Imagini ale paginilor
PDF
ePub

tional navigation; the exclusive economic zone; the continental shelf; the high seas; landlocked states; archipelagos; regime of islands; enclosed and semi-enclosed seas; territories under foreign occupation or colonial domination; and provision for an annex on highly migratory species.

Part III-The Chairman of the Third Committee's text on protection of the marine environment; marine scientific research; and development and transfer of technology.

Part IV-The President of the Conference's text on settlement of disputes, containing 18 articles of a general nature, followed by annexes on conciliation, arbitration, and the Statute of the Sea Tribunal; annexes on special procedures for specific categories of disputes, including disputes on fisheries, pollution, and scientific research; and an annex on information and consultation.

Ambassador John R. Stevenson, United States Representative at the Geneva Session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, summarized the results of the session and United States views on some of the controversial issues in a statement before the Conference on May 9, 1975. An excerpt from his statement follows:

On some important controversial issues, we have negotiated texts that come quite close to what might be generally acceptable. On a large number of technical issues such as baselines, innocent passage in the territorial sea, and high seas law, we have a large body of negotiated texts. Together with the single texts, these represent the tools with which we can proceed.

Whether or not we do proceed, and how fast, depends upon the answer to one question, and that is: Are governments willing to make the political decisions on a few critical issues which must be resolved to permit accommodation of fundamental interests?

We are prepared . . . to accommodate the interests of other countries. But at the same time, we are not prepared to abandon those interests which we deem vital not only for the United States but for the world community as a whole.

On some very important issues we have arrived at the point where, if we continue to move ahead, an agreed text is possible. On the economic zone, the Evensen group, an informal group of 40 countries meeting under the chairmanship of Minister Jens Evensen of Norway, has completed a text of articles on the 200-mile economic zone, including fisheries questions. The text attempted, and . . . in large measure succeeded in, the essential task of the economic zone negotiation: to establish the balance of rights and duties of coastal states, and of all other states, which have a vital interest in the many uses of an area which would amount to more than one-third of the world's oceans. Neverthe

less... the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states do not believe adequate provision has yet been made to protect their interests.

The fisheries issue is a matter of great concern to the United States and to many other nations at this conference. The Evensen text provides for the right of the coastal state to manage coastal fish stocks in the 200-mile economic zone and for their conservation and full utilization in a world which has great need for additional food resources. Moreover, the Evensen text contains a new and very welcome development of great importance to our environmentalists and fishermen: recognition of the special interests of the state of origin in anadromous fish, such as salmon, that spawn in our streams. No agreement, however, was reached on the treatment in the economic zone of highly migratory fish such as tuna.

The economic zone is one part, although clearly a critical part, of a Committee II package of issues which includes also the resolution of the question of a territorial sea and unimpeded passage through straits used for international navigation. There is a clear consensus in this conference for a 12-mile territorial sea and growing perception of the importance to the world community of fully guaranteeing unimpeded transit for ships and aircraft in straits used for international navigation.

. . . on the issue of the continental margin, . . . I believe a compromise could be worked out which would couple coastal state jurisdiction over the continental margin in those areas where it extends beyond 200 miles with revenue sharing on production in that area beyond 200 miles. . . . we have presented a specific idea with respect to revenue sharing from the continental margin under coastal state jurisdiction beyond 200 miles. After five years of production at a site, the coastal state obligation to share revenues would begin at 1 percent of wellhead value and increase by 1 percent per year until it reached 5 percent in the 10th year, after which it would remain at 5 percent. Our experts tell us that if we assumed a given field would produce 700 million barrels of oil through a 20-year depletion period, and a value of $11 per barrel, the total amount would be $130 million per field. ... the oil and other minerals themselves, and revenues collected by the coastal state, would of course remain with the coastal state. . . .

With respect to the deep seabed, we were encouraged early in the session by what appeared to be a sincere effort on the part of many states to create a regime which would serve the interests of the international community without obstructing, or subjecting to political judgments, the development of the mineral resources. The investment in this type of project is . . . an enormous one. And in a world where we have all felt the effects not only of scarcity of vital raw materials but of uncertainty of access to them, nations are not prepared, in my judgment, to subject their access to seabed minerals to a system of exploration and exploitation and to a decisionmaking process in which they do not have reasonable assurances of security of access and

may not be adequately represented. Moreover, I do not think it will be possible, seen against the background of today's developments in raw materials matters, to agree to give ultimate powers of exclusive exploitation to a single new international entity. The United States has been willing to work with all nations of the world to insure that a system of exploitation is devised that will permit both sharing in the benefits and future participation in the development of these resources.

On problems of marine pollution, . . . there is a growing agreement that pollution standards should be established internationally. Together with new and effective enforcement of such agreed standards, this is the only way in which the problem of pollution can effectively be dealt with.

I am particularly dismayed by continuing attempts to place restrictions on the conduct of marine scientific research. Knowledge of the oceans is important to all of us. Good science is free science; it is not a commodity that can be packaged and purchased in predetermined quantities. The conference should concentrate on means to insure that all will enjoy the fruits of science, not on means to restrict science for fear it will only benefit the few.

... What this agreement must do, if it is to be effective, is to create a balance of ... multiple uses of the oceans, so that while interests of coastal states are recognized, the interest of all in navigation and other nonresource uses of the oceans and in their preservation as a productive and healthy environment is maintained.

Such a balance of interests is inevitably going to lead to disputes as to their interpretation, and this conference has also done some notable work in the drafting of general articles and alternative possibilities of means of binding settlement of such disputes. In the U.S. view, binding dispute-settlement procedures would be a necessary part of such a treaty.

The informal single negotiating texts submitted by the Chairman of the three main committees are at U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.8/Parts I-III, May 7, 1975. The negotiating text on Settlement of Disputes is at U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.9, July 21, 1975. For the texts and the U.S. delegation report, see The Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, Geneva Session, March-May 1975, Report to the Senate, Aug. 1975, Committee Print of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. and, Hearings on Status Report on Law of the Sea Conference before the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., June 4, 1975, Part 3. For the full text of Ambassador Stevenson's statement, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1876, June 9, 1975, pp. 783–786.

In an address to the annual convention of the American Bar Association at Montreal on August 11, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger described United States positions and attitudes with respect to major subject areas in the law of the sea negotiations. In particular, he offered a United States proposal concerning a

legal regime for the deep seabeds that would preserve the rights of all countries and their citizens to exploit deep seabed resources in accordance with rules set by an international organization, but would require a portion of their revenues to be paid to the international organization for the benefit of developing countries. Excerpts from the Secretary's address devoted to the law of the sea negotiations follow:

The United States is now engaged with some 140 nations in one of the most comprehensive and critical negotiations in history-an international effort to devise rules to govern the domain of the oceans. No current international negotiation is more vital for the long term stability and prosperity of our globe. One need not be a legal scholar to understand what is at stake. The oceans cover 70 percent of the Earth's surface. They both unite and divide mankind. The importance of free navigation for the security of nations, including our country, is traditional; the economic significance of ocean resources is becoming

enormous.

From the 17th century until now, the law of the seas has been founded on a relatively simple precept: Freedom of the seas, limited only by a narrow belt of territorial waters generally extending 3 miles offshore. Today, the explosion of technology requires new and more sophisticated solutions.

The current negotiation may . . . be the world's last chance. Unilateral national claims to fishing zones and territorial seas extending from 50 to 200 miles have already resulted in seizures of fishing vessels and constant disputes over rights to ocean space. The breakdown of the current negotiation, a failure to reach a legal consensus, will lead to unrestrained military and commercial rivalry and mounting political turmoil.

The United States strongly believes that law must govern the oceans. In this spirit, we welcomed the U.N. mandate in 1970 for a multilateral conference to write a comprehensive treaty governing the use of the oceans and their resources. We contributed substantially to the progress that was made at Caracas last summer and at Geneva this past spring which produced a "single negotiating text" of a draft treaty. . . .

The issues in the Law of the Sea negotiation stretch from the shoreline to the farthest deep seabed. They include:

•The extent of the territorial sea and the related issues of guarantees of free transit through straits;

•The degree of control that a coastal state can exercise in an offshore economic zone beyond its territorial waters; and

The international system for the exploitation of the resources of the deep seabeds.

If we move outward from the coastline, the first issue is the extent of the territorial sea-the belt of ocean over which the

coastal state exercises sovereignty. Historically, it has been recognized as 3 miles; that has been the long-established U.S. position. Increasingly, other states have claimed 12 miles or even 200.

After years of dispute and contradictory international practice, the Law of the Sea Conference is approaching a consensus on a 12-mile territorial limit. We are prepared to accept this solution, provided that the unimpeded transit rights through and over straits used for international navigation are guaranteed. For without such guarantees, a 12-mile territorial sea would place over 100 straits-including the Straits of Gilbraltar, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb-now free for international sea and air travel under the jurisdictional_control of coastal states. This the United States cannot accept. Freedom of international transit through these and other straits is for the benefit of all nations, for trade and for security. We will not join in an agreement which leaves any uncertainty about the right to use world communication routes without interference.

Within 200 miles of the shore are some of the world's most important fishing grounds as well as substantial deposits of petroleum, natural gas, and minerals. This has led some coastal states to seek full sovereignty over this zone. These claims, too, are unacceptable to the United States. To accept them would bring 30 percent of the oceans under national territorial control in the very areas through which most of the world's shipping travels.

The United States joins many other countries in urging international agreement on a 200-mile offshore economic zone. Under this proposal, coastal states would be permitted to control fisheries and mineral resources in the economic zone, but freedom of navigation and other rights of the international community would be preserved. Fishing within the zone would be managed by the coastal state, which would have an international duty to apply agreed standards of conservation. If the coastal state could not harvest all the allowed yearly fishing catch, other countries would be permitted to do so. Special arrangements for tuna and salmon, and other fish which migrate over large distances, would be required. We favor also provisions to protect the fishing interests of landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged countries.

In some areas the continental margin extends beyond 200 miles. To resolve disagreements over the use of this area, the United States proposes that the coastal states be given jurisdiction over continental margin resources beyond 200 miles, to a precisely defined limit, and that they share a percentage of financial benefit from mineral exploitation in that area with the international community.

Beyond the territorial sea, the offshore economic zone, and the continental margin lie the deep seabeds. They are our planet's last great unexplored frontier. For more than a century we have known that the deep seabeds hold vast deposits of manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, and other minerals, but we

« ÎnapoiContinuă »