Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of HungaryCentral European University Press, 10 feb. 2016 - 336 pagini In an article in 2001 the author analyzed the way Fidesz, the party on government for the first time then, was eliminating the institutional system of the rule of law. At that time, many readers doubted the legitimacy of the new approach, whose key categories were the 'organized over-world', the 'state employing mafia methods' and the 'adopted political family'. Critics considered these categories metaphors rather than elements of a coherent conceptual framework. Ten years later Fidesz won a two-third majority in Parliament at the 2010 elections: the institutional obstacles of exerting power were thus largely removed. Just like the party, the state itself was placed under the control of a single individual, who since then has applied the techniques used within his party to enforce submission and obedience onto society as a whole. While in many post-communist systems a segment of the party and secret service became the elite in possession of not only political power but also of wealth, Fidesz, as a late-coming new political predator, was able to occupy this position through an aggressive change of elite. The actions of the post-communist mafia state model are led by the logic of power and wealth concentration in the hands of the clan. But while the classical mafia channeled wealth and economic players into its spheres of interest by means of direct coercion, the mafia state does the same by means of parliamentary legislation, legal prosecution, tax authority, police forces and secret service. The new conceptual framework is important and timely not only for Hungary, but also for other post-communist countries subjected to autocratic rules. |
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Pagina viii
... 173 175 177 178 179 195 201 6. The legitimacy deficit faced by the mafia state and the means to overcome it .............................................................. 209 209 209 6.1. Domestication of the media ................
... 173 175 177 178 179 195 201 6. The legitimacy deficit faced by the mafia state and the means to overcome it .............................................................. 209 209 209 6.1. Domestication of the media ................
Pagina 4
... legitimate behavioral norms. (Corruption related to party funding—which is widespread even in well-tried democracies—is qualified as a deviancy, similarly to corruption in public office.) Beyond state deterrence and penalties, anti ...
... legitimate behavioral norms. (Corruption related to party funding—which is widespread even in well-tried democracies—is qualified as a deviancy, similarly to corruption in public office.) Beyond state deterrence and penalties, anti ...
Pagina 5
... legitimacy and illegitimacy made this web of corrupt transactions a morally accepted convention. For this system worked in a quasi egalitarian manner, after all the opportunities for illegitimate ways of accumulating wealth were greatly ...
... legitimacy and illegitimacy made this web of corrupt transactions a morally accepted convention. For this system worked in a quasi egalitarian manner, after all the opportunities for illegitimate ways of accumulating wealth were greatly ...
Pagina 7
... legitimacy and illegitimacy. Such relations carried the inherent possibility not only of parties working their budgets around the law, but the personal corruption of members of the political class. The threat of such illegitimate ...
... legitimacy and illegitimacy. Such relations carried the inherent possibility not only of parties working their budgets around the law, but the personal corruption of members of the political class. The threat of such illegitimate ...
Pagina 8
... legitimate lobbying and the advance of the organized underworld involving bribery and blackmail. Its actions are based not necessarily on the voluntary acquiescence of both parties and the reciprocity of illegal advantages—as in the ...
... legitimate lobbying and the advance of the organized underworld involving bribery and blackmail. Its actions are based not necessarily on the voluntary acquiescence of both parties and the reciprocity of illegal advantages—as in the ...
Cuprins
1 | |
2 The disintegration of the Third Hungarian Republic in 2010 | 15 |
from the functional disorders of democracy to a critique of the system | 57 |
4 Definition of the postcommunist mafia state | 67 |
a subtype of autocratic regimes | 73 |
6 The legitimacy deficit faced by the mafia state and the means to overcome it | 209 |
the ideological arsenal | 231 |
8 The Criminal State | 255 |
9 Pyramid schemesthe limits of the mafia state | 269 |
Annexes | 297 |
List of accompanying studies | 304 |
Former publications | 306 |
Index of Names | 309 |
Back cover | 313 |
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Termeni și expresii frecvente
according actions activity administration adopted political family allowed authority autocratic bank become billion budget called carried central communist constitutional corruption course Court criminal critical culture deal decisions democracy democratic directed economic elections elite ensured established euro European fact Felcsút Fidesz force forint freedom function funds groups hand head Hungarian Hungary ideological individual institutions interests legitimate levels liberal longer mafia Magyar majority matter means measures ment minister municipal nature offer Office oligarchs operation Orbán organized owners parliament party position possible post-communist president regime result role rule serve situation social socialist society stooges taken tion Union various wealth