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3. Page 2, line 2, replace the word "thereof" with the words "of the said agreement".

4. Page 2, line 4, insert after the word "agreement" the words amended".

"as

5. Page 2, line 7, insert after the word "agreement" the words "and exchange of notes".

Other sections of the resolutions relate to questions of domestic policy and as they are therefore outside the jurisdiction of this Department, I refrain from commenting on them.

In the President's Economic Message to the Congress he said that "although long-range improvement of our river basins is essential for the continued economic strength of the country, in the fiscal year 1952 we must emphasize those aspects of the programs which primarily support the national defense." We included

the St. Lawrence seaway and power project as one of the seven projects essential to the national defense.

In my opinion the enactment of one of these joint resolutions is of vital importance to the security and economic development of our Nation. It is also of great importance to the industrial development of Canada to which we are so closely bound by ties of mutual political, economic, and military interests.

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report, and that this would be in accord with the program of the President.

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EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada in relation to the utilization of water in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin, signed at Ottawa March 19, 1941, article II (b) of which provides that the Government of Canada shall complete the essential Canadian links in the Deep Waterway not later than December 31, 1948.

As the above-mentioned date of December 31, 1948, is no longer appropriate, the Government of the United States of America proposes that in article II (b) of the said agreement the words "to complete, not later than December 31, 1948," be deleted and that the words "to complete within 8 years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement" be substituted therefor.

If the Government of Canada agrees to the foregoing proposal, I have the honor to suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect shall be regarded as placing on record the understanding arrived at between the two Governments in this matter and as amending the said Agreement accordingly. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

No. 275

Mr. JAMES E. WEBB,

JAMES E. WEBB, Acting Secretary of State.

CANADIAN EMBASSY, Washington, D. C., May 8, 1950.

Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this date regarding the agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America in relation to the utilization of water in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin, signed at Ottawa, March 19, 1941, article II (b) of which provides that the Government of Canada shall complete the essential Canadian links in the deep waterway not later than December 31, 1948.

Your note states that as the above-mentioned date of December 31, 1948, is no longer appropriate, the Government of the United States of America proposes

that in article II (b) of the said agreement the words "to complete within 8 years after the date of entry into force of this agreement" be substituted therefor.

I have the honor to inform you that the Government of Canada agrees to the foregoing proposal and regards your note and this reply as constituting the understanding reached with regard to this matter and as amending the said agreement accordingly.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Hon. CHARLES A. BUCKLEY,
Chairman, Committee on Public Works,

H. H. WRONG.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Washington, February 20, 1951.

House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to your recent requests for views of the Department of the Army with respect to House Joint Resolutions 2, 102, and 122, Eighty-second Congress, "approving the agreement between the United States and Canada relating to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin with the exception of certain provisions thereof; expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the negotiation of certain treaties; providing for making the St. Lawrence seaway selfliquidating; and for other purposes," and with respect to House Joint Resolutions 3, 4, and 15, Eighty-second Congress, "approving the agreement between the United States and Canada relating to the development of the resources of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin for national security and continental defense of the United States and Canada; providing for making the St. Lawrence seaway self-liquidating; and for other purposes."

The various forms of the proposed legislation would approve the essential features of the 1941 agreement with Canada covering the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway and power project; authorize the President to fulfill certain of the undertakings made therein on behalf of the United States; express the sense of the Congress that it would be desirable for the President to negotiate with Canada a treaty or treaties with respect to perpetual navigation rights on the Great Lakes, on the connecting channels and canals and in the wholly Canadian sections of the St. Lawrence River; authorize negotiation of a further agreement with Canada with respect to tolls to be charged for use of the deep-water navigation facilities on the St. Lawrence River; and authorize the negotiation of an arrangement with the State of New York for transfer of the power facilities on the United States side of the International Rapids to that State.

The Department of Defense has studied and reviewed the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway and power project in relation to national defense over an extended period. The Department of Defense considers the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway to be a decidedly important project from the standpoint of the mobilization effort and national defense. The strain placed on this country's transportation facilities during the last war is a matter of common knowledge; the value to this Department of the additional transportation facilities which the seaway would provide is great. They would make the large and important industrial capacity of the Great Lakes region readily accessible for defense purposes, and ocean-going vessels would be able to penetrate the Great Lakes area for approximately seven months a year. The ship-building and ship-repair industry on the Great Lakes would be accessible for the building, repair or reconversion of practically all types of cargo vessels in times of emergency. The value of making such facilities readily available was amply demonstrated during the last war when the use thereof was greatly restricted, principally in relation to the size of ships handled, by the limitations imposed by the then existing transportation facilities, despite the fact that the full capacity of that industry was needed for defense purposes. In addition to making the Great Lakes region more accessible, the ability to load seagoing vessels in the Great Lakes would obviate the necessity of rehandling large amounts of cargo at seacoast ports, thereby resulting in substantial savings of manpower as well as relieving much of the congestion at those ports. The seaway would reduce by some 1,000 miles the open-sea route for the transportation of cargoes between the Great Lakes region and the British Isles.

In addition to making the industrial capacity of the Great Lakes area more available for defense purposes, the seaway would also provide the steel industry in that region with greater, safer, and more economic access to the high-grade iron ore fields now being developed in Quebec and Labrador. With the vastly

increased steel production programed over the next few years, those sources of iron ore will become vital to the steel and fabricating industries in the Great Lakes and Pittsburgh areas to supplement or replace in substantial part, iron ore from present sources in the Lake Superior district, which sources are being rapidly depleted.

Similarly, the power project which would be developed in connection with the seaway is decidedly important from the standpoint of the Department of Defense. Development of this large source of economic, dependable power will facilitate the production of aluminum and other vital defense needs.

In summary, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway and power project has great industrial and logistical value. Accordingly, the Department of Defense strongly urges the passage of the pending legislation as an important contribution to national defense. This recommendation is based solely upon a consideration of the joint resolutions from the standpoint of national defense. This Department does not offer any recommendations with respect to those aspects that do not directly affect the Department of Defense.

It is noted that House Joint Resolutions 2, 102, and 122 include language expressing the sense of the Congress that it would be desirable for the President to negotiate a treaty with Canada with respect to the diversion of waters of the Niagara River. Such a provision is no longer necessary inasmuch as a treaty providing for such diversion was signed on February 27, 1950, and ratified by the Senate on August 9, 1950.

We have been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report and that the proposed legislation would be in accord with the program of the President.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT, Acting Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley would also like to have this statement inserted in the record.

(The statement of Senator Wiley is as follows:)

Hon. ALEXANDER WILEY,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS,
Washington, D. C., February 19, 1951.

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR WILEY: In accordance with the request contained in your letter of February 15, your statements in support of the St. Lawrence seaway project will be included in the transcript of hearings to be held during the next 2 weeks.

You are assured that your views on this project will receive the careful consideration of the Committee on Public Works. Hearings to consider several resolutions for the St. Lawrence seaway will begin on February 20 and proponents will be heard during the first 2 weeks, led by representatives of Government departments Testimony of opponents will follow.

Your letter of endorsement will be included in the testimony of proponents. Yours very sincerely,

CHARLES A. BUCKLEY, Chairman.

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, February 15, 1951.

Re My endorsement of St. Lawrence seaway.

Hon. CHARLES BUCKLEY,

Chairman, Public Works Committee,

Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am happy once more to submit my comments to the attention of your distinguished committee. I want to congratulate you for your enterprise in holding the seaway hearings so early in this, the first session of the Eighty-second Congress. I should be delighted to appear before you in person, but rather than reiterate a personal position which is, I believe, quite familiar to you and rather than take up your time that might better be spent with technical experts, I am presenting these thoughts in writing, asking that you kindly consider them and print them in the text of the hearings.

I can summarize my position on the seaway in just four simple points:

1. The prompt ratification of the Canadian-United States agreement of 1941 is absolutely essential to America's long-range defense.

2. It is essential to the future health and prosperity of the great American Middle West.

3. Completion of the 2,347-mile deep-water, 27-foot sea channel will not in the slightest harm any other economic interest in this Nation, whether it be port, railroad, utility, or any other group.

4. The power phases of the project are essential to the future health and prosperity of the great northeastern section of our country.

The detailed proof of these various contentions is contained in the tremendous collection of reports, documents, and hearings, which have already thoroughly exhausted the seaway topic. I respectfully refer the attention of your committee to the debate on the Senate floor in 1948. I refer it to the hearings which I conducted as chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee in 1947-hearings at which the outstanding leaders of American government, labor, and industry testified for the seaway. I refer you to the message which I sent to the House Public Works Committee when it was conducting similar hearings in 1950.

We are all aware of the fact that a tremendous variety of opposition arguments have been raised against the seaway. Quite a few of these opposition arguments are completely self-contradictory and cancel one another out. On the one hand, the opponents recklessly charge that the seaway will be an economic waste, because it will not be used. On the other hand, they charge that it will be used to such an extent that it will harm existing groups. It is a fact that neither of these assertions are correct. The seaway will be used, but in an expanding free American society, it will merely constitute one additional great artery of transportation. It will pay for itself. It will lengthen America's natural coast line by around 4,000 miles, or nearly one-third, and will thereby increase the efficiency of United States transportation, in terms of cost, capacity, and flexibility.

The only waste connected with this project is the present incredible waste of the mighty unused water which could provide a total capacity of 2.2 million horsepower, or an average annual output of around 13 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity divided between Canada and ourselves. This power development would be the second largest single dam project in the world. It would be exceeded in size only by the Grand Coulee Dam. Why should we tarry in developing so crucial a power resource, particularly when power is so crucial for atomic-age production? For years and years, the great mass of the American people have supported the seaway, as proven in every public-opinion poll. But a handful of powerful lobbying groups have frustrated the desire of our people. I recognize and do not belittle the honest convictions of opponents, but I have little respect for the vicious fearmongering techniques of the lobbyists. Now these lobbyists have given a current switch to their arguments so as to contend that the seaway should not be constructed now because of the national defense crisis..

If, however, this crisis were to blow over tomorrow, if communism were to disappear from the face of the earth, the opposition would come back and say that the seaway should not be constructed until the Nation readjusts itself to a complete peacetime economy. When the Nation did so readjust, the opposition would be back with new excuses, new alibis for stalling and delaying.

My friend of the Public Works Committee, it is a fact that where there is no will, there is no way. Where people want to invent excuses against taking constructive action, they can invent such excuses far faster than we can demolish them by our logical arguments. I contend therefore that now is the time to build the seaway. It is about as good a time (albeit not from the cost standpoint) as 5 or 10 or 15 or 20 years ago; and it is an infinitely better time than waiting a single additional day.

Let us remember these facts:

1. Soviet Russia is going ahead with a tremendous program of constructing and improving her dams, her ship canals, and other internal projects.

2. The United States in its program of aid to Western Europe is also contributing millions upon millions of dollars to enable our allies to improve their dams and shipping arteries.

3. It is ridiculous to claim, therefore, that the United States should not add to her own continental facilities when both her enemies and her allies are adding to theirs.

It is a fact, of course, that enemy attack could do tremendous damage to the seaway and power project; but for that matter, there are a score of other targets

in America that could also be damaged. And can we tolerate the nonsensical argument that it is better to remain weak so that one does not provide a strong target for attack? Of course not.

I realize that probably every single member of this committee will be approached directly or indirectly by honest, but misguided railroad union men, for example, and by otherwise competent executives of the railroads, voicing doubts, fears, and anxieties over the seaway. I want to recall to you, however, the fact that when the Panama Canal was originally being considered, the railroads unfortunately also lobbied against it. Thank God, the Congress and the President did not listen to them. Thank heaven, our leaders did not listen to the voices moaning of possible adverse competition by the Canal.

My friends, it will take courage on your part to vote for this project, because powerful forces will be arrayed against you and yet I know that you have the realism, the clear-sightedness, the intelligence to appreciate that a national need must come before individual and sectional fears. I particularly want to congratulate the conscientious legislators in the House as well as in the Senate who have, after careful review of the facts, changed their position from opposition to support of the seaway.

Great masses of opposition literature will continue to flood your office; trumpedup newspaper editorial campaigns will be directed against you. I respectfully urge you, however, to continue to recognize the long-range need of the American people.

You and I know that this is a country which is literally bursting at the seams. Our cities are choked with traffic and population. Our railroads are choked. Pretty soon, it has been predicted that even our air lanes will be choked; and certainly our existing airports are jammed with traffic. It is fantastic, therefore, that we should fail to provide a supplemental artery to handle future traffic needs.

I have not dwelt in detail upon the tremendous need for Canadian Labrador ore, which is so essential for the future heavy industrial protection of this country. But I do want to mention that I feel it is absolutely ridiculous that America should come to rely more and more heavily on imports of South American iron ore as the Mesabi high-grade deposits are exhausted. I warn my colleagues that if we allow ourselves to become so dependent on imports, then during a war period, our ore freighters could be torpedoed by the dozens by Russian snorkel submarines and we would see a tragic repetition of World War II's scenes when hundreds of lives of American sailors and merchant mariners were lost as tankers blew up in seas of flaming oil under German submarine attacks. Through the seaway, however, we will have a protected inland artery, free of the submarine menace, an artery that will convey vital food and industrial materials. Moreover, through the seaway we will prevent the trend toward the setting up of more and more of our steelproducing facilities in already overcongested bomb-target areas close to the Atlantic.

I humbly urge this committee, therefore, to vote the seaway resolution. In doing so, you will be carrying on in the great bipartisan tradition which has seen seaway support given by every American President in the last three decades and by countless other leaders of both parties.

With every good wish, I am,

Sincere yours,

The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow morning we have

ALEXANDER WILEY.

Mr. PICKETT. May I interrupt the chairman just a moment? I assume that each of the gentlemen whose statements have been introduced in the record will be permitted as a matter of mutual convenience to them and the committee to appear in person and supplement them if they wish or that the committee may call any of them whom it so desires for further interrogation at some mutually convenient time? The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow morning we have at 10 o'clock General Marshall, Secretary of Defense; Mr. John Small, Chairman, Munitions Board; and Mr. Charles E. Wilson, Chief, Defense Mobilization.

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