Article V . . . was included in the treaty to insure that the non-nuclear-weapon states adhering to the treaty would not be deprived of any potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions that might be realized by the nuclear-weapon states.

In the United States, there has been much research and experimentation on the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. But we have not yet reduced any application to practice, nor have we obtained any commercial benefits from this technology. If and when we should succeed in doing so, we would of course make those benefits available as called for in the treaty.

Questions remain to be resolved regarding the feasibility and practicability of peaceful nuclear explosions. Moreover, no request for such explosions has ever gone beyond the stage of preliminary feasibility studies. For these reasons, there has so far been no practical necessity to conclude the international agreement or agreements mentioned in Article V. However, the United States stands ready to negotiate the requisite agreements when the practical need develops.

In the meantime, the United States is prepared to participate in consideration of the institutional arrangements that may be required to make the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions available internationally. Toward this end, important steps have already been taken within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. My government, as one of the potential suppliers of such services, has agreed to assist the Agency in a study of the related legal problems.

The Final Declaration of the Review Conference was adopted on May 30, 1975, by consensus. It gave strong support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system and urged that all suppliers of nuclear materials strengthen common safeguards requirements for nuclear exports. It called for elaboration, within the IAEA, of concrete recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage, and transit, and called on states to enter into international arrangements for such protection. It recommended continued and increased assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing states parties to the Treaty and urged that weight be given to adherence to the NPT by recipient states in reaching decisions on the provision of materials, services, information and technical assistance. It recommended with strong support from the United States that the IAEA's studies of regional nuclear fuel cycle centers be accelerated and that, if studies prove positive, NPT parties cooperate and provide assistance for the realization of such projects. The

Declaration appeals to nuclear-weapon states to make every effort to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty and urges states to refrain from the threat or use of force, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.

At the time of the adoption of the Declaration, David Klein, U.S. Alternate Representative, made a statement reiterating for the record U.S. positions on issues dealt with in the Declaration. Excerpts from his statement follow:

First, I would like to reiterate that we look forward, as soon as possible after the conclusion of the agreement outlined at Vladivostok, to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations and reductions in the level of strategic arms.

Second, with respect to the question of restraints on nuclear testing, my government joins in affirming the determination of participants of this conference to achieve the discontinuance of all explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The final declaration notes that a number of delegations at the conference expressed the desire that the nuclear-weapon states parties enter as soon as possible into an agreement to halt all nuclearweapon tests for a specified period of time. Our view is that any treaty or agreement on nuclear-weapons testing must contain provisions for adequate verification and must solve the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. It would not be realistic to assume that an agreement banning all nuclear-weapons testing. whether by nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT or by all testing powers, could be concluded before solutions to these problems are found.

With reference to nuclear-free zones, we believe that the creation of such zones could effectively complement the NPT as a means of preventing the spread of nuclear-explosive capabilities. We have emphasized that, to be effective, regional arrangements should meet the following criteria:

The initiative should be taken by the states in the region. concerned. The zone should preferably include all states in the area whose participation is deemed important. The creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security arrangements, and provision must be made for adequate verification. Finally, we do not believe that the objective of nonproliferation would be served if a nuclear-free-zone arrangement permitted the indigenous development of nuclear explosives for any purpose; no effort to achieve nonproliferation could succeed if it permitted such indigenous development of nuclear explosives by nonnuclear-weapon states or failed to safeguard against diversion of nuclear materials to such use.

A number of delegations at the conference urged that nuclear-weapon states provide, in an appropriate manner, binding security assurances to those states which became fully bound

by the provisions of a regional arrangement. My goverment adhered to protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty, which contains such a binding security assurance, after determining that that treaty met the criteria noted above. However, we believe that each nuclear-free-zone proposal must be judged on its own merits to determine whether the provision of specific security assurances would be likely to have a favorable effect. Moreover, we do not believe it would be realistic to expect nuclear-weapon states to make implied commitments to provide such assurances before the scope and content of any nuclearfree-zone arrangement are worked out.

The text of the Declaration follows:

FINAL DECLARATION OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PREAMBLE

The states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which met in Geneva in May 1975, in accordance with the Treaty, to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized,

Recognizing the continuing importance of the objectives of the Treaty, Affirming the belief that universal adherence to the Treaty would greatly strengthen international peace and enhance the security of all states,

Firmly convinced that, in order to achieve this aim, it is essential to maintain, in the implementation of the Treaty, an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of all states party to the Treaty, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states,

Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind,

Convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remains a vital element in efforts to avert nuclear warfare, and that the promotion of this objective will be furthered by more rapid progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the limitation and reduction of existing nuclear weapons, with a view to the eventual elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons, pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling the determination expressed by the parties to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between states provides a favorable climate within which more significant progress should be possible towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Noting the important role which nuclear energy can, particularly in changing economic circumstances, play in power production and in contributing to the progressive elimination of the economic and technological gap between developing and developed states,

Recognizing that the accelerated spread and development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy will, in the absence of effective safeguards, contribute to further proliferation of nuclear explosive capability,

Recognizing the continuing necessity of full cooperation in the application and improvement of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Recalling that all parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other states to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological byproducts which may be derived by nuclear-weapon states from the development of nuclear explosive

devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all parties to the Treaty, and

Recognizing that all states parties have a duty to strive for the adoption of tangible and effective measures to attain the objectives of the Treaty, Declare as follows:

PURPOSES

The states party to the Treaty reaffirm their strong common interest in averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.

They reaffirm the vital role of the Treaty in international efforts

-to avert further proliferation of nuclear weapons

-to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, and

-to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under adequate safeguards.

REVIEW OF ARTICLES I AND II

The review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by all parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued strict observance of these Articles remains central to the shared objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE III

The Conference notes that the verification activities of the IAEA under Article III, 1, of the Treaty respect the sovereign rights of states and do not hamper the economic, scientific or technological development of the parties to the Treaty or international cooperation in peaceful nuclear activities. It urges that this situation be maintained. The Conference attaches considerable importance to the continued application of safeguards under Article III, 1, on a nondiscriminatory basis, for the equal benefit of all states party to the Treaty.

The Conference notes the importance of systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, from the standpoints both of the responsibilities of states party to the Treaty and of cooperation with the IAEA in order to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in Article III, 1. The Conference expresses the hope that all states having peaceful nuclear activities will establish and maintain effective accounting and control systems and welcomes the readiness of the IAEA to assist states in so doing.

The Conference expresses its strong support for effective IAEA safeguards. In this context it recommends that intensified efforts be made towards the standardization and the universality of application of IAEA safeguards, while ensuring that safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the Treaty are of adequate duration, preclude diversion to any nuclear explosive devices and contain appropriate provisions for the continuance of the application of safeguards upon reexport.

The Conference recommends that more attention and fuller support be given to the improvement of safeguards techniques, instrumentation, data handling and implementation in order, among other things, to ensure optimum cost effectiveness. It notes with satisfaction the establishment by the Director General of the IAEA of a standing advisory group on safeguards implementation.

The Conference emphasizes the necessity for the states party to the Treaty that have not yet done so to conclude as soon as possible safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

With regard to the implementation of Article III, 2, of the Treaty, the Conference notes that a number of states suppliers of nuclear material or equipment have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connection with their exports of certain such items to nonnuclear-weapon states not party to the Treaty (IAEA document INFCIRC 209 and Addenda). The Conference attaches particular importance to the condition, established by those states, of an undertaking of nondiversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said require

ments.

The Conference urges that:

(a) in all achievable ways, common export requirements relating to safeguards be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing states not party to the Treaty;

(b) such common requirements be accorded the widest possible measure of acceptance among all suppliers and recipients;

(c) all parties to the Treaty should actively pursue their efforts to these ends.

The Conference takes note of:

(a) the considered view of many parties to the Treaty that the safeguards required under Article III, 2, should extend to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing states;

(b) (i) the suggestion that it is desirable to arrange for common safeguards requirements in respect of nuclear material processed, used or produced by the use of scientific and technological information transferred in tangible form to non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the Treaty;

(ii) the hope that this aspect of safeguards could be further examined. The Conference recommends that, during the review of the arrangements relating to the financing of safeguards in the IAEA which is to be undertaken by its Board of Governors at an appropriate time after 1975, the less favorable financial situation of the developing countries be fully taken into account. It recommends further that, on that occasion, the parties to the Treaty concerned seek measures that would restrict within appropriate limits the respective shares of developing countries in safeguards costs.

The Conference attaches considerable importance, so far as safeguards inspectors are concerned, to adherence by the IAEA to Article VII.D of its Statute, prescribing, among other things, that "due regard shall be paid... to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible;" it also recommends that safeguards training be made available to personnel from all geographic regions.

The Conference, convinced that nuclear materials should be effectively protected at all times, urges that action be pursued to elaborate further, within the IAEA, concrete recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit, including principles relating to the responsibility of states, with a view to ensuring a uniform, minimum level of effective protection for such material.

It calls upon all states engaging in peaceful nuclear activities (i) to enter into such international agreements and arrangements as may be necessary to ensure such protection; and (ii) in the framework of their respective physical protection systems, to give the earliest possible effective application to the IAEA's recommendations.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE IV

The Conference reaffirms, in the framework of Article IV, 1, that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in the Treaty has been identified as affecting, the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms, in the framework of Article IV, 2, the undertaking by all parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange and welcomes the efforts made towards that end. Noting that the Treaty constitutes a favorable framework for broadening international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Conference is convinced that on this basis, and in conformity with the Treaty, further efforts should be made to ensure that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology should be available to all parties to the Treaty.

The Conference recognizes that there continues to be a need for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, including up-to-date developments, consistent with the objectives and safeguards requirements of the Treaty. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to cooperate in contributing, alone