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international bodies, in particular the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
Provisions concerning trade and industrial cooperation
Harmonization of standards The participating states,
Recognizing the development of international harmonization of standards and technical regulations and of international cooperation in the field of certification as an important means of eliminating technical obstacles to international trade and industrial cooperation, thereby facilitating their de velopment and increasing productivity.
reaffirm their interest to achieve the widest possible international harmonization of standards and technical regulations;
express their readiness to promote international agreements and other appropriate arrangements on acceptance of certificates of conformity with standards and technical regulations;
consider it desirable to increase international cooperation on standardization, in particular by supporting the activities of intergovernmental and other appropriate organizations in this field.
Specific bilateral arrangements The participating states,
Conscious of the need to facilitate trade and to promote the application of new forms of industrial cooperation,
will consider favorably the conclusion, in appropriate cases, of specific bilateral agreements concerning various problems of mutual interest in the fields of commercial exchanges and industrial cooperation, in particular with a view to avoiding double taxation and to facilitating the transfer of profits and the return of the value of the assets invested.
For the full text of the Final Act of the CSCE, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1888, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350. For reference to other provisions of the Final Act, see index entries, this Digest, under Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCEX1975).
On June 5, 1975, President Ford established a Textile Trade Policy Group to be chaired by the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations and to consist, in addition, of Under Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, and the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy. It replaced the Special Working Group for Textile Trade Policy within the Council on International Economic Policy, established in 1972. In a memorandum to officials of the relevant departments and agencies, the President set forth the duties of the new group as follows:
1. Advise generally with respect to policies affecting actions by the United States concerning international trade in textiles and textile products under Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, as amended, and other laws.
2. Establish procedures by which the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements shall, under the policy guidance of the Textile Trade Policy Group, take actions with respect to the rights and obligations of the United States under Articles 3 and 8 of the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, and with respect to any other matter affecting textile trade policy.
3. Develop policy proposals with respect to the negotiation of additional bilateral and multilateral textile trade agreements.
4. Authorize and provide for the negotiation of bilateral agreements regarding international trade in textiles which it determines to be appropriate with representatives of governments of foreign countries.
The memorandum also directs the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements to continue to supervise the imple mentation of United States rights and obligations under textile trade agreements, but to submit to the new group reports and recommendations concerning textile trade policy and the implementation of textile trade agreements as requested.
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 11, No. 23, June 9, 1975, p. 602.
The United States submitted to the Textiles Surveillance Body, established under the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (TIAS 7840; 25 UST 1001; entered into force January 1, 1974, except for Article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 which entered into force April 1, 1974), status reports through July 14, 1975, pursuant to the obligation embodied in Article 2 of that Arrangement. Article 2 obligated the participating countries to terminate or bring into conformity with the Arrangement all of the quantitative restrictions which they applied to textile imports at the time of the Arrangement's coming into force. Under paragraph 2 of that Article, unilateral restrictions, unless justified under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), including its Annexes and Protocols, were to be eliminated within one year of the Arrangement's coming into force, or brought into conformity with it by one of the three procedures provided in the paragraph. See also the 1974 Digest, p. 485.
The United States reported that by July 14, 1975, it had renegotiated, under. Article 4 of the Arrangement, 17 of its previously existing bilateral agreements, and that negotiations were still in progress on two others. The United States also reported termination of, or conclusion of agreements to terminate, seven other bilateral agreements containing quantitative restrictions on textile imports, and negotiations in progress for the termination of one other. In four other cases, agreements had been allowed to expire.
Report of the Textiles Surveillance Body, GATT Doc. COM.TEX/SB/115, Aug. 28, 1975, pp. 19–22, 70–73.
On July 14, 1975, Julius L. Katz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, testified before the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives regarding developments affecting world sugar trade since the defeat in the House of Representatives in 1974 of the bill to renew the U.S. Sugar Act, 7 U.S.C. 1100 et seq. That Act granted preferential quotas to various foreign countries from which sugar could be brought or imported into the United States. With respect to renegotiation of the International Sugar Agreement to which the United States had not been a party since 1968, Mr. Katz stated:
... The United States continues to cooperate with the International Sugar Organization by providing statistical data and by sending observers to meetings of the Sugar Council. ...
Although the United States has been a member of sugar agreements dating as far back as 1937, we did not choose to participate in the 1968 agreement. Since all U.S. sugar imports were covered by special arrangement, they would have, in any case, been exempt from the regulation of the 1968 agreement. Thus U.S. participation in the agreement was not necessary either to support the operation of the agreement or to protect the U.S. market. With the end of the Sugar Act, U.S. participation in an international sugar agreement would become more meaningful.
Should the International Sugar Council decide to open negotiations for a new sugar agreement later this year or next, it would be our intention to participate actively in the negotiations. Whether we will be a member of any new agreement will, however, depend on a number of considerations, including our evaluation of the agreement negotiated and the future course of U.S. sugar policy.
The question has been raised whether the absence of a sugar agreement or a U.S. Sugar Act is likely to lead to a sugar cartel among foreign producers. In my view the threat of cartel action in sugar is not serious. This is not to say that producers will not seek to consult among themselves, to coordinate their policies, and even to concert their price policies. I seriously question, however, whether any group of producers can without consumer cooperation succeed in regulating price for any significant period of time. Cartel arrangements are inherently unstable and can endure only so long as it takes for a supply response to undermine the cartel. For sugar, unlike petroleum, the supply response would not be long in coming.
Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1887, Aug. 25, 1975, pp. 277-278.
On December 1, 1975, the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the 1975 protocols for the further extension of the 1971 Wheat Trade Convention and the 1971 Food Aid Convention, which together constitute the International Wheat Agreement (TIAS 7144; 22 UST 820; entered into force definitively for the United States July 24, 1971). On January 5, 1976, the United States deposited its ratification of the two protocols, which continue the International Wheat Agreement in effect until June 30, 1976. The Foreign Relations Committee, in reporting the protocols favorably noted that discussions concerning a new wheat agreement that could possibly come into force by June 30, 1976, were being held in the framework of the International Wheat Council. The Committee also took note of the U.S. proposal at those meetings for a fiveyear agreement on an international grain reserves system.
See the 1974 Digest, pp. 486 487 for a summary of the International Wheat Agreement. See S. Ex. C and S. Ex. Rept. No. 94–18, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., regarding the 1975 protocols. For the U.S. proposal on grain reserves, see post, Ch. 10, $ 10, p. 686.
On October 28, 1975, the Senate gave its advice and consent to U.S. acceptance of the 1974 protocol (Senate Exec. B, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.) for the continuation in force of the International Coffee Agreement of 1968, as extended (TIAS 6584, 7809; 19 UST 6333; 25 UST 379). The protocol kept alive the International Coffee Organization through September 30, 1976, or up to 12 months beyond that date if a new coffee agreement had by then progressed to a specified degree.
The text of a new International Coffee Agreement, 1976, was approved by the International Coffee Council on Dec. 3, 1975, to be open for signature from Jan. 31 to July 31, 1976. It has a duration of six years, and contains transitional provisions for uninterrupted continuation of the International Coffee Agreement of 1968, as extended. On Feb. 27, 1976, the United States signed the new agreement.
The United States and the Arab Republic of Egypt, on February 13, 1975, signed an agreement (TIAS 8039; 26 UST 371; entered into force February 13, 1975) providing for a loan by the United States of $80 million to Egypt for a term of 40 years, including a 10-year grace period on the repayment of principal with interest at two percent per annum during the grace period and three percent per annum thereafter. The purpose of the loan was to finance the foreign exchange costs of commodities and commodity-related services which were to be procured from the United States and which were needed by Egypt to increase its agricultural and industrial production.
The U.S. loan was intended to alleviate Egypt's difficult balance of payments situation, arising from the 1973 war and the coincident rise in international prices for food and other commodities. It followed similar loans made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and a number of European donors. The intended effect was to enable Egypt to purchase from U.S. suppliers $80 million in agricultural and industrial commodities such as trucks, tractors, spare parts, tallow, and industrial chemicals crucial to Egypt's economic recovery.
Dept. of State File LT.
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, at a news conference in the Department of State on January 14, 1975, announced that the 1972 trade agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union “cannot be brought into force at this time.” The trade agreement had been signed at Washington on October 18, 1972, and was to enter into force upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance. Secretary Kissinger explained that the Soviet Government had informed the U.S. Government that it could not accept a trading relationship based on legislation recently enacted in the United States. The legislation referred to was the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 88 Stat. 1978; 19 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), approved January 3, 1975. The Secretary added that the Soviet Union “considers this legislation as contravening both the 1972 Trade Agreement which had called for an unconditional elimination of discriminatory trade restrictions, and the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs." Expressing the Administration's regret at the turn of events, he stated that it continued "to regard an