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owner undertakes a hiring and training program for U.S. citizens or legally domiciled aliens. Possible extension beyond the four-year period is provided for.
See also H. Rept. No. 94–292 and S. Rept. No. 94 474.
The Chairman of the First Main Committee at the Geneva session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva March 17-May 9, 1975, produced an informal single negotiating text under the heading “Convention on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.” It includes sections on general principles, the establishment and functioning of an International Seabed Authority, including a Tribunal on disputes settlement and an organ of the Seabed Authority to be known as "The Enterprise,” as well as final provisions for a convention.
Ambassador John R. Stevenson, U.S. Representative at the Geneva session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, in reporting on June 4, 1975, to the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, characterized the negotiation on the nature of the deep seabed regime and the Seabed Authority as “the principal stumbling block to a comprehensive law of the sea treaty." He asserted that the basic problem was the ideological gap between those countries possessing the technological ability to develop deep seabed minerals and those developing countries which insisted that an International Authority directly and effectively control all deep seabed mining and ultimately become the exclusive operator on the deep seabed.
The U.S. delegation report summarized the Committee I negotiations on the deep seabeds, and the U.S. negotiating positions with respect to them, as follows:
Committee 1 (Deep Seabed)
The United States ... came to Geneva prepared to be more flexible on issues of direct concern to the developing countries. We expressed our willing. ness to consider basic conditions in the treaty as opposed to detailed regulatory provisions (on the condition that detailed regulations for the provisional period would be adopted by the Conference) and to consider a system of joint ventures, with the possibility of profit-sharing, as the single method of exploitation.
(a) Basic Conditions and the Exploitation System
In the working group, the United States explored a system for the reservation of areas. Under this approach, an applicant for a joint venture would submit two mine sites, one of which the Authority would designate as a reserved area. In the reserved areas, the Authority could negotiate with applicants for the most favorable financial terms and commitments to transfer technology.
At the same time that the Group of 77 was considering the United States banking system proposal and any implications it might have, the U.S.S.R. formally introduced a draft of basic conditions that was applicable to a parallel system in which the Authority directly exploited a portion of the seabed-by itself or under contract with private entities—while another portion of the area was reserved exclusively for state access.
At mid-session the chairman of the working group introduced a personal draft of basic conditions that focused primarily on a contractual joint venture system that included reservation of areas for both states and for direct exploitation by the Authority. This elaboration of a parallel system (an approach in which the Authority directly exploits at the same time that states and their nationals exploit under a separate system) was intensively considered by the Group of 17, who eventually rejected the concept of designating areas solely for state exploitation and also rejected the parallel system as elaborated in the draft. (b) Machinery
The United States delivered a statement in which we listed twelve critical elements that would have to appear in an acceptable version of the machinery articles: (1) the Authority's control should only cover activities directly related to exploitation and should not extend to other activities, such as basic or fundamental research; (2) the Authority's powers should only be those specifically provided for; (3) the Assembly's voting procedures should protect minority interests, require efforts to reach consensus, and provide for the suspension of Assembly action if an advisory opinion on a legal matter was requested of the Tribunal; (4) the Assembly's powers should not overlap those of the Council; (5) basic conditions that elaborated the Authority's fundamental resource policies; (6) a rulemaking procedure similar to ICAO's; (7) the Council should have exclusive jurisdiction over the Authority's powers relating to exploitation; (8) a rules commission, supervisory commission, and a commission empowered to enter into contracts should have separate functions and report directly to the Council; (9) an effective dispute settlement system; (10) stringent conflict of interests provisions and penalties for data disclosure to apply to the Secretariat; (11) a financially self-sufficient Authority with the power to borrow funds in the initial years; (12) provisional application.
For the text of Ambassador Stevenson's statement of June 4, 1975, and a statement on the same date by Leigh Ratiner, Administrator of the U.S. Ocean Mining Administration, concerning the work in Committee I on deep seabed mining, see Hearings on Status Report on Law of the Sea Conference before the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., June 4, 1975, pp. 1169–1174. The informal single negotiating text produced by the Chairman of Committee I at the Geneva session of the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference is at A/CONF.62/ WP.8/Part I, May 7, 1975. For the text and the report of the U.S. delegation, see Hearings on Status Report on Law of the Sea Conference, supra, and The Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, Geneva Session, March-May 1975, Report to the Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
SS Mayaguez Incident On May 12, 1975, Cambodian forces seized the American merchant ship SS Mayaguez, with a crew of 40 aboard, in international waters in the Gulf of Thailand. The SS Mayaguez, an unarmed commercial vessel owned by the Sea-Land Corporation of Menlo Park, New Jersey, was fired upon and halted by Cambodian gunboats and forcibly boarded. The boarding took place at 09 degrees, 48 minutes north latitude, 102 degrees, 53 minutes east longitude. The vessel was en route from Hong Kong to Thailand on an established trade route and was some 52 nautical miles from the Cambodian coast. It was some seven nautical miles from the islands of Poulo Wai, which were understood by the United States Government to have been claimed by both Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. The vessel was forced to the Cambodian port of Kompong Som, renamed Sihanoukville.
White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen on May 15 released a statement to the press in which he said that the President considered the seizure “an act of piracy” and had issued instructions to demand the immediate release of the ship. The statement added that a Cambodian failure to release it would have the most
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 11, No. 20, May 19, 1975, p.
After attempting unsuccessfully through diplomatic channels, as well as through public demands, to obtain the release of the vessel and crew, the President on the evening of May 13, 1975, ordered the U.S. Armed Forces to undertake military action to that end, in accordance with the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In a report to the U.N. Security Council on May 14, 1975, the U.S. Government stated:
The vessel was on the high seas, in international shipping lanes commonly used by ships calling at the various ports of Southeast Asia. Even if, in the view of others, the ship were considered to be within Cambodian territorial waters, it would clearly have been engaged in innocent passage to the port of another country. Hence, its seizure was unlawful and involved a clear-cut illegal use of force.
See U.N. Doc. S/11689, May 15, 1975. For the text of the U.S. note to the Security Council and for a detailed account of U.S. military action in response to the Cambodian seizure, see post, Ch. 14, $8 1 and 8, pp. 777 and 879.
On May 15, 1975, President Ford announced that the vessel had been recovered intact and the crew had been rescued.
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 11, No. 20, May 19, 1975, p. 514.
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) of the U.S. Government, on May 15, 1975, recorded a Cambodian radio broadcast of a Cambodian communique, dated at Phnom Penh May 15, 1975, charging the vessel with invading Cambodian territorial waters for purposes of espionage. The communique was the first public notice of the alleged basis for Cambodian seizure of the SS Mayaguez. Excerpts from the communique, as translated by the FBIS, follow:
. . . U.S. imperialist spy ships have entered Cambodia's territorial waters and engaged in espionage activities there almost daily, especially in the areas of Sihanoukville port, from Pring, Tang and Wai Islands to Pres Island, south of Sihanoukville.
These ships have been operating as fishing vessels. There have been two or three of them entering our territorial waters daily. . .
on May 12, 1975, at 1400 our patrol sighted another large vessel steaming toward our waters. We took no action at first. The ship continued to intrude deeper into our waters, passing the Wai Islands eastward to a point four or five kilometers beyond the islands. Seeing that this ship intentionally violated our waters, our patrol then stopped it in order to examine and question it and report back to our higher authorities so that the latter could report to the Royal Government. This vessel sails in the form of a merchant ship code-named Mayaguez, flying American flags and manned by an Ameri
It is ... evident that this ship came to violate our waters, conduct espionage and provoke incidents to create pretexts or mislead the opinion of the world people, the American people and the American politicians, pretending that the Cambodian nation and people are the provocateurs while feigning innocence on their part.
Regarding the Mayaguez ship, we have no intention of detaining it permanently and we have no desire to stage provocations. We only wanted to know the reason for its coming and to warn it against violating our waters again. This is why our coast guard seized this ship. Their goal was to examine it, question it and make a report to higher authorities who would then report to the Royal Government so that the Royal Government could itself decide to order it to withdraw from Cambodia's territorial waters and warn it against conducting further espionage and provocative activities. This applies to this Mayaguez ship and to any other vessels.
we will release this ship, but we will not allow the U.S. imperialists to violate our territorial waters, conduct espionage in our territorial waters, provoke incidents in our territorial waters or force us to release their ships whenever they want, by applying threats.
For the full text of the Cambodian communique, see The New York Times, May 16, 1975, p. 15.
With respect to the Cambodian allegation that the SS Mayaguez was in territorial waters, it is relevant that both the United States and Cambodia were parties to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (TIAS 5639; 15 UST 1606; entered into force for the U.S. Sept. 10, 1964, and for Cambodia Mar. 18, 1960). Art. 14 of that Convention provides that, subject to the articles of the Convention, “ships of all states, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea."
A White House announcement on May 13, 1975, stated that after the seizure of the SS Mayaguez, a warning was issued to mariners in that area. The warning specifically disclaimed any recognition of Cambodian or Vietnamese territorial sea claims in the area of the seizure. Following is the text of the notice to mariners, as issued by the Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center at 7:15 p.m., e.d.t., May 12, 1975:
Special Warning: Shipping is advised until further notice to remain more than 35 nautical miles off the coast of Cambodia and more than 20 nautical miles off the coast of Viet-Nam including off lying islands. Recent incidents have been reported of firing on, stopping and detention of ships within waters claimed by Cambodia, particularly in the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island. This warning in no way should be construed as United States recognition of Cambodian or Vietnamese territorial sea claims or as derogation of the right of innocent passage for United States flag vessels, or derogation of the freedom of the high seas.
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 11, No. 20, May 19, 1975, p. 510. Regarding the SS Mayaguez incident, see also ante, Ch. 2, § 1, p. 13; post, Ch. 13, § 3, p. 766; Ch. 14, § 1, p. 777; Ch. 14, § 8, p. 879.
On February 25, 1975, Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, announced the creation of an Ocean Mining Administration within the Department of the Interior to promote and encourage ocean mineral resource recovery from the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The Ocean Mining Administration is charged with developing policy for deep ocean minerals recovery and implementing a domestic program to provide new sources of nickel, copper and other minerals from the seabed.
In announcing the new Administration, Secretary Morton underscored the importance of ocean mining to the future raw material needs of the United States. He said: “By 1990 the United States can become a net exporter of nickel, copper and cobalt, if we ensure a healthy, stable investment climate for ocean mining now. This would reduce our present high level of dependence on other countries for several of these metals.” The Secretary expressed the hope that in 1975, which he called a critical year for the ocean miner, the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea would be concluded successfully. He added:
The Administration, however, mindful of its responsibilities to reduce wherever possible our nation's vulnerability to interruptible or high cost sources of raw materials, will have to be prepared to act through a domestic program to secure our access to ocean minerals. We must create an investment climate which will promote the development of this new minerals frontier while at the same time protecting the ocean environment.
The Ocean Mining Administration, under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Energy and Minerals, is to supervise the conduct of ocean mineral technology and resource