Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of HungaryCentral European University Press, 10 feb. 2016 - 336 pagini In an article in 2001 the author analyzed the way Fidesz, the party on government for the first time then, was eliminating the institutional system of the rule of law. At that time, many readers doubted the legitimacy of the new approach, whose key categories were the 'organized over-world', the 'state employing mafia methods' and the 'adopted political family'. Critics considered these categories metaphors rather than elements of a coherent conceptual framework. Ten years later Fidesz won a two-third majority in Parliament at the 2010 elections: the institutional obstacles of exerting power were thus largely removed. Just like the party, the state itself was placed under the control of a single individual, who since then has applied the techniques used within his party to enforce submission and obedience onto society as a whole. While in many post-communist systems a segment of the party and secret service became the elite in possession of not only political power but also of wealth, Fidesz, as a late-coming new political predator, was able to occupy this position through an aggressive change of elite. The actions of the post-communist mafia state model are led by the logic of power and wealth concentration in the hands of the clan. But while the classical mafia channeled wealth and economic players into its spheres of interest by means of direct coercion, the mafia state does the same by means of parliamentary legislation, legal prosecution, tax authority, police forces and secret service. The new conceptual framework is important and timely not only for Hungary, but also for other post-communist countries subjected to autocratic rules. |
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Pagina vi
... Fidesz as political apex predator ................................... 2.7.1. From the close college fraternity to the adopted political family, an alternative rebel turned godfather 2.7.2. Socialist erosion, liberal vaporization and ...
... Fidesz as political apex predator ................................... 2.7.1. From the close college fraternity to the adopted political family, an alternative rebel turned godfather 2.7.2. Socialist erosion, liberal vaporization and ...
Pagina xi
... Fidesz government (with coalition partners), Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 2002–2010 Socialist government, until 2008 in coalition with liberals 2004 Hungary enters the European Union 2004–2009 Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány 2009–2010 ...
... Fidesz government (with coalition partners), Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 2002–2010 Socialist government, until 2008 in coalition with liberals 2004 Hungary enters the European Union 2004–2009 Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány 2009–2010 ...
Pagina xx
... Fidesz's constitutional majority, the party could—and did—change the constitution at will. Twelve amendments of the inherited constitution preceded the rapid enactment of the new Fidesz constitution in 2011. After the constitution came ...
... Fidesz's constitutional majority, the party could—and did—change the constitution at will. Twelve amendments of the inherited constitution preceded the rapid enactment of the new Fidesz constitution in 2011. After the constitution came ...
Pagina xxii
... Fidesz. In the end, Fidesz was able to win another term in office with 66% of the seats in the parliament, even though the party won less than 44% of the vote. The drop in Fidesz's vote totals was made up for in significant part by ...
... Fidesz. In the end, Fidesz was able to win another term in office with 66% of the seats in the parliament, even though the party won less than 44% of the vote. The drop in Fidesz's vote totals was made up for in significant part by ...
Pagina xxiii
... Fidesz moneylaundering machine reaches into the nooks and crannies of Hungarian daily life. The capture of the government by the adopted political family—the takeover of state by mafia—is not a routine political rotation of power. It is ...
... Fidesz moneylaundering machine reaches into the nooks and crannies of Hungarian daily life. The capture of the government by the adopted political family—the takeover of state by mafia—is not a routine political rotation of power. It is ...
Cuprins
1 | |
2 The disintegration of the Third Hungarian Republic in 2010 | 15 |
from the functional disorders of democracy to a critique of the system | 57 |
4 Definition of the postcommunist mafia state | 67 |
a subtype of autocratic regimes | 73 |
6 The legitimacy deficit faced by the mafia state and the means to overcome it | 209 |
the ideological arsenal | 231 |
8 The Criminal State | 255 |
9 Pyramid schemesthe limits of the mafia state | 269 |
Annexes | 297 |
List of accompanying studies | 304 |
Former publications | 306 |
Index of Names | 309 |
Back cover | 313 |
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Termeni și expresii frecvente
according actions activity administration adopted political family allowed authority autocratic bank become billion budget called carried central communist constitutional corruption course Court criminal critical culture deal decisions democracy democratic directed economic elections elite ensured established euro European fact Felcsút Fidesz force forint freedom function funds groups hand head Hungarian Hungary ideological individual institutions interests legitimate levels liberal longer mafia Magyar majority matter means measures ment minister municipal nature offer Office oligarchs operation Orbán organized owners parliament party position possible post-communist president regime result role rule serve situation social socialist society stooges taken tion Union various wealth