from this Government what the attitude of that Government is toward the President's calling of such a conference and what the opinion of British officials is in regard to its reception by other European countries on subjects of both land and naval armament. I am not yet prepared to make inquiry of European countries and for that reason wish this to be simply an informal talk by you on your own responsibility.21 500.A12/70: Telegram KELLOGG The Chargé in Japan (Neville) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] TOKYO, October 24, 1925-3 p. m. [Received October 24-11:30 a. m.] 176. Reference to Department's telegram inquiring newspaper comment on President's press statement.22 His remarks were not widely carried, none of the vernacular papers featured the news item prominently; only a few of the metropolitan papers printed condensations in their news columns; an account in English appeared in Japan Advertiser. There has been no editorial comment. There has been some discussion of effect that could be expected from the Locarno Agreements. I am informed that Japan would prefer to see settlement as far as possible of all the outstanding obligations arising out of Washington 1922 Conference before considering new commitments; that for the present moment the country is content with its armament situation and would not welcome further conference on armament until Chinese situation shows some sign of clarifying and until relations with Russia are placed upon more secure foundation than at present exists. NEVILLE 500.A12/73: Telegram The Ambassador in Germany (Schurman) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] BERLIN, October 26, 1925-5 p. m. 183. Department's circular telegram, October 22, 4 p. m.22 President's remarks have received exceedingly little press comment here; only article of any interest is in Vossische Zeitung of October 23. "On Oct. 26, noon, the Ambassador telegraphed that the Department's inquiry had been fully answered by his telegram No. 332, supra. (File No. 500. A 12/72.) 22 See footnote 15, p. 11. I believe, however, that German opinion in general for obvious reasons would welcome call from President Coolidge for disarmament conference at Washington. SCHURMAN 500.A12/77: Telegram The Ambassador in Great Britain (Houghton) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] LONDON, October 29, 1925—(?) p. m. [Received 3:53 p. m.] 337. Department's telegram No. 322, October 24. The probable calling of a European conference for limitation of armaments is occasioning me real concern. Should a conference of this sort eventuate, nothing can prevent at least a part of European press from voicing distinct satisfaction and from seeing in our exclusion a definite and intended rebuff to would-be American leadership. This view would be copied into the American press and, coupled with the fact that the League of Nations is now a formidable political machine, would be used to demonstrate that our policy, despite all our sacrifices, has resulted merely in eliminating us from the general comity of nations and has left us isolated against a united Europe and without friends in Asia. In these circumstances may I suggest for consideration that it might clear the situation if President Coolidge were to point out at early opportunity that any so-called American interference in European affairs has come only when the European powers themselves were unable to agree and had asked our help, as in the Dawes Plan. When these powers can agree, especially in efforts to effect limitation of armaments, neither reason nor excuse for our participation exists. Our approval of a conference of that sort may be taken as matter of course. The administration, rather than its enemies, it seems to me, should define its position, but unless such a definition as suggested be made early any later statement would avail little. Attitude on our part such as I suggest would unquestionably have salutary effect on this side the water and would serve to bring to minds of the powers concerned that they would be affected adversely and possibly disastrously by any real withdrawal on our part. HOUGHTON 500.A12/77: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Houghton) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, November 19, 1925-10 a.m. 338. Your No. 337, October 29. I have talked over the matter with the President and have given him a memorandum.23 He will take up the subject in his message to Congress on December 9 [8].24 It will receive much more publicity in that way than it would from a newspaper interview. If you think that there is any possibility that European countries will take steps to call a conference before his message, I should be glad to be advised. KELLOGG DISINCLINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO BE ASSOCIATED IN EUROPEAN SECURITY PACTS: (1) GENEVA PROTOCOL; (2) LOCARNO AGREEMENT 511.3 B 1/2861 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the British Ambassador (Howard), January 5, 1925 Geneva Protocol.25 The Ambassador said that he had received a private letter from Mr. Austen Chamberlain 26 requesting him to take up with the Secretary the question of the Geneva Protocol. Mr. Chamberlain desired to know the views of this Government. It would seem that the putting into effect of the Protocol without modifications might leave the way open for the development of situations which would be embarrassing with respect to the relations between Great Britain and the United States. It was a cardinal point in British policy to maintain friendly relations with the United States and to cooperate with this Government wherever possible, and there might be interference with this policy if contingencies should arise in which through the operation of the Protocol the British Government was brought into opposition to the interests of the United States. On the other hand, it seemed to the British Government that it would not be well to throw out the Protocol entirely, for if this were done there would most probably be a continuance of competitive armament in Europe which the countries concerned could not afford. The only alternative to such a competition in armament with all its possible consequences would seem "Not printed. 24 See the President's message to Congress, December 8, p. vii. 25 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes; text printed as S. Doc. 180, 68th Cong., 2d sess. 28 "British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. to be the adoption in some form of such an arrangement as the Geneva Protocol proposed. The British Government were seeking for modifications which might suit the purpose and would be very glad to know the position of the United States. The Secretary said he should hardly care to make any answer for this Government to such a broad inquiry, involving important questions of future policies, without bringing the matter to the attention of the President, and this he would do at the first opportunity. He did not mind saying, however, as an informal expression of his personal views, that there were two aspects at least of the Geneva Protocol which might give concern to this Government. The Secretary said that if the Protocol were taken as having practical value and of actually portending what it set forth, there would appear to be a proposal of a concert against the United States, when the Powers joining in the Protocol considered that the United States had committed some act of aggression, although the United States might believe itself to be entirely justified in its action, and in fact be acting in accordance with its traditional policies. The Secretary said that he did not believe that such a concert would actually become effective but he supposed that the Protocol must be taken as it is written and in this view the United States would be compelled to view it with disfavor. The Secretary said there was another class of cases where the action of the United States itself might not be involved but that of some other country with which the United States had trade relations, and the action of the Powers who had joined in the Protocol might turn out to be inimical to the interests of the United States in such relations with the country in question. The Ambassador said that he had not supposed that the first situation would actually arise and he really had in mind the second case that the Secretary had put. In other words, they might be called upon to blockade some country and come into antagonism to the interests of the United States in consequence. The Secretary said that there was one thing he believed could be depended upon, and that was that this Government from its very beginning had been insistent upon the rights of neutrals and would continue to maintain them. The Secretary did not believe any Administration, short of a treaty concluded and ratified, could commit the country against assertion of its neutral rights in case there should be occasion to demand their recognition. The Ambassador said that he believed that that was the situation and that that was the point which his Government had in view. The Secretary said that while the effect of the Protocol upon the interests of the United States in the con tingencies suggested seemed to be quite obvious, the Government of the United States did not desire to be put in the position of taking action against the adoption of the Protocol. He had rather expected that situations similar to those which might arise in the view of the United States, would be in contemplation of other Governments and especially of the British Government, and he had not believed that the Protocol would become effective according to its present terms; that it was desired by this Government that if other Governments did not approve the Protocol, they should deal with the matter from the standpoint of their own interests and not put the responsibility upon the United States. The Ambassador said that there had been nothing on the particular point in Mr. Chamberlain's letter, but it had occurred to him (the Ambassador) that possibly the result might be reached by a reservation on the part of the British Government; that they could reserve the right in any contingency to which the sanctions might apply to consult with any Power that was not a member of the League of Nations and make such arrangements as might be desirable in the light of such consultation. The Ambassador said that he had not worked out the phraseology but the idea occurred to him and it seemed to him that it might be a satisfactory solution. The Secretary said that he could well understand the reasons which might lead the British Government to make such a reservation but that he thought it would be inadvisable to have anything said on the other side to the effect that an arrangement had been made in relation to the ratification of the Protocol which was satisfactory to the United States. The Secretary said that if any such statement or suggestion was made there would at once be inquiry here as to what understanding we had and why we had it and what right we had to have it, et cetera; that it would be a most unpleasant situation. The Secretary must emphasize the point, therefore, that whatever action the British Government took it must take on its own responsibility and while, as it seemed to the Secretary, they could appropriately envisage the possible contingencies of conflict with the interests of the United States and develop their course accordingly, they should not make any suggestion that the course they did take was taken pursuant to some understanding with the United States. The Secretary said this was all he cared to say at present and he would talk over the matter with the President. The Ambassador said that he was leaving the city and would not write to Mr. Chamberlain at once and might see the Secretary again on his return on Thursday."7 "i. e., January 8. |