Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of HungaryCentral European University Press, 10 feb. 2016 - 336 pagini In an article in 2001 the author analyzed the way Fidesz, the party on government for the first time then, was eliminating the institutional system of the rule of law. At that time, many readers doubted the legitimacy of the new approach, whose key categories were the 'organized over-world', the 'state employing mafia methods' and the 'adopted political family'. Critics considered these categories metaphors rather than elements of a coherent conceptual framework. Ten years later Fidesz won a two-third majority in Parliament at the 2010 elections: the institutional obstacles of exerting power were thus largely removed. Just like the party, the state itself was placed under the control of a single individual, who since then has applied the techniques used within his party to enforce submission and obedience onto society as a whole. While in many post-communist systems a segment of the party and secret service became the elite in possession of not only political power but also of wealth, Fidesz, as a late-coming new political predator, was able to occupy this position through an aggressive change of elite. The actions of the post-communist mafia state model are led by the logic of power and wealth concentration in the hands of the clan. But while the classical mafia channeled wealth and economic players into its spheres of interest by means of direct coercion, the mafia state does the same by means of parliamentary legislation, legal prosecution, tax authority, police forces and secret service. The new conceptual framework is important and timely not only for Hungary, but also for other post-communist countries subjected to autocratic rules. |
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Pagina xvi
... levels of intolerance against minority groups rising, and a single governing party controlling all public institutions in a non-transparent manner and digging itself in for the long haul. The rotation of political power is no longer ...
... levels of intolerance against minority groups rising, and a single governing party controlling all public institutions in a non-transparent manner and digging itself in for the long haul. The rotation of political power is no longer ...
Pagina 3
... levels of seniority. Day-to-day corruption consists of a series of individual phenomena: an official responsible for a decision accepts or requests financial or other benefits for handling a case in a manner advantageous to the ...
... levels of seniority. Day-to-day corruption consists of a series of individual phenomena: an official responsible for a decision accepts or requests financial or other benefits for handling a case in a manner advantageous to the ...
Pagina 6
... levels, rising unemployment and inflation only a symbolic sum could be charged as membership fees, or else non ... level would have far outstripped the gains of overstraining people's ability to pay membership fees. Naturally, the later ...
... levels, rising unemployment and inflation only a symbolic sum could be charged as membership fees, or else non ... level would have far outstripped the gains of overstraining people's ability to pay membership fees. Naturally, the later ...
Pagina 7
... levels on the scale of legitimacy and illegitimacy. Such relations carried the inherent possibility not only of parties working their budgets around the law, but the personal corruption of members of the political class. The threat of ...
... levels on the scale of legitimacy and illegitimacy. Such relations carried the inherent possibility not only of parties working their budgets around the law, but the personal corruption of members of the political class. The threat of ...
Pagina 10
... actors in the private economy. In this phase the players of the economy and politics seek each other out along established paths, mutually. • On the third evolutionary level the mafia state (the 10 POST-COMMUNIST MAFIA STATE.
... actors in the private economy. In this phase the players of the economy and politics seek each other out along established paths, mutually. • On the third evolutionary level the mafia state (the 10 POST-COMMUNIST MAFIA STATE.
Cuprins
1 | |
2 The disintegration of the Third Hungarian Republic in 2010 | 15 |
from the functional disorders of democracy to a critique of the system | 57 |
4 Definition of the postcommunist mafia state | 67 |
a subtype of autocratic regimes | 73 |
6 The legitimacy deficit faced by the mafia state and the means to overcome it | 209 |
the ideological arsenal | 231 |
8 The Criminal State | 255 |
9 Pyramid schemesthe limits of the mafia state | 269 |
Annexes | 297 |
List of accompanying studies | 304 |
Former publications | 306 |
Index of Names | 309 |
Back cover | 313 |
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Termeni și expresii frecvente
according actions activity administration adopted political family allowed authority autocratic bank become billion budget called carried central communist constitutional corruption course Court criminal critical culture deal decisions democracy democratic directed economic elections elite ensured established euro European fact Felcsút Fidesz force forint freedom function funds groups hand head Hungarian Hungary ideological individual institutions interests legitimate levels liberal longer mafia Magyar majority matter means measures ment minister municipal nature offer Office oligarchs operation Orbán organized owners parliament party position possible post-communist president regime result role rule serve situation social socialist society stooges taken tion Union various wealth