foreign countries. A limitation of $8 million is provided on the authorization through September 30, 1976, and of $300,000 for any fiscal year beginning thereafter. The immediate need for the legislation arose from the evacuation of substantial numbers of American citizens and their dependents from South Viet-Nam.

Under Sec. 1113(a)(1) of the Social Security Act, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare "is authorized to provide temporary assistance to citizens of the United States and to dependents of citizens of the United States, if they (A) are identified by the Department of State as having returned, or been brought, from a foreign country to the United States because of the destitution of the citizen of the United States or the illness of such citizen or any of his dependents or because of war, threat of war, invasion, or similar crisis, and (B) are without available resources." See also S. Rept. No. 94-176 and H. Rept. No. 94-209, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. Amendment of 45 CFR 212.4(d) to implement P.L. 94-44 was announced in Fed. Reg., Vol. 40, No. 183, Sept. 19, 1975, p. 43218.

Voting Rights

The Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-203; 89 Stat. 1142; 42 U.S.C. 1973dd) was approved January 2, 1976. It ensures a U.S. citizen residing abroad the right to register absentee and vote by absentee ballot in Federal elections in a State, even though he maintains no address in the State or district, if he otherwise qualifies, does not maintain domicile or vote in another State or territory of the United States, and has a valid passport or identity card issued by the Department of State.

See also H. Rept. No. 94-649 and S. Rept. No. 94-121, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

In Nazareno v. Attorney General of the United States, 512 F.2d 936 (1975), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held on March 10, 1975, that the Board of Immigration Appeals had acted reasonably in interpreting the phrase "sons or daughters," as it appears in Section 203(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(1) (1970), relating to preference classifications for immigration purposes, as excluding persons adopted at or over the age of 14.

Two unmarried adult aliens who had been adopted by American citizens pursuant to state judicial decrees had brought an action for declaratory judgment and review of the action of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in denying petitions filed by their adoptive parents to classify them under the first preference

immigration classification. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.

The sole question on appeal was the validity of the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation of Section 203(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides:

Visas shall be first made available, in a number not to exceed 20 per centum of the number specified in Section 201(a)(ii) [8 U.S.C. 1151(a)(ii)] to qualified immigrants who are the unmarried sons or daughters of citizens of the United States.

The Board ruled that "sons or daughters" in that section did not include an adopted person who is excluded from the definition of child in Section 101(b)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E).

The Court of Appeals examined the legislative background of various amendments to the Act and, although the legislative intent of the 1965 amendment of Section 203(a)(1) was not clear, it concluded that a statute using terms like "child," "son," "daughter," and "parent" used them in an interrelated way, and did not contemplate that a person who was ineligible to qualify as a "child" of a "parent" would at the same time be eligible as a "son" or "daughter."

The Court also noted that in a recent opinion it had been stated that in construing ambiguous statutes, "Supreme Court decisions counsel us to show 'great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.'" See NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 706 (1974). It declined to overrule an interpretation by the Board which was consistent with earlier decisions and which it could not say was either unreasonable or contrary to discernible legislative intent.

Conditional Entry

In Chinese American Civic Council et al. v. Attorney General, 396 F. Supp. 1250 (1975), the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held, on July 7, 1975, that Chinese aliens who had been denied conditional entry as refugees and who sought to invoke the District Court's jurisdiction from Hong Kong without ever having been in the United States did not have standing to challenge the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS's) denial of their applications for conditional entry into the United States as refugees. The Court also stated that the organization which acted as sponsor for the refugees did not have standing to bring action in their stead since it simply stood in their shoes. However, the Court held that one of the Chinese alien plaintiffs,

who had for several years prior to 1972 been in the United States under a fraudulently obtained preference classification and had then been denied a refugee preference classification by INS under 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(7), had undisputed standing to challenge that denial.

The individual plaintiffs had all fled from mainland China to Hong Kong between 1949 and 1956 and, with the one exception of Shui Chong Kwan, had remained in Hong Kong since their arrival. As to the five who had never been in the United States, the Court denied them standing in view of the precedent that standing had apparently never been granted to a person outside the United States challenging the denial of entry or immigration eligibility, and in view of the policy reasons against affording a Federal forum for a person anywhere in the world challenging denial of entry or immigration status. The opinion also noted that even if the plaintiffs did have standing, they were confronted with an almost irrebuttable presumption that at the present time, 20 to 25 years after leaving mainland China, they were "firmly resettled" in Hong Kong.

With respect to the sixth plaintiff, Shui Chong Kwan, the Court took note of the 1971 Hong Kong Immigration Ordinance, which classifies as a Chinese resident any person who resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of seven years prior to April 1, 1972, the effective date of the Ordinance. However, the Court concluded that for INS to classify persons as "firmly resettled" in Hong Kong on the basis of any seven-year continuous residence period prior to April 1, 1972, was arbitrary and unreasonable. Rather, it said, in the case of those not residents of Hong Kong for the seven-year period immediately preceding April 1, 1972, factors such as intent, family ties, business or property connections should have been considered in determining an alien's resettlement or continuing search for refuge. Rosenberg v. Woo, 402 U.S. 49, at 56-57 (1971); Chi-Wai Lui v. Pilliod, 358 F. Supp. 542 (1973) (see the 1973 Digest, p. 102); Matter of Sun, 12 I & N Dec. 36 (1966). Accordingly, the Court remanded the cause of Shui Chong Kwan to INS for further proceedings.

Nonimmigrants

On January 15, 1975, L. F. Chapman, Jr., Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, ordered that effective February 16, 1975, §§ 214.1(a) and 214.2(b) of Part 214, Chapter I, Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, pertaining to the period of admission of a temporary visitor for pleasure and his eligibility for extension of his temporary stay, be amended. The amendments have the effect of excluding nonimmigrant visitors for pleasure

from the classes of nonimmigrants eligible to apply for or to be granted extensions of temporary stay.

The amendment to § 214.1(a) provides that a nonimmigrant within the class defined in section 101(a)(15)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act who is visiting the United States temporarily for pleasure is ineligible for an extension of his temporary stay. The amendment to § 214.2(b), while providing that a temporary visitor for pleasure will ordinarily be admitted for a period not exceeding six months, would permit his admission for a period not exceeding one year if the admitting immigration officer determines that special circumstances warrant such longer period.

The order specifies that the prohibition against extensions of stay of temporary visitors for pleasure contained in the new rules applies to any alien admitted as a B-2 nonimmigrant (visitor for pleasure) or whose status is changed to that of a B-2 nonimmigrant on or after February 16, 1975. The prohibition also applies to any alien admitted as a B-2 nonimmigrant or whose status was changed to that of a B-2 nonimmigrant prior to February 16, 1975, who submits an application for extension of temporary stay on or after the latter date and has previously been granted an extension of his temporary stay. The order points out, however, that existing and long-established procedures of the Immigration and Naturalization Service permit a district director of the Service to grant an alien permission to remain in the United States beyond his previously authorized stay if such officer determines that the existence of compelling circumstances warrant such action.

For the amended text of 8 CFR 214.1(a) and 214.2(b), see Fed. Reg., Vol. 40, No. 11, Jan. 16, 1975, pp. 2794-2795.

The Commuter System

Effective September 15, 1975, a new regulation devoted exclusively to alien commuters was added to Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 211, as Section 211.6. In a notice of proposed rulemaking, dated March 24, 1975, L. F. Chapman, Jr., Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, described the regulation as consisting of: a restatement of basic criteria for Form I-151 to be accepted as an entry document when presented by a person claiming commuter status, derived from the Administrative Decisions under immigration and naturalization laws; a reaffirmation of the long-established interpretation that residence counting toward naturalization eligibility is not accumulated while one is a commuter; a new interpretative statement, inspired by comments in the dissenting opinion in Saxbe et al. v. Bustos (419 U.S. 65), decided by the United States Supreme Court, November

25, 1974, concerning the possibility that, contrary to the evident will of Congress, a commuter might be able to confer certain rights and privileges under the immigration laws on his relatives. (See the 1974 Digest, pp. 81-85.) Mr. Chapman also noted that the regulation contained a repositioning, for clarification, of the socalled anti-strikebreaker regulation.

The new regulation, as adopted, follows:

§ 211.6 Alien commuters.

(a) General. Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence may commence or continue to reside in foreign contiguous territory and commute as a special immigrant defined in section 101(a)(27)(B) of the Act to his place of employment in the United States to engage in daily or seasonal work which, on the whole, is regular and stable: Provided, That at the time of each reentry he presents a valid Form I-151 in lieu of an immigrant visa and passport. An alien commuter engaged in seasonal work would be presumed to have taken up residence in the United States if he is present in this country for more than six months, in the aggregate, during any continuous 12-month period. An alien commuter's address report under section 265 of the Act must show his actual residence address even though it is not in the United States.

(b) Loss of commuter status. An alien commuter who has been out of regular employment in the United States for a continuous period of six months shall be deemed to have lost his status as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, notwithstanding temporary entries in the interim for other than employment purposes, unless his employment in the United States was interrupted for reasons beyond his control other than lack of a job opportunity. Upon loss of status, Form I-151 shall become invalid and shall be surrendered to an immigration officer.

(c) Eligibility for benefits under the immigration and nationality laws. Until he has taken up residence in the United States, an alien commuter cannot satisfy the residence requirements of the naturalization laws and cannot qualify for any benefits under the immigration laws on his own behalf or on behalf of his relatives other than as specified in paragraph (a). When an alien commuter takes up residence in the United States, he shall no longer be regarded as a commuter. He may facilitate proof of having taken up such residence by notifying the Service as soon as possible, preferably at the time of his first reentry for that purpose. Application for issuance of a new alien registration receipt card to show that he has taken up residence in the United States shall be made on Form I-90.

(d) Labor disputes. When the Secretary of Labor determines and announces that a labor dispute involving a work stoppage or layoff of employees is in progress at a named place of employment, Form I-151 shall not be acceptable in lieu of an immigrant visa or reentry permit when presented by an alien commuter who has departed for and seeks reentry from any foreign place and who, prior to his departure or during his temporary absence abroad has in any manner entered into an arrangement to return to the United States for the primary purpose, or seeks reentry with the intention of accepting employment at the place where the Secretary of Labor has determined that a labor dispute exists, or of continuing employment which commenced at such place subsequent to the date of the Secretary of Labor's determination. (Immigration and Nationality Act, Sec. 103, 66 Stat. 173; 8 U.S.C. 1103)

See Fed. Reg., Vol. 40, No. 158, Aug. 14, 1975, pp. 34106–34107. For the notice of proposed rulemaking, see ibid, Vol. 40, No. 61, Mar. 28, 1975, pp. 14090–14091.

Labor Certification

In Yong v. Regional Manpower Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 509 F.2d 243 (1975), decided on January 24, 1975, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered a complaint filed