1791 so nearly attained was a circumstance particularly afflicting.-Drouet the postmaster at St. Menehoud, recognizing his majesty's person, pursued him to Varennes, and contrived to detain him there, till some of the national guards could be assembled, by getting a waggon loaded with furniture overturned upon a bridge which led towards Montmedi. Parties of dragoons were stationed both at St. Menehoud and Varennes; but these were seduced from their duty. *—On information of the disaster, de Bouillé used all possible dispatch to rescue his sovereign; hastening with a regiment of dragoons to Varennes for that purpose. But he arrived too late. His majesty had been laid under an arrest, and was instantly carried back to Paris, under an escort of the national guards. No event could have happened so fatal as this to the king's personal welfare or the royal cause. It is well known that the happiness of a state depends on mutual confidence between the sovereign and the people, and must expire with it. But the complete loss of it which ensued in this instance was accompanied with peculiar evils. Delay, says an intelligent French writer, was the only thing that afforded a hope of restoring the monarch to his just power; time alone could effect it. On the contrary, the republican faction derived that advantage from the failure of this design which all their intrigues could not otherwise have given them. They were enabled by the duplicity of his majesty's conduct to make the people their partisans in the execution of their most violent purposes by impressing them with a persuasion of his insincerity.-The king, on his return to Paris, declared Our attention is agreeably diverted, by an historian of this period, from these scenes to the events which happened to the princes of the house of Stewart under similar circumstances. Among the number of those persons in whose fidelity Charles the Second reposed a confidence in his escape after the battle of Worcester not one was found who would betray his prince, notwithstanding a great reward was offered for apprehending him, and death was denounced against those who protected him. And when the pretender was concealed in the Highlands, after the battle of Culloden," the wealth of the Indies," says he, "would not have bribed the poorest High"lander in Scotland to have done what would have rendered him for ever infamous in the eyes "of his countrymen and his own. And many who were enemies to the cause of that unfortunate person rejected the idea of stopping him in his flight, or betraying him into the hands of his "pursuers."-[Moore's View. 2. 350.]-May the British nation be ever distinguished by their love of freedom, and by those humane and generous feelings which are adherent on the habits of it. 66 Puisaye. 1. 303. Bouillé. 332. 40. Moore. 2. 340. declared to the commissioners sent by the national assembly that the reason for his leaving the capital was the apprehension of danger to the royal family, especially her majesty, excited by the insults of the populace and the threats conveyed in the pamphlets, by which they were continually aspersed, without an attempt to punish the authors of them. That he meant. not to leave the kingdom, but only to repair to Montmedi, where he would have been better situated than at the capital for opposing the attempts of foreign powers. That another object which he had in view was to ascertain what the real disposition of the nation was respecting the constitution; which had been variously represented to him, but which he now knew to be decidedly in its favour. And that he wished to prove to France and all Europe that he was at liberty, and not a prisoner, as was believed by many.' -This declaration, had credit been given it, would have justified his escape: and the friends to the constitution would have rejoiced at an event which, by liberating him from his degrading subjection to a republican faction, who were meditating the ruin of the present monarchical government, might have enabled him to re-establish it.* On the contrary, it was suspected by many of these, and believed by the body of the people, that a plot had been concerted for re-establishing the ancient monarchy by a co-operation of the aristocratic partisans, who were to be raised by the nobles and disaffected clergy still remaining in the kingdom, with the German, Italian, and Spanish troops, stationed near the frontiers, professedly with a view of guarding the territories of the sovereigns to whom they belonged.** The 1791 1 Moore. 2. 370. * We may apply to his majesty's present declaration an observation of count de Puisaye on his conduct at an earlier period, and, indeed, to the conduct of others on similar occasions. "Had "the king," says he, "made his declaration at an earlier period, it would have been received "with enthusiasm by a vast majority of the tiers etat, and he would have been hailed with the "blessings of the whole French nation: what evinces a knowledge of the art of governing con"sists, above all things, in observing the exact time for adopting any measure, in attending to "circumstances and accommodating their conduct to them."-Memoires de Puisaye. 46 ** "The king's advisers," says the count de Puisaye, "could not have recommended a more injudicious step than his flight was. Had it succeeded, it would have given the duke of "Orleans the regency, and perhaps the throne: if not, it could not but create a general "mistrust, and alienate from his majesty the hearts of the people, whom it was become so easy 66 10 1791 The apathy with which the inhabitants of the provinces beheld the afflicted royal family, the consternation which prevailed among the citizens of Paris when their escape was announced, and their joy on intelligence of their arrest, might have awakened the aristocrats from those delusive dreams respecting the aid which would be derived from the people in the invasion of France in the ensuing year. Unfortunately for their own welfare and the repose of Europe, their understandings were so completely under the influence of passion and prejudice that the admonitions of common sense could not be heard, and even the evidence of matters of fact was disregarded. The measures adopted by the neighbouring powers, in the mean-time, were very unfavourable to the domestic tranquillity of France, and are particularly deserving our attention, as in them originated the approaching war with this state.--Some of the Germanic powers had such grounds of complaint against the French government as are sometimes made a pretext for war-such as the abolition of their rights of vassallage and other seigneurial claims, in Alsace and Lorrain, on the subversion of the feudal institutions. But Leopold, who now filled the imperial throne, although it is asserted that he had conferred with an envoy from Lewis the Sixteenth at Mantua on the subject of his liberation, was not apparently disposed to hostilities with France."-The first scheme for an armed interposition of which we knew the particulars appears to have been suggested by the enterprising king of Sweden.-Within a few days after Lewis's unsuccessful attempt, de Bouillé, then proscribed by the national assembly, had an interview with Gustavus at Aix la Chapelle; whither he had come to inform himself 66 "to alarm respecting his intentions."-[De Puisaye. 1. 302.]-The same writer gives us an insight into the motives of the marquis de la Fayette's conduct at this crisis. "The marquis de "la Fayette, who had, in his youth, been dazzled with the American constitution, persuaded "himself that, by grafting the declaration of rights upon the worm-eaten stock of an old abso"lute monarchy, he should produce under his hands those fruits which others had easily gathered, among a people who were too few in number, too much dispersed over an immense tract of country, and too much engaged in their own personal speculations, for ambition, so soon, to "excite and multiply rivalships. He saw in the elevation of the duke of Orleans to the throne "not only the entire destruction of his projects, but also the triumph of a personal and irrecon"cileable enemy. This affords us a key, which explains his motives of action on this occasion." -Memoires du Comte de Puisaye. 1. 302. 66 Gifford. 5. 508. 66 himself more perfectly of the situation of affairs in France.-The king opened the conference with a profession of his warm attachment to the interests of Lewis the Sixteenth, and declared to the marquis that the Russian empress had commissioned him to assure that monarch of her disposition to join Gustavus in such measures as might be deemed advisable to extricate him from his present embarrassments."-De Bouillé gave it as his opinion, that, considering the number and strength of the enemies to royalty, no resource remained but in the intervention of the powers in "alliance with the king of France, supported by powerful armies which might either bring about an accommodation, by sustaining the moderate " and constitutional royalists against the anarchists, or might effect a new "revolution in favour of the king, by entering France in the characters of "mediators and protectors of the most reasonable party."-The marquis having, in addition to this advice, recommended the present time as the most advantageous for the execution of such a project, on account of the unprepared state of France, Gustavus proceeded to communicate a project concerted by himself, the empress of Russia, and the king of Spain, for a joint invasion of the French frontier, with a view to the enforcing a negotiation which should be then opened with the French government in favour of the king."-Gustavus declared his intention of taking the field at the head of the allied army; and de Bouillé was to have had the honour of being his lieutenant."P These matters being settled, Gustavus departed to his own dominions, and the marquis went, soon after, to Coblentz; where he conferred with the princes of the blood and others there assembled; gave them his opinion respecting the present situation of France; and told them that the only effectual means of frustrating the designs of the republicans and accomplishing their own restoration, was to drop all thoughts of re-establishing the ancient monarchy, encumbered with the unpopular privileges and exemptions of the nobility and clergy, and to recommend their cause to the nation by the promise of ameliorating the condition of the people at large. De Bouillé then repaired to Pilnitz, a castle belonging to the elector of Saxony, that he might attend the memorable congress there held by the 1791 1791 emperor, the Prussian king, and the elector of Saxony.‡-In the result of their conferences on the affairs of France we may perceive the apprehensions of danger justly entertained from the principles of equality by which the French republicans were endeavouring to recommend themselves to the support of the lower orders of the people in every part of Europe. On application from monsieur and count d'Artois that they would assist their royal brother, they formally declared,|| "that they regard the situation of "the king of France as an object of common interest to all the sovereigns "of Europe; they hope that this interest cannot fail of being recognized by those powers whose assistance is demanded; they profess their readi"ness in concert with such powers, to employ the most efficacious means "relatively to their abilities for enabling the king of France, in the most perfect liberty, to lay the foundation of a monarchical government, calcu"lated alike to secure the rights of the sovereign and the welfare of the "French nation. Then and in that case, the emperor and the king of "Prussia are resolved to act promptly and by mutual accord with the forces necessary to attain the common object proposed." From the information here given us by this active and sincere partisan of Lewis the Sixteenth we find that there were two separate schemes formed for restoring that monarch to the free exercise of his sovereign authority; one by the alliance of Russia, Sweden, and Spain; the other by that of the emperor and his Prussian majesty, the prosecution of which was to depend on the co-operation of other powers, which were to be applied to. But the views of these powers were far from being in harmony with each other. The German powers were jealous of the enterprising spirit of the Swedish monarch. "I am on very indifferent terms with all my royal brethren, except the king of England," said Gustavus to de Bouillé; " but I have "compelled the empress of Russia at least to esteem me."-The views of the emperor and the king of Prussia were also widely different from each other." Leopold," says de Bouillé, "wished to terminate the affairs of "France by negotiation. His plan was to form a league between all the powers of Europe, to surround France on every side with their armies; 66 and August 4. Bouillé. 421. Marsh. 1. 35. August 27. Idem. 327. 424. |