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(2) The President shall submit to the Congress within sixty days after the enactment of this paragraph, and at the end of each succeeding sixty-day period, a report on progress made during such period toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict.
Sec. 2(c) of the Act of Oct. 6, 1975, in addition, provides that nothing in that section shall be construed as authorizing military assistance to Turkey under Ch. 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or sales, credits, or guaranties to Turkey under the Foreign Military Sales Act for the procurement of defense articles or defense services not determined by the President to be needed for the fulfillment of Turkey's NATO responsibilities. It calls further for the submission by the President to Congress of a report concerning any letter of offer to sell any defense article or service under the Foreign Military Sales Act for $25 million or more, and for nonissuance of such offer if the Congress by concurrent resolution objects to such sale. The subsection was to be effective only upon enactment of foreign assistance legislation authorizing sales, credits. and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act for fiscal year 1976. The legislation proposed for fiscal year 1976 would further modify the above quoted provision. (S. 2662, H.R. 11963, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.)
India and Pakistan
On February 24, 1975, the Department of State announced that the U.S. embargo on the export of military equipment to India and Pakistan was lifted and that henceforth requests for arms exports for cash to those two countries would be considered on a case-bycase basis. This ended an arms embargo that had been in effect since 1965. Between 1967 and 1971 and from March 14, 1973, until the lifting of the arms embargo in 1975, the United States had followed a policy of selling to India and Pakistan only nonlethal end items and spares and ammunition for previously supplied equipment of U.S. origin.
In making the announcement, Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations, noted that the lifting of the embargo brought U.S. policy into line with that followed by other major Western arms suppliers such as the British and French. He added:
... this is a cash only policy; we are not planning to provide any equipment on a grant military assistance basis or on credit. In weighing any individual export requests, we will take into account a number of factors including the high importance we attach to continued progress toward India-Pakistan normalization, the effect of any particular sale on the outlook for regional peace and stability, the relationship between U.S. sales and those of other external arms suppliers, and of course the relationship of the request to legitimate defense requirements and the level of armaments in the region.
Mr. Anderson also noted that prior to 1965 the United States had been the major supplier to Pakistan and that the new policy was not anticipated to be open ended. He pointed out further that both the authorizing legislation for military sales and the basic agreements with countries to which the United States supplies arms spell out specific restrictions on their use, such as for self-defense and in keeping with the purposes of the U.N. Charter.
In a press conference on February 25, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger was questioned about a protest received from India regarding the lifting of the embargo. He replied that "India, because of its size and position, has a special role in South Asia which the United States recognizes" and that "the United States has no interest and will not support or engage in an arms race in South Asia.” He added:
It seemed to us. that to maintain an embargo against a friendly country with which we have an allied relationship, while its neighbor was producing and acquiring nearly a billion dollars' worth of arms a year, was morally, politically and symbolically improper.
.. the decision to lift the arms embargo does not mean that the United States will engage in a massive supply of arms to Pakistan or that the United States will engage in arms deliveries that can affect the underlying strategic balance. ..
For the text of the U.S. announcement on the lifting of the arms embargo, see Dept. of State News Briefing, DPC 33, Feb. 24, 1975. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1864, Mar. 17, 1975, pp. 331–332. For the text of Secretary Kissinger's press conference, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1864, Mar. 17, 1975, pp. 321-330.
Secs. 3 and 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended (P.L. 90–629; 22 U.S.C. 2753, 2754; approved Oct. 22, 1968), establish the basis of eligibility and the purposes for which military sales by the U.S. are authorized. Limitations on the uses which may be made of military equipment furnished by the U.S. to Pakistan are contained in the following agreements between the two countries: Agreement relating to transfer of military supplies and equipment to Pakistan effected by exchange of notes of Nov. 29 and Dec. 15, 1950 (TIAS 2165; 1 UST 884); mutual defense agreement signed May 19, 1950 (TIAS 2976; 5 UST 852); and defense support assistance agreement, signed Jan. 11, 1955 (TIAS 3183; 6 UST 501).
A triple veto in the Security Council of the United Nations on June 6, 1975, by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France blocked a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa called for in a draft resolution dealing with the situation in Namibia and sponsored by Cameroon, Guyana, Iraq, Mauritania, and Tanzania. The vote, which came after a week of debate and unsuccessful efforts to find acceptable middle ground, was 10 to 3, with Japan and Italy abstaining.
The Council had met in pursuance of Resolution 366 (1974) by which it had, inter alia, demanded that South Africa make a solemn declaration that it would comply with U.N. resolutions and decisions and that it recognized the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia, demanded that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal of its illegal administration, and decided to meet by May 30, 1975, to review South Africa's compliance with the terms of the resolution.
The five-state draft resolution, in addition to reciting several condemnations and demands of South Africa, specifically declared that the Council, "acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter," determined that the illegal occupation of Namibia constituted “a threat to international peace and security" and decided that all states should prevent any supply to South Africa of arms, ammunition, aircraft, vehicles, military equipment, or spare parts, or any activities in their territories that might promote such supply. The draft further decided that the embargo should remain in effect until it was established to the satisfaction of the Council that the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa had been brought to an end.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and France made clear from the beginning of the discussions that they would oppose any reference to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which concerns threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, and authorizes the application of mandatory sanctions. In a statement before the Security Council on June 3, 1975, Ambassador John Scali, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, noted that there had been some forward movement in Namibia in the last six months, although not enough, and recommended that the Council consider South Africa's offer to resume the dialogue on Namibia with a mutually acceptable representative of the Secretary-General and to enter into discussions with African leaders, the President of the U.N. Council for Namibia, and the Special Committee on Namibia of the Organization of African Unity. Ambassador Scali said that the Security Council's obligation was to foster a peaceful and just settlement; its goal was the exercise by the people of Namibia of their right to self-determination; and its duty was to encourage all the parties concerned and to explore every opportunity for launching the process of timely self-determination. He stated that, in view of South Africa's recent attitude, it was difficult to find that a threat to international peace and security existed within the meaning of the Charter. It would not,
therefore, be appropriate, he said, to invoke mandatory sanctions which were specifically reserved for threats to the peace. With respect to an arms embargo, he noted that the United States had for 12 years voluntarily refused to allow shipments of arms to South Africa, and he invited other states to join in such a voluntary policy.
Following the triple veto of the five-state draft resolution on June 6, 1975, Ambassador Scali made a statement in explanation of the U.S. vote, excerpts from which follow:
my Government believes that the situation in Namibia, however illegal, however unacceptable to the international community does not constitute a threat to international peace and security. . . . we cannot accept the view that there exists a threat to the peace in Namibia in a situation where the wrongdoer, South Africa, has offered, even if on terms not entirely to our liking, to enter into discussions with the organized international community on the objective of self-determination for Namibia.
the United States for twelve long years has followed a policy of banning all arms and military supplies to South Africa. We have done so voluntarily as a matter of principle-deliberately—to avoid encouraging Pretoria to think the United States will sacrifice national principle for military or financial gain. We will continue to uphold principle..
Ambassador Scali's statement may be found at U.N. Doc. S/PV.1825, June 3, 1975, pp. 46–51, and U.N. Doc. S/PV.1829, June 6, 1975, pp. 76–77. For an excerpt from his June 3 statement, see ante, Ch. 2, § 1, p. 21. See also Press Release USUN-64(75), June 6, 1975. Regarding Res. 366 (1974) in respect of Namibia, see the 1974 Digest, Ch. 2, § 1, pp. 9–11. The five-state draft resolution is at U.N. Doc. S/11713, June 6, 1975.
George Aldrich, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, in a memorandum of June 10, 1975, to Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, commented on the legal issues involved in the veto by the United States and others of mandatory sanctions against South Africa in respect of Namibia. He expressed the opinion that the veto could not be justified by resort solely to legal principles, its principal justification being that it was right as a matter of policy. While noting that the policy arguments relating to South Africa could doubtless be buttressed by reference to the U.N. Charter and the inappropriate nature of Chapter VII sanctions, he stated that law did not determine and could not have determined the U.S. veto. He could not, he said, advise asserting that Chapter VII could not lawfully be invoked in the Namibian case. The following is an excerpt from Mr. Aldrich's memorandum:
There is no doubt that Chapter VII of the Charter was designed with interstate conflicts in mind, not unique situations such as Namibia. On the other hand, as revealed by the Rhodesian case, the concepts of threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and act of aggression can legitimately be interpreted by the U.N. Security Council as covering situations other than normal interstate conflict. Unless we were to reverse our position in the Rhodesian case and consider that unique invocation of Chapter VII mandatory sanctions as unlawful, it would be extremely difficult to consider the invocation of Chapter VII unlawful with respect to Namibia—which the International Court of Justice has held to be unlawfully occupied by South Africa. Quite apart from the law, it would not, I believe, be in our national interest to argue that the Security Council lacks the power to determine in its discretion, that an illegal occupation is an act of aggression.
Chapter VII was designed to give the Security Council authority to deal with the most serious illegal uses of armed force by one state against another and has been invoked only once for the purpose of imposing mandatory sanctions during the history of the Charter. All too many wars have proceeded unaffected by Chapter VII. Although it may provide legal authority for sanctions with respect to Namibia, the United States believes that such sanctions would be neither useful nor appropriate for dealing with the present situation in Namibia. ... Dept. of State File No. P75 0105–2337.
§ 7 Arms Control and Disarmament
Strategic Arms Limitation Compliance
In a press conference on December 9, 1975, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger discussed the issue of whether the Soviet Union was complying fully with the terms of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet agreements on strategic arms limitation (SALT). The agreements were the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), signed May 26, 1972 (TIAS 7503; 23 UST 3435; entered into force October 3, 1972), and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed May 26, 1972 (TIAS 7504; 23 UST 3462; entered into force October 3, 1972). The following are excerpts from the Secretary's statement: