One evening they walked out to "The Bluff," as they had done many times before, to see the sun set. This was a picturesque spot a short distance west of the hotel, overlooking the Sacramento Valley and affording a fine view of the Coast Range beyond. Behind the distant chain the sun had just disappeared, and half his golden halo burned as a crown upon the intervening purple peak. A thousand streamers of orange-colored light, radiating from the point of exit, extended almost to the zenith. Far on each side of the crowned height glowed aureate splendors, softening into a suspicion of amethyst and green. To right and left along the mighty sweep of ridged mountain wall, the intense coloring gradually paled

to a delicate tone of azure, a veil of tinted light through which rugged grandeur appeared only in softened lines of beauty. From behind a high butte southward a long pencil of sunbeams fell along the range midway from its illuminated crest, and seemed to melt its way, a line of golden vapor, through the bank of purple and blue. The long reach of uplifted crag and peak and buttressed hills, pine-fringed, triangled with dark-shadowed cañons, and stretching in grand terraces down to the valley, almost hidden in its Indian summer haze, made up the foreground of a picture that only Nature with heaven and earth for a canvas, can produce.

Syringa was aware that she had changed much in the last few weeks, and a vague thought was in her mind that she had outlived her bitterest sorrow; that the ghost of the Past would forever cease to trouble, and that the future might still be stored with happiness for her. But should she forget? Had she a right to be happy, if she could?

"We have known each other so short a time, we must make no mistake. Let me explain, fully. I loved before I saw you, and thought I could never-care again as I did for him-who is now dead. I confess, you have taught me different. But let us take time to think. Take time yourself. It might make a difference with you, let us make no mistake."

"But you do care for me, you admit. Your past love does not concern me. It is for the present and future that I crave your affection." He took her hand and she let him retain it.

"Yes, I care for you," she murmured, "but I love the memory of the dead. I might wrong you,-you might regret,-"

"No!" he interrupted, "with your love, I cannot regret. Your memory of the past, your scruples, only prove your worth. If we love each other, we can make no mistake. But I will not urge you. If you love me, there can be but one conclusion. I will wait and hope. Let me speak to you to-morrow."

When our lovers met next morning, no doubt or indecision was in Syringa's face, and her manner dispelled any fear Gaylord may have had that the past would come between them. He was content to let the day pass without further questioning; and when, at evening, he proposed that they again view the sunset from the Bluff, her smiling assent gave further assurance to his hope.

Syringa had never looked lovelier than on this occasion. Her dark eyes shone with the light which only happiness and affection can give, and her face was a bright index of love's tender emotions.

When they were seated, he asked: "Are you ready to give me my answer?" "Yes," she replied, simply, giving him her hand.

They sat for some minutes in silent happiness, seeing, but little heeding, the gorgeous spectacle in the west. Then Gaylord spoke as if by sudden impulse:

My darling, your frankness makes me feel that I should have told you before now of the one thing in my life that you ought to know-to have known. It is nothing that can affect your love or respect for me, and yet I should have told you. To-day I have thought of it many times, and I cannot feel at ease until I can say that I have kept no secret from you."

He paused, and then went on with downcast eyes, but in steady tones. "Less than a year ago, I had the misfortune to take the life of a fellow-man. I was, possibly, in a measure to blame; but I was not guilty of any crime-the jury said I was justified. In bitter regrets I have expiated all the blame that may have attached to me in that unfortunate affair, in which my worst offense was venial, the result of education in false codes of honor. That is all now,-you know the worst of me. Some day I will tell you all, if you care to know; but let us not mar our happiness now by-"

He glanced at her and stopped abruptly, startled and alarmed at the expression on her face. She was looking directly at him, with pale face and dilating eyes. She shuddered nervously, and with a perceptible effort to speak calmly, said:-" No; tell me all now. Where did it happen? "At New Orleans," he answered. "We

were both attending a medical college there "

She quickly withdrew her hand from his. Terror and anguish were depicted on her face. She pressed one hand quickly to her heart, her lips quivered, and she gasped:

"It was Albert Favour! You are the Ford that killed him!"

"Yes, O, my darling! Did you know him? Have I-"

He tried to take her hands. She repulsed him sternly and sprang to her feet. He also arose. A look of livid passion chased the terror from her face, and she cried in hoarse, unnatural tones:—

"He was the man I loved. He is the man I love! O, let me not 'curse you! Let me not curse you, but you have blighted my life forever!"

She struck aside his extended hands, turned abruptly and walked rapidly toward the camp. Gaylord stood with agonized face, watching her go up the slope. He heard her sob convulsively, and saw her press her hands to her throat. called her name and started to follow. She turned-and waved him back.

He

Gaylord left next day without seeing Syringa. When ready to start, he sent to her room a brief note begging to see her for one minute only. It was returned with this answer written thereon :—

I cannot see you. But I will not curse you, and will try not to hate you. You have no right to ask more. S. F.

L

A dream.

Grace Hibbard.

T

HE facts relating to the lease of the Philadelphia Gas-Works have been fully stated and sufficiently discussed by several distinguished writers, but as yet no one has touched upon the real cause of failure or proposed a remedy.

The great advantage of the municipal ownership and operation of gas-works can not be disputed, and it is a most lamentable circumstance that the third largest city in the United States, after ten years' experience, has relinquished their control. In spite of all possible explanations, such action must be regarded as a confession of inability to administer them successfully, and an acknowledgment of the superiority of private over public management. This unfortunate conclusion cannot be ignored, and certainly ought to lead to a careful contrast of the two systems, in order to find out wherein they differ, and whether there is any hope of putting municipal gas-work management and the conduct of other public utilities on a private corporation basis. If this could be done, we might reasonably expect the same result.

In the first place, it must be noted that the citizens substantially correspond with the stockholders in a private corporation. In both cases the stockholders may be few or many, male or female, old or young, wise or ignorant, rich or poor. All or none may be endowed with social or philanthropic instincts. Like private stockholders, citizens may constitute a strange and constantly changing medley of Protestants, Catholics, Atheists, Socialists, Democrats, Republicans, Populists, etc. Neither "private" nor "citizen" stockholders expect personal association in the conduct of affairs, but are ready to intrust their interests to their representatives. The main difference consists in the need of residence. Whilst the private stockholder may reside in London, Paris, or Japan, the citizen acquires his interest by residence, and at the same time becomes the consumer of his own productions.

In the next place, the success of corporations is not dependent on the character or social standing of the stockholders, but on the form and constitution of the

business government. No large business corporation trusts the management to a single person except when that person owns the controlling interest and would. be the greatest sufferer by his own neglect. The very worst proprietary is certain to prefer the election of honest representatives. Whilst the efforts of the most exemplary and most honorable body of stockholders and officials would assuredly fail if the principle of management encouraged the growth of corrupting human weaknesses. Under such conditions the most immaculate officials must eventually become corrupt. From this it follows that corruption in government affords prima facie evidence that its form and method must be wrong.

How, then, do private stockholders secure honest and successful management? It is universally acknowledged that there are no two ways. They simply elect a committee of themselves. They elect a corporate body, which they endow with corporate power and corporate responsibility; which determines the policies and the mode of action; which appoints, promotes, and removes all executive officers at its own pleasure, settles their salaries and duties, and the conditions of all employment; which supervises all official acts, regulates all expenditures, orders all repairs, improvements, and extension of the works, and asks of the stockholders more capital as soon as it may be wisely and profitably employed.

This representative board of directors has absolute and undivided control. No one is permitted to obstruct their deliberations or dispute their action. No one can veto their ordinances nor contract their operations. No one can cancel or postpone the payment of their checks. In the election of a corporate business management, individual power and responsibility are both lost. No individual can have special privileges by right. No one has personal power to give an order, make an appointment, remove an official, or spend a cent, without the elected corporate consent. No one has it in his power to promise appointments, contracts, or

emoluments of any kind, to the friends who have assisted to elect him. No one has "spoils" to give away. Moreover, the board of directors is not permitted to alienate any portion of their power to boards, commissioners, or individuals, over whom they have no absolute control. They are responsible for the fitness and .conduct of every officer employed, and can not shift any part of the appointing, promoting, or controlling power on the shoulders of commissioners less qualified than themselves to judge of the merits of the candidates or their special fitness for the duties they are expected to perform. And lastly, the sole and most efficient bond of union is the financial interest of the corporation, and the sole test of success is the profitable return.

If these simple conditions satisfy the requirements of a private corporation, why should they not be tried in city government and in the management of public gas-works?

Now, it is remarkable that no successful municipal government can anywhere be found which is not conducted on this simple business plan, and municipal authorities so constituted present innumerable examples of the successful management of gas-works. The town of Birmingham, England, is a case in point. It is a large manufacturing town which, like Philadelphia, is engaged in a variety of industries. There are 95,000 citizens who vote, or nearly one fifth of the population, a proportion equal to that of an American city. The large council elected by the people has complete control; the gas-works are managed by a committee of eight members, who submit all their operations for the approval of the council. Their last report presents a sample of their work. They state that additional and enlarged mains are required in districts in which it was found difficult to maintain the supply as efficiently as necessary for gas-engines and heating purposes. They report that a bench of retorts had to be reconstructed, and that the adoption of eight instead of seven retorts will require a small expenditure on capital account. They report the acceptance of tenders in connection with the works, and that satisfactory terms have been arranged with patentees for the use of inclined retorts.

At the request of the council, they have made arrangements for providing a recre ation ground from a portion of land not in present use, and are in communication with the baths and parks committee, who will carry out the scheme. The committee have under consideration a revision of the salaries rendered necessary by more important duties, and in answer to an application from one of the superintendents for an increased salary, they propose to grant him an addition of $250 a year. Their accounts show a profit amounting to more than a quarter of a million dollars. This profit is dealt with in a purely business way. The committee reports that half of the total output is sold to consumers whose demands remain constant throughout the year, and whose consumption it is most desirable to encourage. They report that some of these large consumers are providing themselves with gas-producing plants, and that the price to this class must be reduced to arrest this loss. They therefore request that a reduction of twenty per cent below the highest price should be made to them. They also recommend that the charge for gas for public lighting be proportionately reduced. They estimate the gross cost of these reductions at $150,000 yearly, which will, it is hoped, be recovered by increased output. It is an error to suppose that the management is authorized to favor any special class, or to set aside financial considerations for the sake of social or industrial progress. They put in connec tions and fixtures as a pure matter of business to promote gas consumption. They introduce penny-in-the-slot machines to extend the use of gas amongst classes who are unable to use it on any other terms; they rent out gas-stoves to those only who cannot afford to buy them; and in order to meet the financial conditions, they raise the price to all these small consumers.

Throughout the report of the committee there is no mention of the manager. who is not permitted to share in any part of their responsibility. He is simply the servant who is paid for his technical skill, his advice, and his executive ability. For the due exercise of these he is immediately responsible, and would be discharged for failure. He recommends candidates for

employment, but cannot appoint them. He recommends the purchase of materials, but has no power to order them. He proposes new processes, but cannot introduce them, and new machinery of production without the power to construct it. Thus is the power of the executive kept under corporate control, and the separation between legislative and executive functions made complete. From this example, which is one of hundreds, it becomes evident that the same form of business management which is found in private business corporations will surely succeed in the management of public utilities under municipal control.

If we examine the municipal governments in American cities, we find that all the characteristic features of private corporation management have completely disappeared. Corporate wisdom is no longer regarded as the test of safety. Corporate power is overwhelmed by individual power. Corporate responsibility is despised, and is replaced by that of individuals. And all this in spite of the accepted principle of all good government, which affirms that no individual action can possibly replace the concerted action of the people, who are necessarily most interested in successful government.

"The

A passage from my article on Municipal Government of San Francisco" in the OVERLAND for March, 1897, applies here:

Individual responsibility as opposed to corpo

rate is relied upon as the fundamental principle of American municipal administration. Subject to a master's control, the value of individual responsibility cannot be exaggerated. It is simple, direct, and easily enforced. There is no escape from it. It is an indispensable feature of all good administration. It is employed and trusted by the directors of all business corporations in departmental work. But in using it business directors take every possible precaution to retain the power of control intact. They carefully examine and determine the qualifications of the candidates for office, and they allot to the appointee only such reasonable work as he may be expected to perform efficiently. They give him full and definite instructions for the regulation of his official conduct, and they expect him to obey them. They also require periodical reports of all transactions, which they revise as they think fit. thus recognized that individual responsibility is necessarily limited by individual capacity and experience, and that it is most effective when employed as an intelligent machine. VOL. XXXIII— 12

It is

In fact, corporate responsibility begins where individual responsibility ends, because in a multitude of councilors there is safety.

It is discretionary individual power which is the source of every kind of abuse and destroys responsibility. It is therefore one of the first duties of a business government to define its limits, and the duty can never be left to the judgment of a No nation can be properly single man.

governed by a king or emperor, and all great business corporations are conducted by corporate authority. The government of the complicated activities now demanded by the citizens assuredly belong to this category, and must therefore be intrusted to representative corporate control. Quoting again from the same article:

There are, therefore, four great and insuperable objections to the extension of the principle of individual responsibility in municipal administration: Frst, the great difficulty of fitting the qualifications of the individual to the responsibilities imposed upon him; second, the difficulty, which becomes an impossibility, when the responsibilities are beyond the capacity of any siugle officer; third, the impossibility of excluding discretionary power in the majority of cases: and lastly, the fact that individual responsibility can neither be trusted with initiative action nor with the power of the purse, which is the only sound foundation of all good administration.

No capitalist would venture to invest his savings in a gas-works with a management constructed on the lines of the Philadelphia government. Instead of a body of representative directors, upon whose corporate wisdom and honesty he has been accustomed to rely, and to which as a body, and not to any individual, he has given unlimited and undivided power over the company's affairs, he finds an emasculated creation, falsely dignified with the name of council, which has been constructed under the power of an immutable charter, from which there is no possible escape, and which curtails freedom of action in every possible direction. Unlike the construction of a private business corporation, the charter of Philadelphia forbids the council to appoint the president or mayor, who is elected by the people not as the servant of the council, but its master. This official is an ingenious complication of legislative and executive power.