A major fact which many people have not fully understood is the high level of technology required to develop and maintain modern agriculture. For many years, people have laboured under the mistaken belief that industrialisation represented the highest level of civilisation. We were taught that men first lived in caves and hunted, then they developed farming and villages, and later developed cities and industrialisation. The idea which was not taught was that after industrialisation men developed modern agriculture.

At first glance, it would seem more difficult to build aeroplanes, automobiles, and television sets than it is to raise food. However, it is actually much harder and it requires a much higher level of technology to grow food than to do almost any other activity.

ASSEMBLY LINE PROCESS

A minute of thought will make this clear. If a team of developers goes to a developing country to build TV sets, their problem is relatively simple: the factory must be built, component supplies located in some convenient country must be found, and then local people must be trained to work on the assembly lines.

It is quite possible to take young men and women from very primitive surroundings and, within a few weeks or a few months training, prepare them to carry out their particular limited responsibilities on that assembly line.

However, with modern agriculture the problem is entirely different. It is true you can supply chemicals and machines, but the local person who is in charge of the land must know how to farm. This requires a sophisticated understanding of managerial skills, a high level of training in the use and maintenance of equipment, a working knowledge in the use of modern agricultural chemicals, and a knowledge of soil, climate, and plant diseases which can only be achieved with intensive and lengthy training.

Having once recognised these two facts: (1) The need for an economic and political system which releases rather than destroys individual energy and creativity, and (2) the high level of technology and technical training required, then we must decide what we can do to increase food production around the world.

I am proposing that we make serious efforts, regardless of the political or economic system we are dealing with in a food-short country, to insure that the farmers are allowed to own the land which they farm. I am talking about the men and women who actually go out on the land, plant the seeds and harvest the crops; not the politicians, not the planners, not the experts, but the farmers. This means they must not be burdened with impossible debt and they must not be subject to irrational regulations in the use of their land. They must truly be able to go to their house or cottage or hut in the evening, sit down with their family at their own table, look out the window at a growing crop, and quietly say to themselves: This is mine, this is my land, this is my crop-I am in charge of my own life.

END FOOD GIVEAWAYS

The following are proposals I wish to recommend to free nations wishing to spread the doctrine of agricultural free enterprise to the nations which need it most. First, I would recommend that the West terminate virtually all foreign aid food giveaways, except in cases of disaster relief. Let these nations pay for the fruits of our free economies. Let them think about what it is costing them to maintain their inefficient, collectivist systems. This is especially applicable to the Third World nations. Most of these countries are young and in the early developmental stages. Now is the crucial time in their histories when they must decide what kind of economic system they want. Freedom or coercion? Abundance or starvation?

Secondly, I would recommend that all agricultural transactions with nonmarket countries be done on a cash and carry basis. No subsidies and soft loans, courtesy of our overtaxed citizens. The easier we make it for these countries, the less reason they will see to reform their archaic feudal systems. Russia and Communist China would be the countries most affected by this policy. In the case of Russia, I would prefer that they pay the United States in gold. Russia possesses about $8 billion in gold reserves and is the second largest producer of that metal in the world. She can spare the gold and we in America can certainly use it to help stabilise our currency. It makes good sense all the way around.

Third, we need to encourage joint ventures of Western agri-business and food processing to the Third World countries. And as I mentioned earlier, the farmers in these nations should be able to own their own land.

One final note. I know there are those, including some in my own country, who urge that we move in the exact opposite direction from what I propose. Rather than strengthening our respective free enterprise systems and exporting these ideas abroad, they would have us move closer to the socialised Russian system. In the case of the United States, this could certainly be done in all areas of economic activity. We could be just like the Soviet Union after a little work. All we would have to do is reduce our paycheques by 75 percent, move 60 million workers back to the farm, abandon two-thirds of our steel making capacity, destroy 40 million TV sets, tear up 14 out of 15 miles of our highways, junk 19 out of 20 of our automobiles, tear up two-thirds of our railroad tracks, knock down 70 percent of our houses, rip out nine-tenths of our telephones, and then all we would have to do is find a capitalist country willing to sell us wheat on credit so we wouldn't starve.

But frankly, I think the American people are happy with what they've got.

Friday, April 23, 1976

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

SESSION V-AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POSITIONS ON THE
MEDITERRANEAN

(Working Documents: Mr. Normanton and Mr. Ryan) 1

The debate was opened with Mr. Rosenthal in the chair. Mr. Ryan outlined his working document. He raised the following points in particular:

The indivisibility of American and European interests;

Whether the US military presence could continue in some locations, such as Greece and Turkey;

The emotional connotations of the term "communism” in American society and the pressure on election candidates to adopt a totally hostile attitude to it;

The role of the Italian Communist Party in Europe; and

The fact that NATO was strong enough militarily to divert some of its attention to other matters.

Mr. Normanton then introduced his working documents with these comments:

From the point of view of the United States, European integration was primarily a stage in the strengthening of Western defense. By contrast, the importance of the European Community to European countries was above all economic. But although defense matters were expressly excluded from the terms of reference of the Treaty of Rome, they had been increasingly raised by the European Parliament in the last three years. Before 1973 this would have been unthinkable.

EC ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY

There was a growing awareness in the Community institutions that external economic policy formed part of overall foreign policy. Recent political developments in other countries-Greece, Portugal, Spain and Iceland-had confirmed this view. Flexible interpretation of the Treaty of Rome was therefore called for. The European Parliament was keeping abreast of these developments. In the Mediterranean the position of Yugoslavia could become critical when President Tito left the political scene.

CYPRUS PROSPECTS BLEAK

Mr. Solarz referred to his recent visits to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. The prospects for a solution to the Cyprus problem were bleak in his view. He had the impression that both sides wished to maintain the

status quo. Although he felt as a result of private talks that some form of participation was generally favored, neither side was ready to make concessions. With Greece, the refugee problem was a central issue.

The continuation of the American arms embargo against Turkey would only strengthen Turkish resistence to a solution and foster Greek illusions. He urged the total lifting of the embargo and approval by Congress of the agreements recently arranged by the United States with Greece and Turkey concerning military bases in both countries. Rejection of these agreements by Congress could force Turkey to seek other allies. Greece had, moreover, more to fear in the long term from the Soviet Union than from Turkey. He hoped that America's allies in the European Community would continue to stress the importance of full Greek and Turkish membership of NATO.

Mr. Pisoni also wondered about possible developments in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period. He felt that Mr. Ryan had a very superficial view of Communism in Italy and warned against jumping to conclusions.

CLOSE RELATION OF U.S.-EC INTERESTS

Mr. Cousté noted that the fate of Western Europe was of especially great importance to the security of the United States. Defense matters had also been raised by the Council of the European Economic Community. There was an increased awareness of the growing threat from the Soviet Union. Political relations between the European Community and the United States were characterized by an atmosphere of mutual trust.

Mr. McDonald also dealt with the connection between the activities of the Community and overall foreign policy. The Community should grow along with the new political developments. He regretted that the United States had failed to take advantage of the political opportunities afforded by the European Community. It was, after all, in the interests of the United States to have a united Europe. The Communist parties in Europe were being financed from abroad. In conclusion, he stated that he was opposed to permanent partition of Cyprus.

Mr. Ryan asserted that a permanent partition should not be the basis for a final Cyprus solution. In virtually no instance has partition brought real peace.

BASE AGREEMENTS SUPPORTED

Mr. Corterier endorsed the views of Mr. Solarz and hoped that Congress would approve the two agreements referred to. He noted that the Federal Republic of Germany was giving military aid to both Turkey and Greece. The role of the European Community in this connection was politically important, since in some respects, it had taken over from NATO there. The Community was attempting to stabilize the situaton by making financial and economic sacrifices. In the wider view, the possible accession of Greece to the European Communityirrespective of the financial consequences for the wealthier countries of the Community, in particular-had also to be considered. The growing success of communism in southern Europe was a serious matter but

should not be dramatized at present. Participation by the Communist Party in the Italian government was, however, imminent and bound to raise serious problems.

Mr. Corterier noted the efforts that Germany and, Europe in general, have made to compensate for the lack of American aid to Turkey. He noted, too, that in the case of Greece the Community was in many respects replacing NATO which continued to stand in great disrepute.

He added that the effort of the EC to stabilize the Mediterranean and to maintain a western influence there during the failure of US policy should not go unnoticed. He said that it was often asked of Europe: What are you doing for NATO and the West? The answer is that we are doing a lot and it is very expensive.

Greek membership in the community will be a particular problem from an economic standpoint, aggravating an existing imbalance between the affluent Benelux countries and the poorer states. And yet, for overriding political reasons, we recognize that Greece must be in the alliance. Moreover, if we accept Greece, it is inevitable that compensatory arrangements will have to be established with Turkey.

MORAL ASPECTS IMPORTANT

Mr. Fraser noted that there were important security considerations at stake in Southern Europe, but that it was wrong to simply ignore the moral dimensions of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. This he found reminiscent of the arguments used to defend U.S. support of the Greek junta.

Mr. Fraser felt that it was unfortunate that Europe was not able. to play more of a mediating role when that conflict unfolded. He said that he understood that the NATO council had been discouraged from taking any action; if this is true then it compounds the error of US policy.

U.S. MISHANDLING OF CYPRUS

In Mr. Fraser's view the Cyprus problem had been mishandled by the United States from the beginning. He doubted whether Congress would approve the pacts with Greece and Turkey. A complete lifting of the arms embargo against Turkey could cause Greece to view membership of NATO as an encumbrance. In the United States there was the overwhelming feeling that the Greek population of Cyprus had suffered a great injustice. In NATO the principle of justice should have priority. Mr. Badillo endorsed Mr. Fraser's views, especially the judgment that the arguments now used to justify normal relations with Turkey were the same justifications used during the Greek military dictatorship to continue normal relations with the junta.

Mr. Lenihan felt that EC aid to southern European countries could only be justified if and when it was certain that they had a pluralist democracy. The Community's external policy had to be compatible with overall foreign policy.

Mr. Corona hoped that American delegations from the Congress to Italy would subsequently establish contact with all political groupings there, including the Communists. He expressed his appreciation of Mr. Ryan's understanding of the delicate political situation in Italy.