or together with other states or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Recognizing, in the context of Article IV, 2, those growing needs of developing states the Conference considers it necessary to continue and increase assistance to them in this field bilaterally and through such multilateral channels as the IAEA and the United Nations Development Program.

The Conference is of the view that, in order to implement as fully as possible Article IV of the Treaty, developed states party to the Treaty should consider taking measures, making contributions and establishing programs, as soon as possible, for the provision of special assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for developing states party to the Treaty.

The Conference recommends that, in reaching decisions on the provision of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on concessional and other appropriate financial arrangements and on the furnishing of technical assistance in the nuclear field, including cooperation related to the continuous operation of peaceful nuclear facilities, states party to the Treaty should give weight to adherence to the Treaty by recipient states. The Conference recommends, in this connection, that any special measures of cooperation to meet the growing needs of developing states party to the Treaty might include increased and supplemental voluntary aid provided bilaterally or through multilateral channels such as the IAEA's facilities for administering funds-in-trust and gifts-inkind.

The Conference further recommends that states party to the Treaty in a position to do so, meet, to the fullest extent possible, "technically sound" requests for technical assistance, submitted to the IAEA by developing states party to the Treaty, which the IAEA is unable to finance from its own resources, as well as such "technically sound" requests as may be made by developing states party to the Treaty which are not members of the IAEA.

The Conference recognizes that regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centers may be an advantageous way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many states in the course of initiating or expanding nuclear power programs, while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of IAEA safeguards, and contributing to the goals of the Treaty. The Conference welcomes the IAEA's studies in this area, and recommends that they be continued as expeditiously as possible. It considers that such studies should include, among other aspects, identification of the complex practical and organizational difficulties which will need to be dealt with in connection with such projects.

The Conference urges all parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to cooperate in these studies, particularly by providing to the IAEA where possible economic data concerning construction and operation of facilities such as chemical reprocessing plants, plutonium fuel fabrication plants, waste management installations, and longer-term spent fuel storage, and by assistance to the IAEA to enable it to undertake feasibility studies concerning the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centers in specific geographic regions.

The Conference hopes that, if these studies lead to positive findings, and if the establishment of regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centers is undertaken, parties to the Treaty in a position to do so, will cooperate in, and provide assistance for, the elaboration and realization of such projects. REVIEW OF ARTICLE V

The Conference reaffirms the obligation of parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of Article V and other applicable international obligations. In this connection, the Conference also reaffirms that such services should be provided to non-nuclearweapon states party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

The Conference notes that any potential benefits could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the Treaty by way of nuclear explosion

services provided by nuclear-weapon states, as defined by the Treaty, and conducted under the appropriate international observation and international procedures called for in Article V and in accordance with other applicable international obligations. The Conference considers it imperative that access to potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes not lead to any proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

The Conference considers the IAEA to be the appropriate international body, referred to in Article V of the Treaty, through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon state. Accordingly, the Conference urges the IAEA to expedite work on identifying and examining the important legal issues involved in, and to commence consideration of, the structure and content of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in Article V of the Treaty, taking into account the views of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the United Nations General Assembly and enabling states party to the Treaty but not members of the IAEA which would wish to do so to participate in such work.

The Conference notes that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still at the stage of development and study and that there are a number of interrelated international legal and other aspects of such explosions which still need to be investigated.

The Conference commends the work in this field that has been carried out within the IAEA and looks forward to the continuance of such work pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3261 D (XXIX). It emphasizes that the IAEA should play the central role in matters relating to the provision of services for the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It believes that the IAEA should broaden its consideration of this subject to encompass, within its area of competence, all aspects and implications of the practical applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. To this end it urges the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which intergovernmental discussion can take place and through which advice can be given on the Agency's work in this field.

The Conference attaches considerable importance to the consideration by the CCD, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3261 Ď (XXIX) and taking due account of the views of the IAEA, of the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The Conference notes that the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly will receive reports pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and will provide an opportunity for states to discuss questions related to the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session will be available to be taken into account by the IAEA and the CCD for their further consideration.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VI

The Conference recalls the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty under which all parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating

-to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and

-to nuclear disarmament and

-to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

While welcoming the various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament elaborated and concluded over the last few years as steps contributing to the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, the Conference expresses its serious concern that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated.

The Conference therefore urges constant and resolute efforts by each of the parties to the Treaty, in particular by the nuclear-weapon states, to achieve an early and effective implementation of Article VI of the Treaty.

The Conference affirms the determination expressed in the preamble to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and reiterated in the preamble to the nonproliferation treaty to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests is one of the most important

measures to halt the nuclear arms race. It expresses the hope that the nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty will take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties on this issue. It appeals to these states to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban. To this end, the desire was expressed by a considerable number of delegations at the Conference that the nuclearweapon states party to the Treaty should as soon as possible enter into an agreement, open to all states and containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear weapons tests of adhering states for a specified time, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity, at that time, to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon states signatories of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, meanwhile, to limit the number of their underground nuclear weapons tests to a minimum. The Conference believes that such steps would constitute an incentive of particular value to negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons test explosions for all time.

The Conference appeals to the nuclear-weapon states parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms to endeavor to conclude at the earliest possible date the new agreement that was outlined by their leaders in November 1974. The Conference looks forward to the commencement of followon negotiations on further limitations of, and significant reductions in, their nuclear weapons systems as soon as possible following the conclusion of such an agreement.

The Conference notes that, notwithstanding earlier progress, the CCD has recently been unable to reach agreement on new substantive measures to advance the objectives of Article VI of the Treaty. It urges, therefore, all members of the CCD party to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon states party, to increase their efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements on all subjects on the agenda of the CCD.

The Conference expresses the hope that all states party to the Treaty, through the United Nations and the CCD and other negotiations in which they participate, will work with determination towards the conclusion of arms limitation and disarmament agreements which will contribute to the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Conference expresses the view that, disarmament being a matter of general concern, the provision of information to all governments and peoples on the situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament is of great importance for the attainment of the aims of Article VI. The Conference therefore invites the United Nations to consider ways and means of improving its existing facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep all governments as well as world public opinion properly informed on progress achieved in the realization of the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VII AND THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

Recognizing that all states have need to ensure their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference emphasizes the particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon states parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It acknowledges that states parties find themselves in different security situations and therefore that various appropriate means are necessary to meet the security concerns of states parties.

The Conference underlines the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-nuclear-weapon states as the best means of reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security.

The Conference takes note of the continued determination of the depositary states to honor their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 255 (1968), that, to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty, they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear

weapon state party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

The Conference, bearing in mind Article VII of the Treaty, considers that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned states of the zone, represents an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and could contribute significantly to the security of those states. It welcomes the steps which have been taken toward the establishment of such zones.

The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any Treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the cooperation of the nuclear-weapon states is necessary. At the Conference it was urged by a considerable number of delegations that nuclear-weapon states should provide, in an appropriate manner, binding security assurances to those states which become fully bound by the provisions of such regional arrangements.

At the Conference it was also urged that determined efforts must be made especially by the nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty, to ensure the security of all non-nuclear-weapon states parties. To this end the Conference urges all states, both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states to refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between states, involving either nuclear or nonnuclear weapons. Additionally, it stresses the responsibility of all parties to the Treaty and especially the nuclear-weapon states, to take effective steps to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon states and to promote in all appropriate fora the consideration of all practical means to this end, taking into account the views expressed at this Conference.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VIII

The Conference invites states party to the Treaty which are members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."

The states party to the Treaty participating in the Conference propose to the depositary governments that a second conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1980.

The Conference accordingly invites states party to the Treaty which are members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second conference."

REVIEW OF ARTICLE IX

The five years that have passed since the entry into force of the Treaty have demonstrated its wide international acceptance. The Conference welcomes the recent progress towards achieving wider adherence. At the same time, the Conference notes with concern that the Treaty has not as yet achieved universal adherence. Therefore, the Conference expresses the hope that states that have not already joined the Treaty should do so at the earliest possible date.

Doc. NPT/CONF/30/Rev. 1. For the statement by Dr. Iklé, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1879, June 30, 1975, pp. 921-929. For the statement by Mr. Klein, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1884, Aug. 4, 1975, pp. 193-195.

On May 6, 1975, the U.S Senate passed a resolution (S. Res. 146), endorsing the purposes of the NPT review conference and commending the President's commitment to furthering the objectives of the Treaty. Cong. Rec., Vol. 121, No. 71, pp. S7565-7566 (daily ed.).

Nuclear Reprocessing

On September 22, 1975, at the 30th Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary of State Kissinger proposed the establishment of multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle centers. The following is an excerpt from Secretary Kissinger's address:

The greatest single danger of unrestrained nuclear proliferation resides in the spread under national control of reprocessing facilities for the atomic materials in nuclear power plants. The United States therefore proposes-as a major step to reinforce all other measures-the establishment of multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle centers. These centers would serve energy needs on a commercially sound basis and encourage regional energy cooperation. Their existence would reduce the incentive for small and inefficient reprocessing facilities, limit the possibility of diverting peaceful nuclear materials to national military use, and create a better framework for applying effective international safeguards.

We urge that groups of nations begin now to explore this concept and that all states support the IAEA's [International Atomic Energy Agency's ] work in this field.

For the full text of Secretary Kissinger's address, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1894, Oct. 13, 1975, pp. 545–553.

International Guardianship of Nuclear Technology

Dr. Fred C. Iklé, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in an address at the U.S. Naval Academy on April 23, 1975, projected a long term U.S. arms control program which would encourage the evolution of an "international guardianship of dangerous nuclear materials . . . to coordinate, or manage directly, the flow of nuclear materials among a steadily growing number of countries." Outlining the problems of a "second nuclear era," in which more and more nations would acquire the nuclear technology for reactors to produce energy that would also yield materials for making nuclear bombs, he declared that “we will no longer be able to curb nuclear arms competition through bilateral agreements." Dr. Iklé envisaged instead an “international guardianship" of the world's nuclear resources, in which the United States could play a particularly creative role, and which would deal with such persistent problems as the growing worldwide need for nuclear waste disposal and the danger of theft of nuclear materials. He cited the International Atomic Energy Agency and the widespread adherence to the Non-Prolifer