Robert S. Ingersoll, Acting Secretary of State, was asked to testify on July 31, 1975, before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations because of his participation in the National Security Council (NSC) deliberations concerning diplomatic and ultimately military action which resulted in the release of the SS Mayaguez and its crew. He outlined the primary factors influencing the policy decisions which arose from the NSC meetings as follows:

First, the President was primarily concerned with obtaining the safe release of the ship and its crew. As soon as it was clear that the ship had been taken to Koh Tang Island and not to the mainland, the National Security Council was faced with develop ing a course of action to prevent the crew from being moved to the mainland, where their rescue would have been more difficult and where the risk of long term internment and the jeopardy to their lives would have increased. In view of the Khmer authorities' hostility toward the United States, the probable conduct of the Cambodians toward the captured Americans was unpredictable.

In the President's letter to the Speaker of the House and to the President pro tempore of the Senate, . . . you received an account of the actions by aircraft to prevent the movement of the crew and to keep track of such movement as could be detected from the air. All of these actions were directed toward minimizing the risks to the crew and toward securing their early safe return.

A second factor influencing National Security Council deliberations was the lack of response to our diplomatic efforts. The President did not make the decision to proceed with military measures to recover the ship and crew until he had come to the reluctant conclusion that diplomatic efforts had not been successful in securing the crew's and the ship's early release. . .

Third, the President was concerned for the principles undermined by the Cambodian action. He believed it was necessary to make clear that the safety of U.S. citizens and the freedom of the seas for U.S. vessels were matters of great concern to the American Government and people. Regardless of the motives the Cambodian Government may have had in seizing the ship, the seizure occurred without any prior warning and without any conceivable basis in international law. The Cambodian authorities, to our knowledge, made no prompt effort to notify us that the ship had been seized or whether and how it might be released. It was important to make clear that this illegal act of force and interference with freedom of navigation by the Cambodian authorities could not be considered an acceptable precedent.

Military action to recover the ship and its crew was finally taken... because we believed that further delay, in the ab

sence of any constructive response to our diplomatic initiatives from any source, would risk removal of the entire crew to the mainland where their rescue would be more difficult and their safety placed in further jeopardy.

It was not until our military actions to recover the ship and crew were already underway that we received in Washington a report of a domestic broadcast in the Cambodian language which did not state that the vessel and crew would be released but only that the vessel would be released. The broadcast did not say when the vessel would be released. Moreover, the broadcast was not directed to the United States. After learning of this message, we announced that as soon as the Cambodian authorities would issue a statement that they were prepared to release the crew members unconditionally and immediately, we would promptly cease military operations. The Cambodian authorities did not issue any such statement. We were not certain that the Cambodians had in fact released the entire crew until some three hours after receiving the domestic broadcast.

It is reasonable to assume that the Cambodian authorities were concerned that our initial efforts to prevent movement of the crew presaged a determined effort to rescue them; we further assume that such concern influenced their decision to release the crew and that our military actions to recover the crew removed any Cambodian doubts about that decision.

We deeply regret the lives lost during this operation. However, even in retrospect, there is no clear reason to believe that courses of action other than those taken would have secured the safe release of the ship and its crew.

The text of Acting Secretary Ingersoll's statement was made available to the press on July 31, 1975. Hearings on Seizure of the Mayaguez before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, July 31 and Sept. 12, 1975, pp. 256–266.

Security in Europe

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975, by the United States and the 34 other participating states, includes a section entitled "Questions Relating to Security in Europe." It contains a preamble affirming the objectives of promoting better relations and ensuring freedom from threats to or attempts against security; continuing détente; overcoming confrontation and distrust; increasing confidence; cooperating in the interest of mankind; and recognizing the indivisibility of security in Europe and the link between that security and security in the world as a whole.

A Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States sets forth guidelines on sovereign equality and

respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes; nonintervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; cooperation among states; and fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law. The declaration is followed by guidelines to give effect to certain of its principles. (See ante, Chapter 2, § 1, pp. 8-12, for the text of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between States and the effectuating guidelines.)

A second portion of the section entitled “Questions Relating to Security in Europe" is devoted to confidence-building measures with respect to the notification of major military maneuvers and movements, questions relating to disarmament, and certain general considerations. The guidelines adopted on these subjects are set forth below:

DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The participating states,

Desirous of eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among them and thus of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world;

Determined to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe;

Determined further to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States as adopted in this Final Act;

Recognizing the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating states lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities; Taking into account considerations relevant to efforts aimed at lessening tension and promoting disarmament;

Recognizing that the exchange of observers by invitation at military maneuvers will help to promote contacts and mutual understanding;

Having studied the question of prior notification of major military movements in the context of confidence-building;

Recognizing that there are other ways in which individual states can contribute further to their common objectives;

Convinced of the political importance of prior notification of major military maneuvers for the promotion of mutual understanding and the strengthening of confidence, stability and security;

Accepting the responsibility of each of them to promote these objectives and to implement this measure, in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities, as essentials for the realization of these objectives;

Recognizing that this measure deriving from politicial decision rests upon a voluntary basis;

Have adopted the following:

I

Prior notification of major military maneuvers

They will notify their major military maneuvers to all other participating states through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notification will be given of major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components (in this context the word "troops" includes amphibious and airborne troops). In the case of independent maneuvers of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combined maneuvers involving them, these troops will be included in this total. Furthermore, in the case of combined maneuvers which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification can also be given.

Notification will be given of major military maneuvers which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating state as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space.

In the case of a participating state whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of maneuvers which take place in an area within 250 kilometers from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating state, the participating state need not, however, give notification in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating state's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating state. Notification will be given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the maneuver or in the case of a maneuver arranged at shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.

Notification will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the states involved in the maneuver, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time frame of its conduct. The participating states will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces.

Prior notification of other military maneuvers

The participating states recognize that they can contribute further to strengthening confidence and increasing security and stability, and to this end may also notify smaller-scale military maneuvers to other participating states, with special regard for those near the area of such maneuvers.

To the same end, the participating states also recognize that they may notify other military maneuvers conducted by them.

Exchange of observers

The participating states will invite other participating states, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards all participating states, to send observers to attend military maneuvers.

The inviting state will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.

The invitation will be given as far ahead as is conveniently possible through usual diplomatic channels.

Prior notification of major military movements

In accordance with the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations the participating states studied the question of prior notification of major military movements as a measure to strengthen confidence.

Accordingly, the participating states recognize that they may, at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence-building, notify their major military movements.

In the same spirit, further consideration will be given by the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to the question of prior notification of major military movements, bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the measures which are set forth in this document.

Other confidence-building measures

The participating states recognize that there are other means by which their common objectives can be promoted.

In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective of confidence-building, the participating states, when conducting their military activities in the area covered by the provisions for the prior notification of major military maneuvers, will duly take into account and respect this objective.

They also recognize that the experience gained by the implementation of the provisions set forth above, together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.

II

Questions relating to disarmament

The participating states recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.

III

General considerations

Having considered the views expressed on various subjects related to the strengthening of security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting détente and disarmament, the participating states, when engaged in such efforts, will, in this context, proceed, in particular, from the following essential considerations:

-The complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security;

The interrelation between the security of each participating state and security in Europe as a whole and the relationship which exists, in the broader context of world security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean area;

-Respect for the security interests of all states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe inherent in their sovereign equality;

-The importance that participants in negotiating fora see to it that information about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an appropriate basis to other states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and, in return, the justified interest of any of those states in having their views considered.

The Final Act of the CSCE also included a section concerned with relationships of the CSCE participants to the non-participating Mediterranean states, the text of which follows:

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The participating states,

Conscious of the geographical, historical, cultural, economic and political aspects of their relationship with the non-participating Mediterranean states, Convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area