« ÎnapoiContinuați »
manner of the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to be conducted freely on an equal footing with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement based on their fundamental and legitimate rights;
6. Urges all parties to refrain from unilateral actions in contravention of Resolution 3212 (XXIX), including changes in the demographic structure of Cyprus;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his role in the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities;
8. Also requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the Security Council and to report on its implementation as soon as appropriate and not later than March 31, 1976;
9. Calls upon all parties to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus;
10. Decides to remain seized of this question.
The Report of the Special Political Committee on Cyprus is at U.N. Doc. A/ 10352. The Report by the Secretary-General on the U.N. Operation in Cyprus for the period June 10, 1975, to Dec. 8, 1975, is at U.N. Doc. S/11900, Dec. 8, 1975. See post, Ch. 13, § 1, p. 763, concerning U.N. Security Council Resolution 367 (1975).
On December 5, 1975, the U.N. General Assembly adopted by a rollcall vote of 84 to 17 (U.S.), with 27 abstentions, Resolution 3414 on the situation in the Middle East. On December 4, U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. stated in plenary session that the United States would vote against the resolution because of its onesided condemnation of Israel; he urged negotiation of the ArabIsraeli dispute. An excerpt from Ambassador Bennett's statement follows:
The resolution before us for our consideration does not, in the view of the United States, help us in the process toward peace we support. We shall vote against it. Its one-sided condemnation of one of the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute and its departure from the accepted negotiating framework established by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 make further settlement between those parties more difficult. It calls upon the Security Council to implement certain resolutions that deal with problems that can only be solved by negotiation..
Further, it adds to the series of one-sided resolutions which are a disservice to ourselves and to this institution. . . . These irresponsible resolutions do not take into account the legitimate concerns of one of the parties and lead us into a domain removed from the reality where a settlement can be achieved.
For the full text of Ambassador Bennett's statement, see Press Release USUN-171(75), Dec. 4, 1975; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1906, Jan. 5, 1976. GA Res. 3414 reads as follows:
The General Assembly,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of the United Nations as well as those principles of international law which prohibit the occupation or acquisition of territory by the use of force and which consider any military occupation, however temporary, or any forcible annexation of such territory, or part thereof, as an act of aggression.
Gravely concerned at the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and Israel's persistent denial of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,
Recalling relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, particularly those concerning the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and its right to participate in any efforts for peace,
Convinced that the early reconvening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region,
Convinced that the present situation prevailing in the Middle East continues to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security, and that urgent measures should be taken in order to ensure Israel's full compliance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the questions of Palestine and the Middle East,
Recognizing that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the question of the Middle East must be based on a comprehensive solution under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into consideration all aspects of the Middle East conflict, including, in particular, the enjoyment by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights, as well as the total withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967,
1. Reaffirms that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and therefore all territories thus occupied must be returned;
2. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and repeated United Nations resolutions;
3. Requests all states to desist from supplying Israel with any military or economic aid as long as it continues to occupy Arab territories and deny the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people;
4. Requests the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all necessary measures for the speedy implementation, according to an appropriate timetable, of all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region through a comprehensive settlement, worked out with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, and within the framework of the United Nations, which ensures complete Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well as full recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the attainment of those rights;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to inform all concerned, including the Cochairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, and to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and report thereon to the Security Council and to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.
On November 10, 1975, Portugal granted independence to the people of Angola, without recognizing any of the three nationalist movements fighting for control in the area as successor government. Secretary of State Kissinger, on September 23, 1975, had urged a negotiated settlement in an address to African Foreign Ministers and heads of delegations to the U.N. General Assembly. He said:
Events in Angola have taken a distressing turn, with widespread violence. We are most alarmed at the interference of extra-continental powers who do not wish Africa well, and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence. We believe a fair and peaceful solution must be negotiated, giving all groups representing the Angolan people a fair role in its future.
Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1894, Oct. 13, 1975, p. 574.
At a press conference on November 11, 1975, Secretary Kissinger reaffirmed U.S. interest in a negotiated settlement. He said:
We favor a negotiation among the three major groups there to attempt to create a transitional government that would permit the popular will to be consulted.
The United States has no national interest in Angola. But Angola is in a position in which the railways for Zaire and Zambia—the outlet to the sea for these two countries—go through Angola. We would support any move that keeps outside powers out of Angola, and we would participate in such a move.
We would also support any move that permits the popular will to be consulted or that forms a transition government in which all the movements that now exist in Angola cooperate. But we cannot recognize one group that seized the capital city with foreign assistance.
Dept of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1901, Dec. 1, 1975, pp. 768–769. See ante, Ch. 2, § 1, p. 20, and Ch. 2, § 3, p. 34.
On August 20, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger, at the request of the Egyptian and Israeli Governments, traveled to the Middle East to renew his role as mediator in the Middle East conflict. An interim agreement between Egypt and Israel initialed on September 1 at Jerusalem and Alexandria, was signed at Geneva on September 4, 1975, and entered into force on October 10, 1975, upon signature by the parties of a detailed military protocol. President Ford issued a statement on September 1, in which he said:
The interim agreement . . . reduces the risk of war in the Middle East and provides fresh opportunities for further progress toward peace for a troubled area whose turmoil has affected the lives and prosperity of peoples of all nations.
The parties have taken an important and indispensable step on the long and hard road to peace. The countries concerned made clear that they wanted America's effort to continue..
The agreement is fair and balanced, and we hope that as a further practical test of peace on the ground it will contribute to
building the confidence between the two sides which is required if ultimate peace is to be achieved.
The United States does not consider this agreement an end in itself, and it is strongly committed to continue to help make progress on all aspects of the problem.
See Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1892, Sept. 29, 1975, p. 460.
Secretary Kissinger, in an address at Cincinnati on September 16, 1975, reviewed the step-by-step approach taken by the United States since 1973 toward bringing about the basic political conditions for the overall settlement called for by U.N. Security Council Resolution 338. He described the new Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the U.S. role as follows:
-Territorially, it provides for withdrawal of Israeli forces from the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez and from the strategic Sinai passes. Egypt recovers a significant portion of its territory, including the economically important oilfields.
– Militarily, the agreement reaffirms the cease-fire. It widens the buffer zone and extends the limitations of forces that were negotiated in the disengagement agreement of January 1974. These balanced provisions markedly reduce the danger of surprise attack that figured centrally in the wars of 1967 and 1973.
-Politically, the agreement, which remains in force until it is superseded by another one, commits both sides to a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict and to refrain from use or threat of force or of military blockade. It permits nonmilitary Israeli cargoes to go through the newly reopened Suez Canal.
... It represents the most far-reaching practical test of peace-political, military, and psychological—in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time, Israel and an Arab state have taken a step not just to halt fighting or to disentangle forces but to reduce the danger of future war and to commit themselves to peaceful settlement of the conflict. The effort that went into it and the inhibitions that both sides had to overcome reflect a serious determination to end a generation of violence. And both sides have affirmed that the agreement is a significant step in a process that must be continued toward a just and
The Egyptian-Israeli agreement is a step in a continuing process. The agreement states explicitly that the parties shall continue the negotiating efforts to reach an overall final peace settlement in accordance with Resolution 338.
The United States did not help negotiate this agreement in order to put an end to the process of peace, but to give it new impetus. There can be no stagnation, for the area remains tense and volatile.
For our part, we stand ready to assist as the parties desire. We will seriously encourage a negotiation between Syria and Israel. We are prepared to consult all countries concerned, including the Soviet Union, about the timing and substance of a reconvened Geneva Conference. And we are fully aware that there will be no permanent peace unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.
The United States seeks no special advantage in the Middle East. It has always been our policy that the nations of the region should be free to determine their own relationships with any outside power. Therefore the United States would not understand, and would be obliged to oppose, efforts by any outside power to thwart the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.
In the search for a final peace, the United States is prepared to work with the Soviet Union. We are cosponsors of the Security Council resolutions that launched this hopeful course of negotiation; we are cochairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference, which met at an early crucial phase. While we have had important differences with the Soviet Union over the substance of a settlement, our two countries have held parallel views that the Middle East situation poses grave dangers and that partial steps must be part of, and contribute to, progress toward a comprehensive solution.
For the full text of Secretary Kissinger's address, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1893, Oct. 6, 1975, pp. 493–500.
The interim Egyptian-Israeli agreement is in four parts: (1) a formal agreement in which the parties undertake not to use or threaten the use of force or blockade, to observe the cease-fire, to establish a new buffer zone, to continue the U.N. Emergency Force and extend its mandate annually, to establish a Joint Commission under the chief coordinator of the U.N. peacekeeping forces in the Middle East, to permit non military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel to pass through the Suez Canal, and to continue negotiations for a final peace agreement; (2) an annex with details on force limitations and surveillance; (3) a military protocol; and (4) a United States proposal for an early warning system entrusted to the United States (TIAS 8155, 8156; 26 UST 2271, 2278; entered into force Oct. 13, 1975).
For the text of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel initialed on Sept. 1 and signed on Sept. 4, 1975, and the U.S. proposal, see U.N. Doc. S/11818/Add. 1, Sept. 2, 1975; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1892, Sept. 29, 1975, pp. 466-470. See ante, Ch. 5, § 5, pp. 316-323 regarding U.S. agreements with Egypt and Israel, and post, Ch. 14, § 5, pp. 827–829 regarding the early warning system.
Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, in statements to the U.N. Security Council on December 5 and December 8, 1975, expressed U.S. willingness to support an appropriate Security Council resolution which would register the disapproval of the Council of all acts