brought some favourable changes. But Communist parties could not transform themselves overnight. In the meantime, provocations by the U.S. could only make the situation worse, as had been the case in the past. The Communist world would not be likely to change in a positive direction if it felt encircled and constantly threatened. The Italian Communists had said repeatedly that they would not seek Italian withdrawal from NATO; we had to take their word for it. If they were to win in Italy, they would win democratically. Mr. Hungate said in regard to the French and Italian Communists that the results of free elections must be accepted, but that the American government could also properly say in advance whether or not a particular result of an election in a foreign country would be viewed as favourable to U.S. interests. GROWING SOVIET STRENGTH Mr. Jahn (Germany) said détente could be regarded as good only if it had real substance based on facts; in the highly precarious military situation in Central Europe, the psychological or philosophical value of détente could not be very important. He applauded the U.S. Congress for increasing defense spending, and described the growing conventional military threat across the border from his district in West Germany. Disagreeing with a point made by Mr. Solarz, he insisted that Angola had great strategic importance to the Soviet Union as a base area. He said reports from Eastern European refugees had convinced him that in order for the East to liberalize, the West had to remain tenacious for the time being. Mr. Martin expressed the opinion that the United States was moving toward a consensus view that if no balanced reduction of forces and armaments were achieved, then a conventional war would break ont, which would be very disadvantageous to the West. |