TABLE V.-Merchant vessels under construction or on order in United States shipyards as of Jan. 1, 1951 TABLE VI.-Ship construction in Great Lakes area during World War II (under supervision of USMC) Source: Statistical Summary of Shipbuilding under the U. S. Maritime Commission during World War II. (The following letter was subsequently received:) Hon. CHARLES A. BUCKLEY, GREAT LAKES HARBORS ASSOCIATION, Milwaukee, Wis., March 9, 1951. Chairman, Public Works Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have been informed that the hearings now in progress before the Public Works Committee relating to the St. Lawrence seaway and power project will be confined strictly to the national defense aspects of the seaway and that it will not permit testimony concerning the general economics of the project. This association and the writer personally are long-time advocates of the St. Lawrence seaway project. I regret my inability to appear before the committee personally in support of the seaway legislation but would be indeed grateful if this statement can be incorporated in the record of the proceedings. On February 27, 1951, Robert S. Allen in his newspaper column states that the demand for freight cars now exceeds supply by 35,000 a day; that the railroads, during January and February, scrapped more freight cars than were built; that there are not enough box cars available to transport an armored division at one time from Fort Knox, Ky., to the west coast; that constant difficulty is encountered to keep the Korean war supply moving; that the Agriculture Department asserts that when Congress acts favorably on the grain grant to India, freight cars will be lacking to move the wheat to ocean ports; and that Monroe Johnson of the Interstate Commerce Commission has reported to the President that when the winter wheat and other crops, plus a flood of defense production begins to flow, the country will face by June the worst transportation tie-up in history. There is nothing new about our facing a boxcar shortage. The problem has persisted since long before World War I. The railroad presidents of the western railroads frankly admitted the grave crisis of boxcar shortages as early as 1925, being caused by hauling grain and western products way across the continent to the eastern seaboard with these freight cars brought back empty when they could have been hauled at great.saving and with short hauls to Great Lakes ports and transported from there by ship. Since then, we have been cursed both in times of peace and war with innumerable embargoes at eastern ports, freight priorities, with grain rotting in the fields of Western States because of lack of cars to haul it, not to speak of the tremendous drain on our steel supply to build freight cars during war years. Statements by leading railroad presidents admitting these facts were placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Pitman during congressional consideration of the St. Lawrence seaway project as long ago as 1934, and were again brought to the attention of Congress in the 1941 seaway hearings, even before World War II. Let me quote from two of these letters: * * * President C. H. Markham, of the Illinois Central said: "You make a striking point when you point out how the congestion of lake traffic has thrown a considerable burden upon the railroads. When you say that railway equipment is 'uneconomically' employed in the long swing from the interior to the seaboard, I assume you have reference to the national situation-uneconomically by reason of the great need for the facilities of transportation. I agree with you on that score, of course. It certainly is uneconomical when a load for which the railroads are not prepared for, which they are not, and should not be expected to prepare-is thrown upon them in a time of transportation shortage. President H. B. Byram of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul, said: "There is no doubt, to the extent that vessels moving through the canal would carry grain and grain products from the Middle West, that there would be an advantage to the railroads serving lake ports in the release of their cars at such ports rather than on the Atlantic coast.' Why the western railroads have since turned somersaults to oppose the seaway might be explained by the Kuhn-Loeb Co. and other national banks who have since become the financial agents of railroads. What we in the great West demand to know is how much longer are we to be suffocated by boxcar shortages and a failure of Congress to give us the much needed relief by the construction of an adequate deep sea St. Lawrence channel to the markets of the world. Since 1920, the population of the United States has increased by 35 million people. The standard of living has risen so that our per capita transportation requirements are much higher than they were in 1920. These two facts combined point inescapably to the need for tremendous expansion of our transportation plant. In spite of these compelling facts, railroad mileage has shrunk considerably during the past 30 years, and railroad locomotive and car supply are grossly inadequate to meet the transportation needs of the country in peacetime to say nothing of meeting wartime loads. The seaway project therefore should be regarded not as a competitive threat to the railroads which they allege it to be, but as a timely and necessary expansion of the complete transportation plant available to the United States and our friendly neighbor, Canada. Respectfully, DANIEL W. HOAN, President, Great Lakes Harbors Association. (At the direction of the committee on April 9 the following report and memorandum were included in these hearings:) Hon. CHARLES A. BUCKLEY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, Chairman, Committee on Public Works, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. DEAR MR. BUCKLEY: The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, has recently reexamined the proposed St. Lawrence seaway and power project in the light of the international situation and the needs of continental defense. As a result, the Board reaffirmed the value of the project in peacetime and recommended that the two Governments take immediate action to implement the 1941 St. Lawrence agreement as a vital measure of their common defense. I enclose a memorandum to the Chief of Engineers concerning this action of the Board for the information of your committee in connection with the current consideration relative to the proposed St. Lawrence project. Sincerely yours, W. E. POTTER, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Assistant Chief of Engineers for Special PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE, Memorandum for the Chief of Engineers, United States Army. The following extract from the journal for the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, January 30-February 1, 1951, is furnished for your information: "2 (Unclassified). St. Lawrence seaway and power project. The Board reexamined the St. Lawrence seaway and power project in the light of the serious international situation and the needs of continental defense. The Board also reaffirmed the value of the project in peacetime and considered anew its immediate importance in terms of the present-day defense of the northern half of this continent. "Since the Board's previous recommendations of May 1947 and December 1948, the international situation had deteriorated markedly. In the Far East, there had already been fighting which involved both Canada and the United States. Other dangerous situations which might lead to open combat involving our two Nations existed in other parts of the world. It appeared that the free nations might be entering a period of protracted crisis during which it was imperative that our military strength be steadily increased. "In view of these ominous circumstances, the Board believed it had a duty again to recommend early construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project. The project would yield additional supplies to hydroelectric powersupplies which were already needed in the northeastern United States and eastern Canada, and which later would become vital to the expansion of our military strength. The seaway would provide an inland waterway relatively safe from enemy action. It would enable the two countries to move war materials at less cost in money and resources than by any other means. In addition, the seaway would permit greatly increased shipbuilding and ship repairs in the relatively well protected Great Lakes shipyards. "The diminution of the iron ore supplies in the Mesabi Range, coupled with the discovery and development of large new deposits of high-grade ore in Labrador, constituted an added reason for immediate commencement of work on the project. Since Labrador iron ore could be transported most economically by ship to the large steel producing centers of the Great Lakes, the value of the Labrador mines, so necessary to defense industry, could be fully exploited only by building the Seaway. "In the Board's opinion, the addition which the project would make to our military potential would far outweigh the initial expenditure in manpower, money, and critical materials. Much of these materials would be required in any event because if the combined project for navigation and power were not now proceeded with, alternative sources of power would have to be provided. "The Board recognized the risk to the St. Lawrence seaway project from enemy attack. It was of the opinion, however, that this risk was no greater than the danger to many other existing installations of comparable importance. Since the area concerned was already one of high defense priority, the Board believed that adequate protective measures would be possible on a reasonably economical basis. "Having in mind these considerations and reaffirming its previous recommendations, the Board recommended: That the two Governments take immediate action to implement the 1941 St. Lawrence agreement as a vital measure for their common defense." R. L. WALSH, Major General, USAF; USAF and Steering Member (The following communication was subsequently received:) NATIONAL MILK PRODUCERS FEDERATION, Washington, D. C., April 4, 1951. Hon. CHARLES A. BUCKLEY, Chairman, House Committee on Public Works, DEAR MR. BUCKLEY: For several years the voting delgates of the National Milk Producers Federation have adopted a resolution in support of the St. Lawrence seaway for navigation and power purposes. These voting delegates represent every area in the United States. No narrow sectional selfish interests influenced the position taken by the National Milk Producers Federation. These voting delegates were motivated by the national benefits to be derived from the proposed project. In view of the voluminous evidence produced over a period of many years in support of the St. Lawrence seaway, no attempt is made in this brief communication to submit material which would merely repeat statements previously made by our organization. Even to inject the element of national defense would repeat our views expressed during World War II. The main purpose in sending this letter is to apprise you and the members of your committee of the position of the dairy famer members of the National Milk Producers Federation supporting the proposed legislation as contained in House Joint Resolution 3 and similar measures. Our members are of the unanimous opinion that the St. Lawrence seaway should be built because it is inevitable and right. Will you kindly incorporate this communication in the record of the hearings on this subject. Very truly yours, CHARLES W. HOLMAN, Secretary, National Milk Producers Federation. |