Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of HungaryCentral European University Press, 10 feb. 2016 - 336 pagini In an article in 2001 the author analyzed the way Fidesz, the party on government for the first time then, was eliminating the institutional system of the rule of law. At that time, many readers doubted the legitimacy of the new approach, whose key categories were the 'organized over-world', the 'state employing mafia methods' and the 'adopted political family'. Critics considered these categories metaphors rather than elements of a coherent conceptual framework. Ten years later Fidesz won a two-third majority in Parliament at the 2010 elections: the institutional obstacles of exerting power were thus largely removed. Just like the party, the state itself was placed under the control of a single individual, who since then has applied the techniques used within his party to enforce submission and obedience onto society as a whole. While in many post-communist systems a segment of the party and secret service became the elite in possession of not only political power but also of wealth, Fidesz, as a late-coming new political predator, was able to occupy this position through an aggressive change of elite. The actions of the post-communist mafia state model are led by the logic of power and wealth concentration in the hands of the clan. But while the classical mafia channeled wealth and economic players into its spheres of interest by means of direct coercion, the mafia state does the same by means of parliamentary legislation, legal prosecution, tax authority, police forces and secret service. The new conceptual framework is important and timely not only for Hungary, but also for other post-communist countries subjected to autocratic rules. |
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Pagina vi
... social embeddedness .................... 2.8. Pre-2010 political cold war, and the erosion of the institutional, two-thirds constraint 2.8.1. Political cold war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8.2. Economic trench truce: 70/30 2.8.3 ...
... social embeddedness .................... 2.8. Pre-2010 political cold war, and the erosion of the institutional, two-thirds constraint 2.8.1. Political cold war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8.2. Economic trench truce: 70/30 2.8.3 ...
Pagina xv
... social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated ...
... social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated ...
Pagina xviii
... social safety nets and insisted on economic austerity in the face of economic contraction. As history would have it, the fall of the Berlin Wall occurred at the height of the Washington Consensus when economic neoliberalism was the only ...
... social safety nets and insisted on economic austerity in the face of economic contraction. As history would have it, the fall of the Berlin Wall occurred at the height of the Washington Consensus when economic neoliberalism was the only ...
Pagina 6
... social fabric of scarcity; while the initiators of the corrupt transactions, who approached actors in the public sector now came from the business or civil sphere. The anomalies of party financing and its openness to corrupt deals were ...
... social fabric of scarcity; while the initiators of the corrupt transactions, who approached actors in the public sector now came from the business or civil sphere. The anomalies of party financing and its openness to corrupt deals were ...
Pagina 7
... social capital—in the event of taking power. While party support based merely on sympathy, offered without expectation of recompense fizzled out, the indebtedness of parties grew and corruption attendant on the financing of parties ...
... social capital—in the event of taking power. While party support based merely on sympathy, offered without expectation of recompense fizzled out, the indebtedness of parties grew and corruption attendant on the financing of parties ...
Cuprins
1 | |
2 The disintegration of the Third Hungarian Republic in 2010 | 15 |
from the functional disorders of democracy to a critique of the system | 57 |
4 Definition of the postcommunist mafia state | 67 |
a subtype of autocratic regimes | 73 |
6 The legitimacy deficit faced by the mafia state and the means to overcome it | 209 |
the ideological arsenal | 231 |
8 The Criminal State | 255 |
9 Pyramid schemesthe limits of the mafia state | 269 |
Annexes | 297 |
List of accompanying studies | 304 |
Former publications | 306 |
Index of Names | 309 |
Back cover | 313 |
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Termeni și expresii frecvente
according actions activity administration adopted political family allowed authority autocratic bank become billion budget called carried central communist constitutional corruption course Court criminal critical culture deal decisions democracy democratic directed economic elections elite ensured established euro European fact Felcsút Fidesz force forint freedom function funds groups hand head Hungarian Hungary ideological individual institutions interests legitimate levels liberal longer mafia Magyar majority matter means measures ment minister municipal nature offer Office oligarchs operation Orbán organized owners parliament party position possible post-communist president regime result role rule serve situation social socialist society stooges taken tion Union various wealth