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GUIDELINES FOR HOLDING AND RELEASING RESERVES
Continuation of full production policies on the part of major producers should provide supplies of grain adequate to permit the buildup of reserves. However, internationally agreed rules or guidelines will be required to assure properly coordinated action. Action to increase reserve holdings would be triggered by a quantitative indicator based upon stock levels and deviations in production from the long term production trend.
Likewise, agreed rales or guidelines would be needed to govern drawdown of reserves. There must be a clear presumption that all participants will make reserves available when needed. Conversely, reserves must not be released prematurely or exceşsively and thus unnecessarily depress market prices. National action to release reserves would be triggered by a quantitative indicator based on stock levels and production shortfalls operating in a manner similar to that for acquiring reserves.
A reserve system based on a two-stage response to shortage situations would provide flexibility in meeting short supply situations, while assuring that reserves would be released when needed.
(1) Warning stage.-When a potential shortage situation-defined by an agreed indicator—was identified, participants in the agreement would consult to determine what action, if any, was warranted and to coordinate the measures each would take within previously agreed guidelines. The Guidelines could provide for:
Measures to reduce stocks (apart from reserves).
Exchange of additional information on anticipated production and trade levels including purchase and sale plans of Government-constituted buy
ing and selling agencies. (2) Shortage stage.—When a shortage situation was identified by an agreed indicator, participants would be obliged to make available reserve stocks up to the reserve holding commitment of each. The quantities to be made available would be determined through consultation, taking into account the supply situation in participating countries and the effect of actions previously taken in the warning stage. If a participant were willing to make available more than the minimum quantity agreed upon, it could do so. Access to Supplies
Participants in the system should receive assured access to supplies at market prices. Non-participants or participants not complying with the agreement, would not be assured of obtaining access to reserves held by others.
Should a shortage be so severe that participants were forced to apply export restraints after having taken the measures outlined in the warning and shortage stages above, they would give preferential treatment to other complying participants.
Participation and Duration
Participation in the agreement should be open to all governments represented at the World Food Conference and the government of any country party to the International Wheat Agreement.
A government could withdraw from the agreement upon due notice, but would be required to fulfill its commitments under the agreement with regard to the management of reserves for the current crop year and the crop year immediately following.
The agreement would have a five-year term but could be dissolved 12 months after a decision effected by a majority of the votes of both the exporting participants and the importing participants, counted separately. Special Provisions for Developing Countries
Special assistance should be extended to participating developing countries to assist them with meeting their obligation to hold a portion of global drawdown.
Developing countries with larger reserve obligations could be provided with financial or food aid to help them meet their commitments. The aggregate shares of developing countries with small reserve obligations could be added to the reserve obligation of developed participants without greatly increasing these commitments. This dual approach would help assure that reserve
targets were achieved in developing countries without imposing an undue financial burden. Administration of the System
Each participating country should be free to determine how its reserves will be maintained and what measures to provide for their buildup, holding and
However, participants would have to assure their ability to fulfill their obligations under the agreement. The agreement would not attempt to specify the manner in which individual participants would meet their obligations.
To accomplish its objectives, the system would require provision for exchange of information and data regarding crop prospects, supply availabilities and stock, anticipated demand and international trade in grain. Such information would be needed on a timely basis.
The agreement would need to provide for governing and executive bodies as appropriate. These bodies, and the agreement itself, could be independent of existing international organizations, but the International Wheat Council could be asked to provide facilities and the services of its Secretariat to administer the agreement. Activities of the governing and executive bodies such as meetings, reporting requirements, etc., would need to be coordinated to the extent possible.
Administrative costs, e.g., for meeting facilities and the services of the Secretariat, would be borne: (1) by countries which are members of the IWC through their contributions to that organization and (2) by countries not members of the IWC through their direct contributions to the IWC of a pro rata share of these costs.
Members of the Reserves Agreement would bear the costs of managing their
For the full text of the U.S. proposal, see S. Ex. Rept. No. 94–18, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
A statement of principles on economic and social aspects of migrant labor was included in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975, by the United States and the 34 other participating states. The statement follows:
Economic and Social Aspects of Migrant Labor
The participating states,
Considering that the movements of migrant workers in Europe have reached substantial proportions, and that they constitute an important economic, social, and human factor for host countries as well as for countries of origin,
Recognizing that workers' migrations have also given rise to a number of economic, social, human and other problems in both the receiving countries and the countries of origin,
Taking due account of the activities of the competent international organizations, more particularly the International Labor Organization, in this area,
are of the opinion that the problems arising bilaterally from the migration of workers in Europe as well as between the participating states should be dealt with by the parties directly concerned, in order to resolve these problems in their mutual interest, in the light of the concern of each state involved to take due account of the requirements resulting from its socioeconomic situation, having regard to the obligation of each state to comply with the bilateral and multilateral agreements to which it is party, and with the following aims in view:
to encourage the efforts of the countries of origin directed towards increasing the possibilities of employment for their nationals in their own territories, in particular by developing economic cooperation appropriate for this purpose and suitable for the host countries and the countries of origin concerned;
to ensure, through collaboration between the host country and the country of origin, the conditions under which the orderly movement of workers might take place, while at the same time protecting their personal and social welfare and, if appropriate, to organize the recruitment of migrant workers and the provision of elementary language and vocational training;
to ensure equality of rights between migrant workers and nationals of the host countries with regard to conditions of employment and work and to social security, and to endeavor to ensure that migrant workers may enjoy satisfactory living conditions, especially housing conditions;
to endeavor to ensure, as far as possible, that migrant workers may enjoy the same opportunities as nationals of the host countries of finding other suitable employment in the event of unemployment;
to regard with favor the provision of vocational training to migrant workers and, as far as possible, free instruction in the language of the host country, in the framework of their employment;
to confirm the right of migrant workers to receive, as far as possible, regular information in their own language, covering both their country of origin and the host country;
to ensure that the children of migrant workers established in the host country have access to the education usually given there, under the same conditions as the children of that country and, furthermore, to permit them to receive supplementary education in their own language, national culture, history and geography;
to bear in mind that migrant workers, particularly those who have acquired qualifications, can by returning to their countries after a certain period of time help to remedy any deficiency of skilled labor in their country of origin;
to facilitate, as far as possible, the reuniting of migrant workers with their families;
to regard with favor the efforts of the countries of origin to attract the savings of migrant workers, with a view to increasing, within the framework of their economic development, appropriate opportunities for employment, thereby facilitating the reintegration of these workers on their return home.
For the full text of the Final Act of the CSCE, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1888, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350. For reference to other provisions of the Final Act, see index entries, this Digest, under Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) (1975).
Ambassador John Scali, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, in addressing the Eighteenth Session of the U.N. Population Commission on February 20, 1975, commended the World Population Plan of Action adopted by the General Assembly on December 17, 1974 (Resolution 3344 (XXIX)), and referred to the efforts being made in the United States to put the plan into effect. His statement included the following passage:
The position of the United States has always been that population programs are only a part of, but an essential part of, economic and social development efforts. . . . only 2% of global development assistance goes to population programs. That hardly indicates excessive emphasis on this aspect of development. It may, in fact, be too little.
The Plan of Action devised and agreed upon by the World Population Conference in Bucharest represents ... one of the United Nations' most important achievements of recent years. ... In the United States, we are reviewing our own population policies and programs to see how we can best cooperate with others in implementing the Plan of Action. We are continuing to expand our own national family planning service programs and our country's fertility rates continue to decline. We have, in fact, been below the replacement level of fertility for three years now.
Already countries with 75% of the peoples of the developing world have national population programs in effect. Others are moving toward the adoption of such programs. It is ... clear that as these programs succeed and expand, considerably increased support will be needed for them domestically, from the present donor countries and from those which have more re cently become potential donors by reason of their new wealth.
Press Release USUN-11(75), Feb. 20, 1975. For information on the World Population Plan of Action, see the 1974 Digest, pp. 586–593.
§ 12 Economic Sanctions
General Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, in an address at Houston, Texas, on March 1, 1975, criticized the use of automatic sanctions to exert economic leverage. The following is an excerpt from his address:
Experience has . . . demonstrated that automatic sanctions—including the 1974 Trade Act's denial of preferences to such OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries as Ecuador and Venezuela, which did not join the oil embargo-are almost always harmful. Automatic sanctions allow no tactical flexibility. They present other governments with a public ultimatum; by seeming to challenge the recipient's sovereignty, they harden positions, encumber diplomacy, and poison the entire relationship.
The Administration supports the purpose of the various bills which have been introduced into the Congress, including one by
. . Senator [Lloyd M.] Bentsen, to modify the provisions of the Trade Act which involve Venezuela and Ecuador. And it is prepared to seek the modification of legislation requiring the automatic cutoff of aid. But as a matter of political reality, a great deal will depend on our ability to work with the nations of Latin America on new approaches which give practical assurance of fair treatment. They must recognize that congressional sanctions stem from perceived injuries to legitimate interests.
As part of the new dialogue, the Administration is prepared to develop new principles and practices which may commend themselves to Congress as a better remedy than automatic sanctions.
Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1865, Mar. 24, 1975, pp. 361-369.
On July 29, 1975, at San José, Costa Rica, the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States (OAS) effectively removed the OAS requirement that parties to the Rio Treaty maintain diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba which it had imposed in 1964. Acting under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) (TIAS 1838; 62 Stat. 1681; entered into force for the United States December 3, 1948), the Sixteenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted on that date a resolution entitled “Freedom of Action of the States Parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to Normalize or Conduct their Relations with the Republic of Cuba at the Level and in the Form that Each State Deems Advisable." The first operative paragraph affirmed the principle of nonintervention, and the second operative paragraph resolved:
To leave the states parties to the Rio Treaty free to normalize or conduct in accordance with the national policy and interests of each their relations with the Republic of Cuba at the level and in the form that each state deems advisable.
An effort to rescind the sanctions at a Meeting of Consultation held at Quito, Ecuador, on November 12, 1974, had failed when only 12 of the 21 members voted to lift the sanctions, thus failing to meet the two-thirds majority requirement under the Rio Treaty (Article 17). See the 1974 Digest, pp. 602-603.
The decision to eliminate the obligatory nature of the sanctions followed the signing of a protocol of amendment to the Rio Treaty. Among the treaty amendments approved was an amendment to Article 17, renumbered Article 20, to permit lifting sanctions by an absolute majority vote, but leaving in effect the two-thirds requirement for imposing sanctions. As the protocol of amendment would go into effect only upon ratification by two-thirds of the members, the freedom of action resolution at San José required 14 votes for adoption. The resolution received 16 affirmative votes,