ing orally to Karakhan and to Chinese Government and authorize[d] Mr. Cerruti to leave an aide-mémoire in both cases if so requested. Translation: "The Ministers and Chargés d'Affaires accredited near the Chinese Government have examined the communication which His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has been good enough to bring to their notice through the Italian Minister in regard to his position in the diplomatic body. His Excellency Mr. Karakhan having been accredited by his Government and agreed to by the Chinese Government as Ambassador, the Ministers and Chargés d'Affaires consider him as dean of the diplomatic body with the prerogatives and functions which this charge carries with it in all the capitals, notably from the point of view of protocol on the occasion of receptions, ceremonies and other official meetings to [at?] which the diplomatic representatives are to be present in a body." A copy of this message has been mailed to Tokio. MAYER 707.1161/25: Telegram The Chargé in China (Mayer) to the Secretary of State PEKING, April 25, 1925—11 a. m. 172. My 161, April 21, 4 p. m. [Received April 25-5:28 a. m.] 1. When Italian Minister informed Karakhan regarding deanship, latter expressed desire to enter into social relations with chiefs of mission of powers which have not recognized Soviets and inquired whether if he left cards on aforementioned diplomatic representatives they would return their cards to him. 2. Netherlands Chargé is telegraphing for instructions while Belgian Minister is prepared to return Karakhan's card. Despite fact that Soviet Ambassador is now recognized as dean for ceremonial purposes, I see no reason why representative of the United States should enter into even slightest social relations with him or further official relations than above recognition implies. In this connection I refer to Department's instruction to American Minister at Vienna 63 top page 1, May 1924, Monthly Political Report, serial 14.64 3. Telegraphic instructions respectfully requested. I should greatly appreciate any mail instructions Department may care to give concerning attitude I should adopt in respect of relations with Karakhan as doyen of diplomatic body. MAYER 63 Telegram No. 24, May 27, 1924, to the Minister in Austria, Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. I, p. 675. Not published. 707.1161/25: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Mayer) WASHINGTON, April 30, 1925-5 p. m. 89. Your 172, April 25, 11 a. m. The following telegram, August 28, 1924, to the Legation at Helsingfors is quoted for your guidance with regard to your relations with Karakhan: "There should be no difficulty in informal and courteous relations, as between two gentlemen, with respect to the representative at the capital to which you are accredited, of a régime not recognized by this Government. I had no difficulty when I attended the celebration of the Centenary of Brazilian Independence at Rio de Janeiro in 1922 in meeting and having cordial relations with the representative of Mexico, although this Government had not recognized the Mexican Government. Of course such personal and private relations largely depend on the character and bearing of others, but ordinary courtesies of a personal nature need never embarrass this Government in maintaining its attitude of non-recognition. Hughes" See also Department's circular telegram August 27, 1 p. m.65 The fact that we have not recognized the Moscow régime should cause you no embarrassment in your social relations with the members of the diplomatic corps in Peking. While you should avoid entering into any relations with Karakhan of an official character, this should not be interpreted as precluding those purely social and unofficial relationships which tend to arise out of association in the diplomatic corps and the special position of Karakhan in that body. You should receive Karakhan informally if he should call on you, and in return for his call or for his card should send your official card, writing on it "The Dean of the Diplomatic Body" in order to avoid any possibility of its being made to appear that you are entering into relations with him officially in his capacity as representing the Soviet Régime. In the course of any subsequent social relations with him you should make use of your personal card. Repeat to Tokyo as #53 for information. KELLOGG 701.6193/74 The Chargé in China (Mayer) to the Secretary of State No. 2962 PEKING, May 4, 1925. SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams No. 161 and No. 172 of April 21, 4 p. m., and April 25, 11 a. m., respectively, relative to 65 See telegram No. 18, Aug. 26, 1924, to the Chargé in Finland, and footnote 1, Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. I, p. 676. the recognition of Mr. Karakhan, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Peking, as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps for ceremonial purposes. I now wish to report that at the time that Mr. Cerruti, the Italian Minister notified Mr. Karakhan of his recognition as Dean, the latter requested to be informed whether he was also Dean of the Protocol Powers. The Italian Minister reported this question to the Diplomatic Body. Considerable discussion ensued, in which the French Minister and I expressed the point of view that we should not take the Soviet Ambassador too seriously; that, if we viewed his request too technically, we should undoubtedly be led into a very unfortunate situation. We stated that we were of the opinion that Mr. Karakhan was sui generis and should be so treated, that we were opposed to admitting him as either Doyen or a participant in meetings of Chiefs of Mission respecting the Protocol. The British Chargé expressed himself of the same opinion, and stated that he had received categorical instructions from his Government against permitting Mr. Karakhan to participate as a representative of a Protocol Power. In concluding, it was unanimously agreed that the Heads of Legation, since the Diplomatic Body had now been abolished in its previous form, should simply meet together, when occasion demanded it, as officials with a common interest and in this way could include in such meetings only those persons with whom they desired to meet. The Italian Minister was, therefore, requested to reply in a negative manner to Mr. Karakhan's request, and in the above sense. This Mr. Cerruti has done. There is transmitted herewith enclosed, for the Department's information, a copy of an article in regard to Mr. Karakhan's recognition as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, which appeared in the Peking Leader of April 23, 1925.6 I have [etc.] FERDINAND MAYER FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOV. ERNMENTS OF MEANS FOR EFFECTIVELY PREVENTING THE TRAFFIC IN ARMS WITH CHINA " 893.113/818 The British Ambassador (Howard) to the Secretary of State No. 252 WASHINGTON, March 12, 1925. SIR: With reference to the Honourable Charles E. Hughes' Note of the 24th of December last 68 and previous correspondence respect *Not reprinted. "For previous correspondence concerning efforts to prevent the traffic in arms with China, see Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. 1, pp. 530 ff. ing the suggested prohibition of export of aircraft to China and the possibility of strengthening the Arms Embargo Agreement of 1919,* I have the honour to state that I have received instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State to submit to your attention the following observations. His Majesty's Government do not consider, after an exchange of views with the French Government, that there is any hope of success for a tripartite agreement prohibiting the export of aircraft to China, but Mr. Chamberlain would be glad to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to support his United States Colleague there in any steps that the latter may be instructed to take to that end. I am further desired to state that Mr. Chamberlain is consulting the French Government as to the general question of the export of munitions of war to China. As regards this latter question Mr. Chamberlain however agrees with the views of the United States Government as expressed in Mr. Hughes' note to me of December 24th last, namely, that it is now doubtful whether further progress can be made in strengthening the China Arms Embargo on the lines contemplated at the Washington Conference. He also agrees that what has been effected is not wholly unsatisfactory. His Majesty's Government intend, for the present at any rate, to continue their policy of doing all that lies in their power to make the embargo a reality. They will continue to maintain, for instance, the stringent administrative measures which penalize British merchants and manufacturers for the benefit of their continental competitors who supply China with weapons and explosives; and they will continue to discourage British Subjects from participating in any way in such transactions even though this involves the loss of much profitable business to the London insurance market. To this end His Majesty's Government have published a declaration explaining their attitude and the Administrative measures by which their policy is enforced. I have [etc.] ESME HOWARD 893.113/820 The British Ambassador (Howard) to the Secretary of State AIDE MEMOIRE Referring to his Note No. 252 of March 12th respecting the suggested prohibition of export of aircraft to China and the possibility of strengthening the Arms Embargo Agreement of 1919, Sir Esme 60 See Foreign Relations, 1919, vol. 1, pp. 667 ff. TO J. Austen Chamberlain, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Howard has been instructed by Mr. Chamberlain to bring the following points to the attention of Mr. Kellogg. 71 It appears not altogether improbable that at the forthcoming Conference on Arms Traffic to be held at Geneva in May " the question may arise whether China should be scheduled as a prohibited area. There is no doubt that there is cause for grave disquiet as regards the present state of China. Sooner or later the change in the conditions of Chinese internecine warfare, brought about by the increasing supply of modern weapons, may involve the Powers in increased military commitments in the Far East. This is a matter of international concern and it is for consideration whether, since the present Arms Embargo Agreement has not proved capable of arresting the progress, some more comprehensive international remedy should not be sought. With this end in view Mr. Chamberlain recently invited the views of His Majesty's Minister in Peking, Sir R. Macleay, of whose reply Sir Esme Howard begs to enclose a copy.72 In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the Powers, so long as they are unable or unwilling effectively to prevent their nationals from making money out of a traffic that merely increases the miseries of the Chinese people, are exposed to some measure of moral reproach and are in a position less strong than they would be otherwise to deal with the calumnies of the agitators who exasperate anti-foreign feeling by representing the sufferings of China as due to the "imperialism" and greed of foreigners. Again, so long as they cannot keep arms out of China, the hands of the Powers are pro tanto weakened for any pacific influence they may wish to exert to promote the evolution of a stable and effective Government in China which is their prime interest in the Far EastThat is impossible so long as China swarms with hordes of soldiers who are indistinguishable from brigands and the difficulty of disbanding these hordes is perpetuated so long as military adventurers can obtain copious supplies of modern weapons from Europe. His Majesty's Government would therefore be very glad to know how the United States Government consider that this serious situation can best be met, how they would view a possible proposal to place China on the list of prohibited areas and, failing this, whether they can suggest any other means of effective international cooperation to cope with this evil which experience has shown the Arms Embargo Agreement is insufficient to check. His Majesty's Government have themselves no intention of bringing forward this proposal but they are earnestly desirous of cooperating with the United States Government in any way possible in order to find an exit from the present impasse. 71 See pp. 26 ff. 12 Not printed. |