designed for ocean service were routed to the open sea by way of the existing 14-foot St. Lawrence channel, which limited the size of those which could be built in the St. Lawrence area; or, with the aid of pontoons fitted at the expense of time, manpower and materials, had to be floated to the Gulf of Mexico by way of the Mississippi River system.

The St. Lawrence seaway would provide a gateway for vessels directly to or from the open sea, thereby permitting the Great Lakes shipyards to build practically all types of cargo vessels designed for use with the United States seagoing merchant fleets. It would also permit Great Lakes shipyards to do part of the repair and reconversion work now performed by the tidewater shipyards. While shipbuilding and repair yards on the seacoast are now capable of caring for peacetime construction or repair programs, the additional facilities that would be available in the Great Lakes would be of distinct advantage in the event of war.

This advantage has another side. There is a possibility, which has been mentioned in the press, of a growing danger that industrial plants on sea coasts may be subject to attack in future wars by guided missiles fired from submarines which would be able to approach fairly close to our coast line. To the extent that an industry vital to our war machine, such as our shipbuilding industry, can be maintained at locations remote from coastal areas, the possibility of damage by such attacks will be reduced. In effect then, the seaway is a contribution in the direction of dispersion of manufacturing and industrial facilities.

Question has been raised as to the vulnerability of the major installations of the project to determined air attack. That vulnerability is recognized. However, the same objection could be raised to any future project of a similar nature at any continental point. If this objection were to be the controlling factor, we would be limited to the development of only minor and widely dispersed natural resources. Further, the area is already one of high defense priority. The project will, therefore, not require commitments for defense of the area that do not already exist in large part.

It is also recognized that the seaway is admittedly susceptible to serious traffic interruptions by enemy action, particularly sabotage. Although precautions against sabotage would be necessary, vital portions of the project can be given defense protection on a par with that accorded other comparatively vital installations. Reasonable protective measures will to a large extent minimize the risks. In this connection, it has been pointed out that to destroy locks or render them inoperable for an appreciable period is one matter when done as a defensive measure and another when performed as a matter of sabotage. To accomplish such damage would normally require prolonged access to the lock and the installation of a considerable quantity of explosives.

In summary, the St. Lawrence seaway and power projects are assuming an ever increasing importance, especially from industrial and logistical viewpoints. We need the power which it can produce. We need this reasonably safe and sure means of supplying the steel industry of the size which our industrial progress warrants and our security demands.

We can use to full advantage a new water communications link from our industrial Midwest to the areas of our national interest throughout the world. We believe that a prompt start must be made so that these projects may be completed as soon as possible. The pay-off may be sooner than we think.

Thank you.

Mr. LARCADE. Thank you very much, Mr. Small. You know, the usual procedure is when a witness testifies it is customary for members of the committee to interrogate him with respect to his statement. So at this time I will ask Mr. Trimble if he has any questions.

Mr. TRIMBLE. I appreciate your statement, Mr. Small. I gather from your testimony that you put this on the top of the list as a defense measure?

sir.

Mr. SMALL. I think it is a highly important defense measure. Yes,

Mr. TRIMBLE. I suppose included in that would be the economic features of it that you mentioned, such as the power and transportation facilities, and the spread of industry in the Middle West?

Mr. SMALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. TRIMBLE. That is all.

Mr. LARCADE. Mr. Dondero.

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Small, I noticed that you omitted two or three very vital things in connection with the seaway which I assume some other witness will take up, namely, the question of income from tolls and the question of saving on tonnage that might be exported from the Great Lakes and Middle West area of farm products and industrial products. You did not touch on those.

Mr. SMALL. No, Mr. Dondero, I did not. There are other witnesses who will undoubtedly cover those specific points, who will appear before your committee. I was talking to my specific responsibility, from the standpoint of national defense.

Mr. DONDERO. From the standpoint of national defense?

Mr. SMALL. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. National defense depends on steel, to a large extent? Mr. SMALL. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. And steel depends on ore?

Mr. SMALL. Correct.

Mr. DONDERO. If you do not have ore, you do not have steel; and if you do not have steel, you do not have national defense.

Mr. SMALL. That is correct.

Mr. DONDERO. And that is about the position the United States is getting into now.

Mr. SMALL. That is right.

Mr. DONDERO. That is all.

Mr. LARCADE. Mr. Blatnik, do you have any questions of Mr. Small?

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Small, you mentioned that there are two principal sources of iron ore in this hemisphere, that is, your South American ore in Venezuela, and the ore in Labrador. Let us assume in case of a serious emergency that we are entirely dependent on the South American ore supply.

Would you be prepared to give or could you get for us, Mr. Small, some idea of the number of naval defense vessels needed for a good convoy to protect such a flow of iron ore. As I understand it, there

are two ways of getting this ore from Venezuela up to the States. One is to take it from the center of Venezuela eastward via the Orinoco River and transport it via oceangoing ships over the high seas and land it on the east coast of the United States. Another proposed method is to haul it by rail from the ore fields in the center of Venezuela almost due north to the coast, and then across the Gulf to one of the Gulf ports. There may be an additional safety factor in using the Gulf in that these ships could hug the coast as the oil tankers did in the last war, although they will still be subject to attack, as were the oil tankers right off the west coast of Florida in the last war.

Briefly, if we are to be dependent entirely on ore from Venezuela, if the Labrador ore is not made accessible, what will be the cost, in the case of all-out war, to us, to move, let us say, 10, 20, 30, or 40 mission tons or so of iron ore from Venezuela, what would be the cost of the convoys and naval protection?

Mr. DONDERO. You mean millions of tons, do you not?

Mr. BLATNIK. Yes.

Mr. SMALL. We will be glad to work out the figures on both routes, and work out the convoy costs.

Mr. BLATNIK. With the number and types of naval vessels?

Mr. SMALL. It is an enormous job, I assure you of that, but we will give you the figures.

Mr. BLATNIK. I have a feature article in a news column of Columnist Alfred D. Stedman, which appeared in the St. Paul Pioneer Press 3 days ago February 18. I am not one who relies entirely on all or any such articles, but this is given such a prominent display and it is by an established writer of many years in his profession that he must have had some basis for writing the article.

It is entitled "Ours versus. Russ Seaway." It has a map showing the internal waterway development now in process and nearing completion in Russia. It shows what they do with their water resources. This network of waterways links the Baltic Sea, way up in the northwest, through the Volga River, with the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. There is quite a distance involved there. It also connects the Baltic Sea northward to the Arctic Ocean. It uses this project both for electric power and for transportation, and the article gives quite a comparison with what we could do with the proposed St. Lawrence project.

I will not go into further detail on it. I merely ask, has any of that been called to your attention, is the Defense Department familiar with it, or is there any basis for a story of that import?

Mr. SMALL. Obviously, I cannot speak to the article, but we are quite familiar with what is going on in general with the waterway and power development within Russia. Their necessities are different from ours because they do not have the ocean frontages that we have available to them. Therefore they must do a great deal of inland waterway work that we fortunately do not have to expend that terrific treasure on, in manpower and money, but they are moving very rapidly in the development of water power. We are very familiar with the problem, and what they are doing.

Mr. BLATNIK. However, the general idea is that the history of nations is such that there has always been the search for new water routes inland as well as on the oceans, and there has always been this drive to break any natural barriers that disrupt the expansion of

water travel and connect them in order to give us a free flow of traffic over water. Is that not true, Mr. Small?

Mr. SMALL. Yes.

Mr. BLATNIK. Getting back to this defense picture, several times the question has come up as to what would be the additional cost in terms of defense, should the St. Lawrence waterway be constructed. What would be the additional cost in defense?

I believe you touched on it. As I get your whole point, it is my understanding that in a given area, such as the east or northeast part of the heavily concentrated industrial area of the United States you do not build your defense pattern on specific industries. In other words, we do not allocate parts of this integrated defense system for specific target possibilities-that is, this part we allocate for the defense of Cleveland, and this part we allocate for the defense of the Golden Triangle in Pittsburgh, and this part we allocate for the defense of New York, and perhaps some defense for Washington, D. C., too; but you have an over-all area defense pattern. Is it my understanding then that the additional defense cost to protect the St. Lawrence seaway would be almost negligible?

That is, if an enemy aircraft should get through the defense barrier he would decide whether he should strike at the seaway or something more important?

Mr. SMALL. I tried to give that in my testimony. It is a fact the additional defense effort required in this seaway is not great. We have to defend that area anyway, jointly.

Mr. BLATNIK. I have one more question. Let us assume we shall now go into the construction of the seaway in the near foreseeable future. Let us say within the next 5 or 8 years. If we allow this thing to continue as it has been allowed to drag on, as it has for the past 40 years, what would be the situation of America? I will not ask you to go into the economic situation, but from a defense angle.

Mr. SMALL. You will have another witness, Mr. Chapman, who will appear here tomorrow, I believe, and he will talk to the point of metal and iron ore. I believe that he will tell you that within a very short time we will be short of iron ore for the steel that we will be currently producing within a short time. That is, within the next several years; and that ore will have to come in from overseas, of course.

If we have an all-out demand, of course, we will have an enormous demand on us for all the other things I have enumerated in this statement-not only iron ore alone, but we have to convoy all these other things from other lands for an all-out war effort, which involves a tremendous job on the part of our naval forces.

Mr. BLATNIK. You say we will be short of iron ore. That means we will be short quite a number of millions of tons in order to keep our economy going at capacity, or to meet our demand for steel for quite a period of years.

Mr. SMALL. That is right.

Mr. BLATNIK. There is one more point in that connection which I would like to emphasize. In times of crisis and in time of war, in addition to having accessibility to iron ore, it is possible that we have an all-rail route from Labrador all the way down to the lower lake ports, as well as getting the supplemental shipments of millions of tons. from Venezuela; but in time of defense the important thing is elasticity or flexibility and expansibility of iron ore production. In the year

1938 the production or output of iron ore from the Lake Superior area was 19,547,000 tons.

Within a year by 1939, the production jumped to 45,547,000. That was almost a 250 percent increase. To over 64,000,000 in 1940, over 81,000,000 in 1941, and 93,500,000 in 1942. That is the element of rapid expansion that is so important to defense.

If we have to rely upon an all-rail route to Labrador and this costly process of getting ore from Venezuela, we will not be able to expand suddenly if an emergency is thrust upon us overnight.

Mr. SMALL. That is right.

Mr. BLATNIK. Thank you very much.

Mr. LARCADE. Have you completed your questions, Mr. Blatnik? Mr. BLATNIK. I have.

Mr. LARCADE. Mr. Angell.

Mr. ANGELL. Mr. Small, if this project is approved, what length of time will be required for construction so it will be ready for operation? Mr. SMALL. My understanding is that by expediting construction it will be completed in 5 years.

Mr. ANGELL. From the time construction is begun?

Mr. SMALL. Yes.

Mr. ANGELL. What drain would it have on critical materials needed in the prosecution of the present emergency?

Mr. SMALL. Very little in terms of percentages of our resources of steel, copper, and the various things that would go into it. I believe that Mr. Wilson will probably testify as to the figures on it; but I can assure you that the impact is minor in terms of tons of steel or tons of

copper.

Mr. ANGELL. It is my understanding that you are recommending this project now in the interests of national defense? Is that correct? Mr. SMALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANGELL. And that construction be begun as quickly as possible?

Mr. SMALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANGELL. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LARCADE. Mr. Pickett, any questions?

Mr. PICKETT. Mr. Small, I am interested in your statement that construction of the seaway will reduce by approximately 1,000 miles the open-sea routes from Atlantic ports to the British Isles. I take it that your measuring point is at the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence from the Atlantic Ocean?

Mr. SMALL. That is right.

Mr. PICKETT. And the added distance then would be applicable to ports like Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and so on?

Mr. SMALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. Now, Mr. Small, I think it would be academic to try to argue that a closed route like the St. Lawrence seaway would be less open to attack by enemy vessels than would an open-sea route down the Atlantic coast.

I have a recollection, however, that there was considerable loss of shipping in the Gulf of St. Lawrence even as far up as the port of Quebec. Do you happen to know the amount of shipping lost in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and in that area?

Mr. SMALL. We can get the exact sinkings that occurred there in the last war. I think it is manifest, and it is a truism that in enclosed waters we can protect far better than we can protect in open water.