« ÎnapoiContinuați »
ation Treaty (TIAS 6839; 21 UST 483; entered into force March 5, 1970) as examples of successful international collaboration in the nuclear field.
For the full text of Dr. Iklé's remarks, see ACDA Press Release No. 75–13, Apr. 23, 1975. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1873, May 19, 1975, pp. 641-645.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
On January 22, 1975, President Ford signed instruments of ratification of two treaties-the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. While reaffirming the U.S. understanding that the 1925 Protocol does not extend to riot-control agents and chemical herbicides, the President announced that as a matter of national policy the United States would renounce first use of herbicides and riot control agents in war, with certain exceptions. (See Executive Order 11850, post, p. 858.)
The Senate had given its advice and consent to ratification of both treaties on December 16, 1974. The instrument of ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol incorporated the reservation stated by the Senate in its resolution of advice and consent, that the prohibitions of the Protocol will cease to be binding on the United States as regards an enemy state if such state or any of its allies fails to respect those prohibitions.
With respect to his ratification of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the President said in part:
This is the first such agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons.
.. the United States had already unilaterally renounced these weapons before the Convention was negotiated. Our entire stockpile of biological and toxin agents and weapons has been destroyed, and our biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses.
The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention entered into force on March 26, 1975, upon deposit by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union of their instruments of ratification at ceremonies in Washington, London, and Moscow (TIAS 8062, 26 UST 583).
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 entered into force for the United States on April 10, 1975, on deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification with the Government of France (TIAS 8061; 26 UST 571). The Protocol had originally come into force on February 8, 1928.
For the full text of the President's statements upon signing the instruments of ratification of the two treaties, see Presidential Documents, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 73– 74. For a discussion relative to Senate consideration of the two treaties, see the 1974 Digest, Ch. 14, $ 7, pp. 740_743.
In a statement on March 4, 1975, to the opening session of the resumed Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr., U.S. Representative to the Conference, announced that the United States was prepared to participate in the active examination of possibilities for further effective restraints on chemical weapons. He added:
An important element in this examination should continue to be a thorough analysis of the verification question in relation to the possible scope of any prohibition.
See Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1867, Apr. 7, 1975, pp. 454 458.
On April 8, 1975, President Ford issued Executive Order 11850, "Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents,” prohibiting use in war of riot control agents and chemical herbicides unless approved by the President in advance. The order reads as follows:
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:
(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturb ances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations.
I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to ensure proper implementation and observance of such national policy.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.
SEC. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States.
Fed. Reg., Vol. 40, No. 70, Apr. 10, 1975, p. 16187.
Dr. Fred C. Iklé, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, testified on June 9, 1975, before the Subcommittee on Defense of the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, on United States efforts to limit chemical weapons in the world. He described, in particular, the relationship of verification possibilities to the scope of any acceptable prohibition on chemical weapons. The following is an excerpt from his address:
From the U.S. point of view the main, if not the only, stumbling block to an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons is the difficult issue of verification. Now that the U.S. has ratified the Geneva Protocol, hence is legally bound not to use chemical weapons first, we would surely be willing to do away with chemical weapons altogether if we could be confident that our potential adversaries also got rid of these weapons. In our Armed Forces, chemical weapons serve only to deter attack with chemical weapons. Unlike our nuclear weapons, our chemical warfare agents do not serve as a general deterrent against major aggression. On the other hand, the Soviet Armed Forces give far more emphasis to chemical warfare in their training, equipment, and doctrine.
Depending on how far new prohibitions on chemical weapons went, their verification would become increasingly difficult, or impossible, in closed societies. Article IX of the Biological Warfare Convention mentions “measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed" for the use of chemical agents. Depending on how you define “specifically designed,” some agreed procedures might be developed to verify such measures. But the same article also mentions destruction of stockpiles. While it seems feasible to design verifiable procedures for the destruction of declared stockpiles, we do not know how to verify whether all existing stockpiles have been properly declared. And just as difficult is the verification of a prohibition of production. Production of chemical weapons could take place in the shadow of normal operations of chemical industries—one of
the most difficult activities to ferret ou degree of secrecy.
Clearly, we must make some difficu what to do about prohibitions of chen benefits of an agreement limiting che cant enough to outweigh the drawback that are essentially unverifiable?
In the case of the Biological Wear cluded the agreement would serve U verification was essentially impossible considerations:
First, the military utility of the bio ered dubious, at best. The effects are tially uncontrollable, and there has be with them. In brief, the Convention military option.
Second, the Convention can help dis tition in biological weapons. Withou discoveries and inventions in the bio to raise anxieties that they might le terror weapons.
Similar considerations must be we chemical weapons policy. In the rev executive branch, we are attempting of the various alternatives to update
Department of Defense Appropriations for 19 tee of the Committee on Appropriations, House 9, 1975, pp. 228-229.
Seabed Arms C
On October 25, 1973, the Socialist slavia deposited with the Departmen ratification of the Treaty on the Pro of Nuclear Weapons and Other Wear the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and i 7337; 23 UST 701; entered into force fi 1972). Four months later, in a note Yugoslav Ambassador at Washingto tary of State an interpretative state III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, readir
In depositing this instrument of of the Socialist Federal Republic of the following:
In view of the Government of the Yugoslavia, Article 3, Paragraph I effect that a state exercising the ri obliged to notify in advance the coastal state, insofar as its observations are to be carried out within the stretch of the sea extending above the Continental Shelf of the said state.
The Ambassador stated that the above statement had been accepted by the Federal Assembly at the time of the ratification of the Treaty, and he requested that, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Treaty, it be forwarded to the governments of the states signatory and acceding at Washington to the Treaty.
In performance of the depositary duties of the Government of the United States under the Treaty, the Secretary of State transmitted the Yugoslav statement in a circular note of January 15, 1975, addressed to the Chiefs of Mission of the governments of the states signatory and acceding at Washington to the Treaty. In a separate note dated January 16, 1975, addressed to the same states, the Secretary of State presented the views of the United States concerning the Yugoslav note. Those views read in pertinent part as follows:
Insofar as the note is intended to be interpretative of the Treaty, the United States cannot accept it as a valid interpretation. In addition, the United States does not consider that it can have any effect on the existing law of the sea.
Insofar as the note is intended to be a reservation to the Treaty, the United States places on record its formal objection to it on the grounds that it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty. The United States also draws attention to the fact that the note was submitted too late to be legally effective as a reservation.
Dept. of State Files Nos. P75 0017–1144, P75 0017_1209 and P74 0014_0611.
Art. III, par. 1 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (1971) provides:
In order to promote the objectives of and insure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each state party to the Treaty shall have the right to verify through observation the activities of other states parties to the Treaty on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the zone referred to in Article I, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities.
The zone referred to in Art. I is the "seabed zone” described in Art. II of the Treaty as follows:
For the purpose of this Treaty, the outer limit of the seabed zone referred to in Article I shall be coterminous with the twelve-mile outer limit of the zone referred to in part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, signed at Geneva on April 29, 1958, and shall be measured in