ligious service would be most acceptable to him. To those, who were so wise, and so candid, as to think and speak in this manner, may we not presume, that the Christian doctrine of repentance and faith, if they had rightly understood it, and if they had known its evidence, would have been a most welcome discovery? To our infidels, indeed, it is not welcome; for they say they have no need of it: being, it seems, fully satisfied, that, however ignorant Socrates might confess himself to be, they have all the knowledge that man has occasion for. And yet, if it had not been for this manifestation of divine grace and truth, they would, probably, at this day, have been consulting oracles, offering incense to idols, or perhaps, like many of our remote forefathers, polluting the creation with human sacrifices. Certain it is, that in these things no material reformation was ever introduced, or attempted by the philosophers of old. That men should worship the gods, and perform the sacrifices, and other rites, as by law established, was the doctrine, not of Pythagoras and Epictetus only, but of Cicero, a wiser, or more learned man at least, than either, and even of Socrates himself, the wisest of them all. So that, if philosophy had been man's only guide, it is probable, nay it is more than probable, that idolatry would at this day have been his religion. 4. Revelation is yet further necessary, in order to make the whole of human duty not only known but obvious to all capacities. The best heathen moralists acknowledged their ignorance in some points of duty; and what they knew they had not power to enforce upon the common people, who, in ancient times, were very illiterate, having rarely access to books, whereof there were then but few in the world. Though they had possessed such power, and been all of the same mind, which was by no means the case; and though they had not been prompted, as most of them were, by pride, vanity, or the spirit of contradiction, to introduce new systems, yet their labours could have but little effect. Such arguments as they had to offer, the greater part of mankind could not understand. For, in fact, the common people, in general, are not capable of perceiving the force of arguments, especially when the reasoning is complex, and relates to matters so remote from sense of the truths of morality and religion. Of this some ancient lawgivers, as Minos of Crete, and Numa of Rome were so sensible, that they thought it prudent to ascribe to their institutions a divine original, pretending that they received them from the gods. I do not mean to say, that the doctrines of the philosophers, particularly of Socrates, and the better sort of Stoicks, did no good. What Socrates taught, or rather conjectured, concerning the immortality of the soul; and what both he and the Stoicks delivered, though not always clearly or consistently, with respect to the divine existence, providence, omnipresence, and omnipotence, was, no doubt, of use in dissipating some of those clouds of superstition and error, which then overshadowed the nations. But, as a system of natural religion and moral duty, all ancient philosophy was very incomplete, as Socrates well knew; nor was it accompanied with evidence or authority sufficient to raise the attention, or convince the understanding of any, except, perhaps, of a few speculative men: and even they were inclined, as Lactantius, Cicero, and Aristotle* testify, to make it a subject of declamation and dispute, and a mere tongue-exercise, rather than a rule of life. Indeed, if we believe Laertius, who, though neither an elegant nor a judicious writer, yet deserves praise as a collector of anecdotes; nay, if we believe Cicero, to whose judgment more respect is due; we must also believe, that the greater part of those, whom antiquity honoured with the name of philosophers, were men of loose principles and bad morals. Many of them disgraced human reason by their profligate * Lactantius, iii. 15. 16. Cicero, Tusc. quaest. ii. 4. Arist. Ethic. ii. 13. tenets and sophistical wrangling; and some of them, by their impudence, buffoonery, and beastliness were a disgrace to human nature. But, even from the best of them, what was to be expected in behalf of the common people, that is, of mankind? Socrates was the most popular, and, in all respects, the least exceptionable teacher of heathen morality. He taught, that is, conversed in public as well as in private; and all who choose it were permitted to attend him. But he never set himself up as a general reformer, nor did he pretend to more wisdom than other men. And, as the charms of his conversation drew the chief men of Athens around him, we may presume, that the common people, probably not very curious to know what he said, would keep at a distance. Besides, his peculiar way of reasoning, by question and answer, though as fair and satisfactory as can be, is better suited to the purpose of instructing a small circle of friends, conversing familiarly and at leisure, than of conveying knowledge to the common people. About the common people the Stoicks gave themselves no trouble, but seem to have considered them as little better than beasts. Some of their paradoxes would appear, from their extreme absurdity, to have been contrived on purpose to exclude the herd of mankind from the sublime mysteries of that philosophy. And many of their tenets they wrapt up in strange language, (for they were very licentious in the use of words;) and they so perplexed the human intellect by frivolous disputation, that their teaching could not be generally useful; nay, even to those men of learning who had made it their duty, it must have been in many particulars unintelligible. Cicero, indeed, in his book of moral duties explained the practical part of their moral philosophy, in a clear and elegant style; and, by so doing, enriched his native tongue with the best system of Pagan morality extant.. Yet still it is an imperfect system; and for a great part of it he was indebted, not to the Stoicks, whom, though he fol Lowed, he did not follow as a translator, but to Plato, Aristotle, and his own good sense. Though the Stoicks had been better qualified than they were, for the office of public teachers, the people would not have greatly profited by what they taught. That external things are neither good nor evil; and that to be stretched on a rack, or to repose on a bed of roses, are, to a wise man, matters of equal and absolute indifference; is a tenet which the generality of mankind could hardly believe, and which, if they did believe it, was more like to do them harm than good. For from this principle it would require no profound skill in logic (and the Stoicks were deep logicians) to infer, that, by robbing a wise man of his money, cutting off his leg or arm, stealing his child, or murdering his friend, they only took that from him on which he set no value. That men ought to be resigned to the divine will, but that, when any thing vexed them, they had an undoubted right to make away with themselves, after the example of Zeno, who in a pet hanged himself, because he had hurt his finger*; would, to a man of plain sense, appear neither very consistent doctrine, nor very beneficial. That the Deity is superior to fate, and that fate is superior to the Deity, is not more consistent; and that the world is God, or at least his body or substance, is an aphorism that throws no great light on the first principles of theology. That the soul is immortal, is affirmed by Seneca; who also affirms that death is nothing, and reduces every thing to nothing, and that the tranquility of the dead is the same with that of those who are not bornt. That at death we return to the elements whence we came, and lose all personal existence; that there is no future punishment or reward, and that it is no matter whether there be any or not; are doctrines of the same school, alike unfriendly to happiness and to virtue. That pity is unworthy of a wise man, is a strange lesson to inculcate on beings so frail as we are, Diogenes Laertius. † Deo Consolat. ad Marc, cap. 19. who stand so much in need of the compassion and kindness of one another: yet this was taught by the followers of Zeno. And that human souls are part of the divine essence, and that a man may become equal and in some respects superior to the Deity:-Is this audacious and impious tenet likely to have any other effect, than to cherish pride and presumption so extravagant, as to harden the heart against every amiable affection, and make the understanding equally impatient to hear, and incapable to receive, the dictates of true wisdom? In fact, notwithstanding the morals of some of them which I am not anxious to find fault with, and the beauty of many of their sentiments, which I readily acknowledge, I am in doubt, whether, as teachers of the common people, they would not have been as blind guides, as even the Epicureans themselves. The doctrines of the latter were downright atheism: and those of the former plainly lead to it; as indeed every form of false philosophy must do, that teaches men to think and speak irreverently of the Supreme Being, and to deny a future state of retribution. Of the Stoicks, therefore, Milton, who knew them well, spoke neither rashly nor too severely, when he said; Alas! what can they teach, and not mislead, And in themselves seek virtue, and to themselves PARADISE REGAINED. But, when the fullness of the time was come, THE TEACHER OF THE POOR did at least appear: not, like the Stoic, proud, hard-hearted, and disputatious; but, like the Son of God, meek and unaffected, compassionate and lowly, divinely benevolent and divinely wise. 'Go,' said he, to two of John's disciples, who had come to ask whether he was the Messiah, Go your way, and tell John what things ye have seen and |