U.S. coastal fishermen are faced with a depletion of some fish stocks which they attribute to overfishing by foreign vessels. They are demanding that the United States create a 200-mile fisheries zone with strict regulations.

Unilateral action to solve the problems of the oceans raises serious questions. Let me explore some of them briefly:

First of all, would unilateral extension of our fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles be consistent with international law? The International Court of Justice held last year that Iceland's declaration of a 50-mile fisheries zone was inconsistent with the legal rights of the United Kingdom and Germany. On the other hand,... there is an emerging consensus within the Law of the Sea Conference supporting a 200-mile economic zone which would, among other things, create the equivalent of a 200-mile fisheries zone. If legislation were modeled on the Law of the Sea Conference, could it be defended on the ground that it was based on emerging international law?

However, even if declaration of a 200-mile fisheries zone would be consistent with developing international law, it might inspire broader or more extensive claims by others, including claims to control other activities within the zone, such as navigation and scientific research.

Would unilateral extension of our fisheries jurisdiction be consistent with other important United States foreign policy objectives? Most of the bills currently pending before Congress would permit the Administration to negotiate agreements with other nations such as the Soviet Union and Japan-to enable them to continue fishing off our coasts- but at greatly reduced levels. They would require the Coast Guard to seize vessels fishing in violation of agreements or without agreements.

If nations who fish off our coasts do not acquiesce in our unilateral extension, what sort of confrontation will result? A seizure under this legislation of a foreign vessel fishing for cod could arguably violate the same article of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas—and the same principle of freedom of the seas that was violated by the Cambodian Navy when it seized the Mayaguez.

In this connection, as illustration of the reality of the problem, I point out that the Soviet fishing fleet is the largest and most modern in the world, is dependent mainly on fisheries off the coasts of other nations and at present time accounts, annually, for one-third of all the fish taken off our coasts.

If our legislation is not generally accepted by other nations, consider the enforcement task: an extension to 200 miles would add to our fisheries jurisdiction an area two-thirds as large as the continental U.S. and all its possessions.

Ideally the solutions should be reached on a broadly acceptable multilateral basis. . . .

Recently, we have taken a number of actions to halt the over fishing by other nations off our coast pending agreement on a

law of the sea treaty. We are in the process of renegotiating our existing bilateral fisheries agreements with nations who fish off our coast to limit the amount of fish they can take annually. The United States is party to eleven bilateral and multilateral fishing agreements limiting fishing off our coasts. We have also instituted new enforcement guidelines to protect our continental shelf fisheries resources. Several of the seizures I referred to earlier are a result of these new guidelines.

Our 25-year fisheries dispute with the Latin American countries is a good example of the diplomatic tensions which can develop where a unilateral claim by one nation is expressly rejected by another. In 1954, less than two years after Chile, Ecuador and Peru claimed 200-mile maritime zones, Congress enacted the Fishermen's Protective Act. That Act provides that owners of U.S. fishing vessels seized by foreign countries will be reimbursed by the U.S. Treasury for their fines, fees and direct charges paid to the foreign nation to secure release of the vessel, plus 50 percent of gross income lost as a result of time spent in the foreign port.

As a result, U.S. tuna and shrimp fishermen have continued to fish within the claimed territorial waters of Chile, Ecuador and Peru knowing that any losses as a result of seizure would be reimbursed by the U.S. Treasury. Ecuador permits fishing within its claimed 200-mile territorial sea under certain conditions if fishermen buy licenses. Since the Fishermen's Protective Act reimburses fishermen for licenses they are forced to buy after seizure-but does not reimburse them for licenses voluntarily bought in advance-the U.S. fishermen have not been in a hurry to obtain licenses.

Although the Act may have succeeded in protecting our juridical position in opposition to a 200-mile territorial sea, it has certainly failed to discourage the seizure of U.S. fishing vessels. Since its enactment, Ecuador alone has seized over 100 U.S. tuna vessels. Since 1970, seizures have resulted in claims against the U.S. Treasury of over $7 million.

The Act may have been a boon to our tuna and shrimp fishermen, but by encouraging them to fish without licenses, it has evoked a nationalistic response from the Latin American countries, provoked seizures, and generally exacerbated a delicate diplomatic situation.

Since our declaration in 1966 of a contiguous fishing zone out to 12 miles, only seizures beyond that distance have been eligible for reimbursement. If the Congress enacts 200-mile fisheries legislation, it is conceivable that U.S. fishing vessels seized within 200 miles of the Latin American coast will no longer be eligible for reimbursement at all—a paradoxical result that 200-mile legislation designed to protect U.S. coastal fishermen may undermine the position of our distant water fisher

men.

Congress has enacted other legislation in reaction to the tuna seizures which has further complicated the conduct of foreign relations.

For example, the so-called Pelly Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act requires that all foreign military sales, credits and guaranties automatically be cut off for one year to any country seizing U.S. fishing vessels more than 12 miles from its coast. The cut-off can be waived only if the President determines it is important to the security of the United States. . . .

Latin American nations have made it clear to us on numerous occasions that they will not negotiate when such sanctions are in effect. It is clear that sanctions of this kind engender a nationalistic reaction and greatly reduce the opportunities for diplomatic solutions.

Incidentally, the prospect of 200-mile U.S. fisheries legislation raises some ticklish questions with respect to sanctions legislation. What should we do with these sanction provisions if the U.S. enacts 200-mile legislation? Should the U.S. continue to eliminate or reduce foreign assistance to countries seizing U.S. vessels within 200 miles at the same time that we are seizing foreign vessels for similar offenses? On the other hand, if we repeal the sanctions legislation, will we be undercutting the claims of our tuna fishermen who wish to follow the tuna wherever they may be? Some drafts of the 200-mile fisheries legislation would exclude tuna from our 200-mile claim and would continue automatic sanctions against foreign countries seizing our tuna boats within their 200-mile zone.

Perhaps we should also consider what kind of sanctions we can expect from other nations whose vessels might be seized by the U.S. Coast Guard for fishing within our claimed 200-mile fishing zone—if we make such a claim.

For the full text of Mr. Maw's address, see Cong. Rec., Vol. 121, No. 110, July 14, 1975, pp. E3803–3805 (daily ed.).

On September 19, 1975, Under Secretary Maw reported to the Senate Commerce Committee on the U.S. reevaluation of its interim policy on fisheries, following the 1975 session of the Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva. The following are excerpts from his statement:

We have considered the strong preference of many members of Congress for a unilateral extension of fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles and the nearly universal acceptance of a 200mile economic zone in the Law of the Sea Conference as part of an overall comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty. We have considered as well the necessity to construct a policy which encourages the solution of oceans problems through multilateral agreement. The Administration shares your concern over the state of the fisheries stocks, particularly the depletion of fisheries stocks off our coasts. We do differ on the means to cope with the problem. The President has decided to continue to oppose

unilateral legislation, such as S. 961, extending fisheries jurisdiction off the U.S. coasts. At the same time, the President is committed to undertake immediate initiatives to deal with this problem. . . .

in evaluating the need for unilateral action, I suggest that there are three questions which should be answered. First, what are the prospects for agreement on a Law of the Sea treaty in the near future? Second, what are the costs of unilateral action? And third, is there a way, other than unilateral action, to achieve our fisheries goals without damaging our oceans interests?

. . . It is our assessment that there are good prospects for a successful completion of the Law of the Sea treaty, and it must be given the opportunity to succeed. The stakes are too great for the United States to fail to make every effort to reach an equitable agreement.

With regard to the second question . . ., the potential costs of unilateral action, I believe the Administration has made its position clear over the last several years.

.. our long held opposition to unilateral action does not stem from a basic objection to the need for extended jurisdiction over coastal fisheries. However, we cannot proclaim our resource interests in the oceans and move unilaterally to protect them, without expecting other nations to act similarly to protect the interests that they perceive to be to their own best advantage. There are likely to be broader claims with serious implications for our fisheries interests, for the transport of oil and other navigation interests, for our defense and security interests, and for our interest in protecting the freedom of marine scientific research throughout the oceans.

We feel strongly, also, that in order to be effective, an extension of fisheries jurisdiction must be accomplished through international agreement. . . . we believe that uses of the oceans must be governed by agreed rules and by cooperative efforts. . .

Unilateral assertions of jurisdiction can only lead to confrontation. The Administration continues to believe that unilateral action by the United States would have an immediate substantial negative impact on our tuna, shrimp, and salmon fishermen, and preempt efforts we are making in the Law of the Sea Conference and elsewhere to negotiate on their behalf.

Our plan would be to accomplish through negotiations the following objectives within 200 miles off our coasts:

-establishment of an effective conservation regime based on the best available scientific evidence

-creation of preferential harvesting rights for U.S. fishermen to the full limits of our harvesting capacity

-implementation of an allocation system which will substantially reduce foreign catches to permit U.S. fishermen to harvest to their full capacity, with only the surplus allocated among foreign fishermen

-implementation of a standardized system for collection of fisheries data with information contributed by both foreign and domestic fishermen

-introduction of more effective enforcement procedures

-implementation of satisfactory arrangements to resolve gear conflicts and insure adequate foreign compensation to U.S. fishermen in case of negligence by foreign fishermen.

.. we plan to accomplish these objectives by working within the framework of existing fisheries commissions wherever possible as well as through bilateral agreements. We presently have at least 11 bilateral fisheries agreements due for renegotiation next year, as well as regular meetings of six fisheries commissions. We intend, during these negotiations, to establish the philosophical underpinnings of our plan and to accomplish through phased negotiations, rather than by unilateral action, the functional objective of a 200-mile fisheries zone. . . . the course of action which I have outlined is not necessarily linked to existing arrangements or to the timing of the Law of the Sea Conference.

Any course of action must meet long range conservation requirements, and be sound from the point of view of fisheries management as well as a negotiating point of view. Our plan will be implemented aggressively and will meet these requirements. Statement released by the Dept. of State Sept. 19, 1975.

The House of Representatives, on October 9, 1975, passed H.R. 200, "To extend on an interim basis the jurisdiction of the United States over certain ocean areas and fish in order to protect the domestic fishing industry. . . ." The vote was 208 to 101. The bill had been reported favorably by the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (House Report No. 94-445) on August 20, 1975, despite objections from the National Security Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea (ibid., p. 84). However, the House Committee on International Relations reported it unfavorably on October 8, 1975 (House Report No. 94542), taking the position that H.R. 200 would violate U.S. treaty obligations and customary international law on high seas fishing rights.

The House bill, as passed, would extend the U.S. exclusive fishery zone from 12 to 200 miles, effective July 1, 1976; provide a comprehensive management program governing U.S. fishermen and foreign fishermen within the zone; regulate all species of fish except highly migratory species; require license fees for fishing