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against another participating state, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory.

-To refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating state to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.

-To refrain from any act of economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating state of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

-To take effective measures which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

-To promote, by all means which each of them considers appropriate, a climate of confidence and respect among peoples consonant with their duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression or for any threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating state.

-To make every effort to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute between them, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security in Europe, and to seek, first of all, a solution through the peaceful means set forth in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.

-To refrain from any action which could hinder the peaceful settlement of disputes between the participating states.

(ii) The participating states,

Reaffirming their determination to settle their disputes as set forth in the Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes;

Convinced that the peaceful settlement of disputes is a complement to refraining from the threat or use of force, both being essential though not exclusive factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security; Desiring to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes;

1. Are resolved to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods, and to continue to this end to work upon the "Draft Convention on a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" submitted by Switzerland during the second stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as other proposals relating to it and directed towards the elaboration of such a method.

2. Decide that, on the invitation of Switzerland, a meeting of experts of all the participating states will be convoked in order to fulfill the mandate described in paragraph 1 above within the framework and under the procedures of the followup to the Conference laid down in the chapter "Followup to the Conference."

3. This meeting of experts will take place after the meeting of the representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participating states, scheduled according to the chapter "Followup to the Conference" for 1977; the results of the work of this meeting of experts will be submitted to governments.

For the full text of the Final Act of the CSCE, signed at Helsinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1888, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350. For President Ford's address to the Conference on Aug. 1, 1975, see ibid., pp. 304-308. For reference to other provisions of the Final Act, see index entries, this Digest, under Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (1975).

On August 6, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford and Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan issued a joint statement in which they affirmed the intention of their two nations to work together for "a

more open and free international community," and stated the following principles:

-A more stable and peaceful world order requires the acceptance by all nations of certain principles of international conduct, and the establishment of a creative international dialoguetranscending differences of ideology, tradition or stages of development.

-Those principles must include respect for the sovereignty of all nations, recognition of the legitimate interests of others, attitudes of mutual respect in international dealings, determination to seek the peaceful resolution of differences among nations, and firm commitment to social justice and economic progress around the globe.

Japan and the United States pledge to support these principles, and to nurture a dialogue among nations which reflects them. They will expand and strengthen their cooperation in many fields of joint endeavor. Recognizing that equitable and durable peace in Asia is essential to that of the entire world, Japan and the United States will extend every support to efforts of the countries of the region to consolidate such a peace.

For the full text of the Joint Statement, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 11, No. 32, Aug. 11, 1975, pp. 835–836; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1889, Sept. 8, 1975, pp. 384–385.

Respect for Sovereignty

Following the Cambodian seizure of the U.S. merchant ship SS Mayaguez on May 12, 1975, and the use by the United States of Utapao airbase in Thailand as a takeoff point for the rescue of the crew, the Government of Thailand charged publicly that the United States had not asked permission to use the base for an operation that the Thai Government regarded as embarrassing and violative of Thai sovereignty. Secretary of State Kissinger, when asked at a press conference in Washington on May 16, 1975, whether there had been a violation of Thai sovereignty, responded:

With respect to Thailand, we have, of course, a treaty relationship with Thailand in SEATO. And we have had a series of base arrangements with them which, over the period of years, had led to a degree of cooperation in events in Indochina which were in

the mutual interest and in which we have greatly appreciated the assistance that Thailand has given us.

In the course of this decade, it may be that a pattern of action has developed that made us assume that our latitude in using these bases was greater than the current situation in Southeast Asia would permit to the Thai Government. And therefore, insofar as we have caused any embarrassment to the Thai Government, we regret those actions.

At the same time, it is clear that any relationship between us and another country must be based on mutual interest. And we, I believe, have a reason, or have a right, to expect that those countries that have an alliance relationship with us look with some sympathy at matters that concern the United States profoundly.

On May 17, 1975, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Chatchai Chunhawan, presented a formal note of protest to the American Embassy in Bangkok regarding the use of Thai territory. It stated, in part:

The Royal Thai Government is deeply concerned over the action taken by the United States in the recent Mayaguez affair which has seriously impinged upon the national sovereignty of Thailand.

Despite the clearly established position of the Royal Thai Government as earlier conveyed to the United States Government, Thai territory was used by the United States for its military action against Cambodia to recover the vessel Mayaguez on Thursday, May 15, 1975, and it was not until the military action had been completed to the satisfaction of the United States that the Marines were withdrawn from Thailand.

In the light of the gravity of the situation evolving from these regrettable developments in which the United States chose to disregard the will of the Thai Government and people, the Royal Thai Government considers that, in order to maintain the traditional ties of friendship between Thailand and the United States and to promote their future cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual interest, it is necessary to ensure that the sovereignty of Thailand be respected and that the goodwill and friendship of Thailand be not abused again.

On May 19, 1975, the United States Government responded in a note which was handed to the Thai Foreign Minister at Bangkok, reading, in part, as follows:

The United States regrets the misunderstandings that have arisen between Thailand and the United States in regard to the

temporary placement of Marines at Utapao to assist in the recovery of the SS Mayaguez. There is a long tradition of close and warm relations between the United States and Thailand, a tradition which has helped our two countries face many difficult periods together.

There is enclosed an account of the incident.. . . As this account demonstrates, speed of action was essential. The actions and public statements of the new Cambodian regime indicated to us that any delay in recovering the ship and rescuing the crew could have had the most serious consequences.

It is clear that by its action the United States was able to counter a common danger to all nations and to the world's ocean commerce presented by this illegal and unwarranted interference with international shipping routes in the Gulf of Thailand. The United States Government wishes to express its understanding of the problem caused the Royal Thai Government by these procedures and wishes to repeat its regret. The policy of the United States continues to be one of respecting the sovereignty and independence of Thailand. The unique circumstances that have led to the recent turn of events do not alter this traditional relationship, and are not going to be repeated. The Government of the United States looks forward to working in harmony and friendship with the Royal Thai Government.

Enclosed with the note was an account of the incident drawn substantially from the report President Ford had submitted to the United States Congress on May 15, 1975. See post, Chapter 14, § 8, p. 879.

The United States note was formally accepted, and at a news conference in Bangkok held shortly afterwards the Thai Foreign Minister said that the case was closed and that he believed "bygones should be bygones." He also stated that in view of the United States note, the Thai Ambassador in Washington would be called home for consultations, not formally recalled as had been previously indicated.

U. S. Embassy Bangkok's telegram No. 8995, May 17, 1975, to Dept. of State; Dept. of State telegram No. 115952, May 18, 1975, to the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. See also Dept. of State News Briefing, DPC 80, May 19, 1975; New York Times, May 20, 1975, p. 1; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1876, June 9, 1975, p. 753.

Nonintervention in Internal Affairs

In a letter to President Ford, dated February 13, 1975, Seymour J. Rubin, Executive Director of the American Society of International Law, expressed concern at differing interpretations that

had been given by members of the Society to the President's remarks at a press conference on September 16, 1974, on the question of the right of one country to attempt to destabilize the constitutionally elected government of another country. The question had arisen at the press conference in the context of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activity in Chile during the Allende regime. On that occasion the President had responded to the question of whether such a right exists under international law by saying: "I am not going to pass judgment on whether it is permitted or authorized under international law. It is a recognized fact that, historically as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interest of the country involved."

Mr. Rubin wrote that he did not construe that statement as indicating that the President felt that international law is irrelevant to the conduct of foreign policy, even in the limited context in which the question had been addressed, but that other members of the Society did so interpret it. He suggested that a clarification would be helpful. President Ford replied in a letter of April 5, 1975, which reads in pertinent part as follows:

. . I assure you that you are right in your interpretation of my views about the relevance of international law. It is my intention that the Government of the United States shall observe international law and endeavor to promote its strengthening in all areas to which it applies.

See also the 1974 Digest, Ch. 2, § 1, p. 4.

On April 21, 1975, President Ford was asked in a television-radio interview whether it would not be clearer if it were simply the law that the CIA gather intelligence only and engage in no covert political operations. The President responded in part:

I can't imagine the United States saying we would not undertake any covert activities, and knowing at the same time that friends, as well as foes, are undertaking covert activity, not only in the United States but elsewhere.

That would be like tying a President's hand behind his back in the planning and execution of foreign policy. I believe that we have to have an outstanding intelligence gathering group, such as the CIA, or in the other intelligence collection organizations in our Government. But, I also think we have to have some operational activity.

.. I can assure you that, if we are to compete with foes on the one hand, or even be equal in the execution of foreign policy with our friends, we have to have covert activities carried out.

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