terest directly or indirectly in the quarter section. The objection to the transfer from the rural school district to the city was denied. The court said: "The statute authorizing annexation does not intimate that the board of education may annex part of the territory which is proposed for annexation and leave out isolated tracts here and there throughout its extent because the owners may object or because some such tracts may have no resident electors; nor need the board of education concern itself that the territory to be annexed may lie in different townships or in different school districts." [4] The difference between that case and the one at bar is that there the territory in question was a single, integral body, while here it was separated into two parts by an intervening strip of the city. But, as already observed, we do not regard the difference as material. Finally it is said that no notice of the proceeding was given the owner of the Cudahy tract. The statute requires none, and it is not seriously contended that it is unconstitutional for that reason. In the case last cited it was held that the validity of the proceeding was not affected by the failure to give notice of it to the district from which the territory was detached. In acting under the statute a board of education is an agency of the legislative branch of the state government. The legislative power of a state in respect of the boundaries of its subordinate political divisions is very broad. See Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307, 23 L. Ed. 552. That changes of boundaries may result in changes in burdens of taxation does not make the proceeding one for taking private property of the inhabitants. The proceeding is not one for the direct imposition of taxes, but is political; the matter of taxes is merely an incident that follows, as it is in much that is done legislatively. The decree is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. HEWEY, County Treasurer, et al. v. JACOB DOLD PACKING CO. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. October 25, 1920.) No. 5443. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas; John C. Pollock, Judge. Suit in equity by the Jacob Dold Packing Company against W. R. Hewey, County Treasurer of Sedgwick County, Kan., and others. Decree for complainant, and defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Glenn Porter, of Wichita, Kan. (S. B. Amidon, D. M. Dale, S. A. Buckland, and H. W. Hart, all of Wichita, Kan., on the brief), for appellants. C. H. Brooks, of Wichita, Kan. (J. D. Houston and Willard Brooks, both of Wichita, Kan., on the brief), for appellee. Before HOOK and CARLAND, Circuit Judges, and TRIEBER, District Judge. HOOK, Circuit Judge. This is a companion case to No. 5442, Hewey, County Treasurer, v. Cudahy Packing Co., 269 Fed. 21, just decided. In all (269 F.) material respects the cases are alike, and the same conclusion follows in this as in the other. The decree is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. WHITEHEAD v. RAILWAY MAIL ASS'N.* (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. December 11, 1920.) No. 3560. Insurance-455-Death held not through accidental means; "injury through external, violent, and accidental means." The death of an insured resulting from his voluntary act in getting off a moving railroad train, while passing over a bridge, held not due to injury through external, violent, and accidental means within the terms of the policy. [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Accident; Accidental.]` In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi; Edwin R. Holmes, Judge. Af Action at law by Julia A. Whitehead against the Railway Mail Association. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. firmed. J. A. Teat, of Jackson, Miss. (Chalmers Potter, of Memphis, Tenn., on the brief), for plaintiff in error. William H. Watkins, of Jackson, Miss., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. This was an action on a benefit certificate to recover the amount payable in the event of the death of the insured resulting from bodily injury through external, violent, and accidental means. The averments of the declaration to the effect that the death of the insured was caused by such means were put in issue. The evidence without dispute showed that the insured's death resulted, not from accidental means, but from his voluntary act in getting off a moving railroad train to a place underneath a bridge over a creek, the car he was in being, at the time he so left it, on that bridge. The court did not err in instructing the jury to find for the defendant. Affirmed. For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes *Certiorari denied 254 U. S. --, 41 Sup. Ct. 375, 65 L. Ed. —. SHAAR v. UNITED STATES. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. December 14, 1920.) No. 3535. Customs duties 130-Internal revenue for failure to make entry and pay tax. 46-Imported bullion forfeited An owner of gold and silver bullion, who intrusted it to another in Mexico to be delivered to a bank in the United States, but with no instructions as to the means of bringing it in, or as to its entry or declaration at a custom house; held bound by the action of such person in delivering it to a third person to be taken across the boundary, and in failing to make entry of it and pay the internal revenue tax thereon, and the bullion held forfeitable for importation in violation of law. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the El Paso Division of the Western District of Texas; William R. Smith, Judge. Libel by the United States against 1,135 ounces of silver bullion and 56 ounces of gold bullion; Antonio L. Shaar, claimant. From a judgment of forfeiture, claimant brings error. Affirmed. John T. Hill, of El Paso, Tex., for plaintiff in error. BRYAN, Circuit Judge. This was a proceeding to enforce a forfeiture of a quantity of gold and silver bullion, upon the ground that it was imported from Mexico into the United States, without being entered or declared, and without the payment of the consular fee and internal revenue tax required by law. Plaintiff in error, herein designated as claimant, interposed a claim to the bullion. A jury was waived and the trial court made the following findings: "The evidence, as I understand it, showed, and the court finds therefrom, the following facts: "That the bullion in controversy in these cases was delivered by the claimant, Antonio L. Shaar, at Parral, Mexico, to one Scott, with instructions to Scott that he should bring it to El Paso, Tex., in the United States, and there deliver it to the Union Bank & Trust Company. That claimant gave Scott no instructions as to the means of bringing said bullion to El Paso, or as to making entry thereof into the United States. That Scott was a man who was informed and experienced in making entries of merchandise from Mexico into the United States. "That afterwards said bullion was found in El Paso, and was seized by the United States customs officers. There was no testimony as to the exact time or manner in which it was crossed over the international boundary line between Mexico and the United States of America, but the testimony showed that none of the requirements of the customs laws was complied with. "The bullion was not entered through a port of entry, and, while it was not dutiable, the value being over $100, the importer should have obtained from the American consul in Mexico a consular certificate or invoice, and should have paid a fee of $2.50 for same, and should have paid an internal revenue tax of $1 to the United States, and have had affixed to the entry a $1 internal revenue stamp as evidence of the payment of this tax. The importer should have declared and presented a manifest to the United States customs officers For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes (269 F.) at the international boundary line for said bullion, and he should have appeared at the custom house at the point of entry and made the necessary entry papers for the said bullion. None of these requirements was complied with. "That there was no legal testimony as to how said bullion was crossed into the United States, but Mr. Hill, counsel for claimant, was permitted to testify, without objection, that some time prior to the trial he went to Juarez, Mexico, and there had a conversation with said Scott, who told him that claimant gave the bullion to him to bring from Parral, Mexico, to El Paso, Tex., and that on arrival at Juarez he delivered it to one Leon, and instructed him to bring it to El Paso, but he did not know how Leon brought it across, and never inquired." Upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court made the following findings of law: "That the bullion described in the petitions herein was crossed from Mexico into the United States fraudulently and knowingly, and was therefore contrary to law. "The statute is broad, and makes no exceptions, and if any person, whether the owner or not, brings bullion across into the United States from Mexico, contrary to law, it is forfeitable. Whether the claimant intended that said bullion should be brought into the United States without compliance with the provisions of the law is immaterial. "That therefore the bullion in controversy is subject to be forfeited, although the owner may not have given any instructions to his agent, Scott, that he should not comply with the law in bringing it in. "The court further finds that whatever Scott did towards the importation of said bullion into the United States was done within the scope of his authority as the claimant's agent. If he delivered it to Leon, he was acting within the scope of his authority, and the claimant was bound by it, and the case is as if claimant had imported it himself. "The court concludes, therefore, that the property in controversy in both of these cases should be forfeited to the United States government; and it is so ordered." Error is assigned upon the finding of law that Scott acted within the scope of his authority, assuming that he entrusted the bullion to Leon in Mexico. In view of claimant's testimony that he gave Scott no instructions as to the manner or means to be employed, the latter was at liberty to perform the service, personally or through others, in any necessary or proper manner. There is no finding of a breach of duty by any of the divers parties who at one time or another may have had possession of the bullion. It is not out of harmony with the court's findings that the very things were done which claimant contemplated would be done. Error is also assigned upon the findings of law, to the effect that forfeiture did not depend upon claimant's intention to comply with the requirements of law, nor upon his instructions to Scott relative thereto. These findings were intended to mean no more than that claimant was bound by the acts of his agent, Scott. So construed, they state a proposition of law which is conceded to be correct. None of the assignments of error is well founded. MACMILLAN CO. v. JOHNSON, State Superintendent of Public Instruction. (District Court, E. D. Michigan, S. D. August 27, 1920.) No. 313. 1. Schools and school districts books constitutional in part. 167—Statute regulating sale of school text Pub. Acts Mich. 1919, No. 380, regulating the sale of school text-books, by prohibiting school officers from buying for use of the schools any books except from those listed with the state superintendent of public instruction, and at prices therein fixed, etc., held constitutional and valid, except as to section 7, which in broadly making it unlawful for any retail dealer to sell any books so listed at higher prices than those prescribed, without limiting such prohibited sales to school officers, exceeds the power of the state and is void. 2. Constitutional law 239-Restricting purchase of books by school districts not class legislation. A state statute prohibiting school districts from buying text-books, except from publishers who list their books and prices with the state superintendent of public instruction, and contract with him to furnish books at such prices, held not invalid as class legislation. 3. Constitutional law 295-Publisher not deprived of property without due process by statute restricting right to contract with school districts. A state statute prohibiting school districts from buying text-books, except from lists filed with the superintendent of public instruction at prices therein named, held not unconstitutional, as depriving a publisher of property without due process of law, since he is not compelled to sell to such districts. 4. Constitutional law 92-Publisher of school books has no vested right to contract with districts. A publisher of school text-books has no vested right to contract with public school districts for the sale of its books, and a statute imposing limitations on such sales is constitutional. 5. Commerce 55-Fixing price to be paid for books by school districts not interference with interstate commerce. A state statute restricting the power of school districts, in purchasing text-books, to such books as are listed with the superintendent of public instruction, and at prices therein fixed, held not unconstitutional as to a nonresident publisher, as an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. 6. Statutes 64 (1)-Not invalid because of unconstitutionality of one provision. The unconstitutionality of one provision of a statute does not render it invalid as a whole, where such provision may be stricken out without altering the meaning, purpose, or effect of those remaining. 7. Schools and school districts 167-Statute authorizing appointment of agents to sell books to pupils at fixed prices valid. A statute authorizing school districts to designate retail dealers as their agents to sell text-books to their pupils, and limiting the price which may be charged therefor, held within the power of the state, and valid. In Equity. Suit by the Macmillan Company against T. E. Johnson, as Superintendent of Public Instruction of the State of Michigan. Decree for complainant in part. Goodenough, Voorhies & Long, of Detroit, Mich., and Thurman, Hume & Kennedy, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff. For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes |