decreased as a result of ore shortages, with corresponding tonnage losses to the railroads which move that material. There will be less work and fewer jobs in every activity, manufacturing and services, that comprises this great and prosperous industrial area. I predict that unless the ways and means are provided to continue to bring in iron-ore tonnage into this inland steel-mill region at the cheapest possible transportation cost, this flourishing section will become a depressed area. I do not contend that the Labrador ore will answer all the problems. I do believe, on the basis of sound information, that the Labrador ore will substitute-ton for ton-for the decreasing tonnage coming into the same ports and docks from the Mesabi, via Duluth. Without the St. Lawrence seaway project, the Labrador tonnage will be moved out to the open sea, and to New London, Boston, the Delaware River, Baltimore, the Chesapeake Bay area, and the James River, to compete with the ore tonnage coming up from Venezuela. As a matter of fact, the trend in that direction is already welldefined. I understand that steel mills are already planned for the vicinity of New London, Conn.; two on the Delaware River above Philadelphia, with two more forecast for that section. There is large steel mill capacity and large foreign ore deliveries to be taken into the Baltimore area. I understand that there is another steel mill being considered now for a site on the James River below Richmond. In other words, lacking the St. Lawrence seaway, the steel business, west of the Alleghenies, is moving toward the Atlantic seaboard-and unless something is done about it, this lake industrial area is going to dry up. I am just an Army officer, I am not a capitalist. But I am also an interested citizen and I am giving you my honest opinion of what I believe may happen unless steps are taken to prevent it. I do not believe it is possible, economically, to bring in as much ore as is needed in this area without the St. Lawrence seaway. I would like to refere again to another aspect of this project which we are discussing. The Canadian Government is ready and willing to go along with the agreement and abide by the terms of it as worked out jointly. The Canadian Minister of Public Works has made a statement which in effect says, "We have waited 41 years for you to do something. If you do not take action, Canada is going to build it herself." Now, what will happen if that occurs? Canada has already built the Welland Canal. It is hers. She could charge tolls on that when and as desired. Canada can build a canal around the present bottleneck, following the route of the 14-foot canals now there-and she can charge tolls. In time of emergency those canals could be cut off to our use. Moreover, as I have already pointed out, the project is a sound investment and if Canada builds the waterway and charges tolls, the investment will be returned over and over again. Gentlemen, I cannot imagine any good reason why the United States should not be party to the building of a project that will pay for itself over and over through the tolls collected on the waterway. I cannot imagine any good reason why we should allow the Canadian Government to build the project alone, giving to Canada the sole privilege of control and the fixing of tolls. Finally and I apoligize for having spoken at such length-I firmly believe that in the face of our own diminishing ore supplies, unless the St. Lawrence seaway project is undertaken, this great inland steel-producing area is going to suffer severely, to the detriment of the entire Nation. Such a course just doesn't make sense. Mr. LARCADE. Thank you very much, General Pick, for this very fine presentation. For the benefit of the new members of the committee-and we have a number as a matter of fact, there are only two members remaining on the committee who heard the testimony on the St. Lawrence seaway in 1941; they are Mr. Dondero and Mr. Angell. I want to say to you new members that General Pick is the most distinguished of all of the distinguished Chiefs of Engineers we have had that I can recall. All of our dealings in flood control and rivers and harbors matters are handled in connection with the Corps of Engineers, and our dealings are very largely with the Chief of Engineers. Down in the South we kind of have a very soft spot in our hearts for General Pick, because he was the district engineer in New Orleans who handled the great Mississippi Valley 1927 flood-one of the worst in the history of the United States. He did a magnificent job there, as he has in all the other assignments that he has had. Of course, we all know what he has done in the Missouri River Valley, and his service to our country during the war when he was in the India-Burma area and built that great Ledo Road. He went into forests there that had never been traversed by white men before to build this road. I was intrigued by a statement that the General made. When assigned the task of building the Ledo Road, he called his staff together and they all told him that it was impossible to build this project. When all of them finished speaking and he had interrogated them all, he said, "Now, gentlemen, we will start the construction of the Ledo Road." Of course, we all know the fine job he did during the great blizzard a couple of years ago in the Midwest, when he opened the roads and furnished the feed for millions and millions of cattle, and kept them from being destroyed, as well as in protecting the lives of thousands and thousands of people. With the permission of the committee, we will file in the record, General, the balance of your statement, as well as the schedules which you have attached to your statement. General PICK. Yes. I would like to have that done. Mr. LARCADE. It will be made part of the record. (The balance of General Pick's statement reads as follows:) STATUS OF PLANS FOR INTERNATIONAL RAPIDS SECTION DEVELOPMENT Pursuant to the Executive order of 1940, the Corps of Engineers in conducting the comprehensive survey and planning of 1940-42 prepared plans and specifications so that construction, if ordered, could be quickly initiated. As a result, general plans and specifications have been prepared for the entire dual-purpose project. For all initial construction features including access facilities, transmission lines for power, etc., as well as initial work on the main dam, powerhouse, and navigation structures, contract plans and specifications are on hand. For the Long Sault Dam, for example, the general plans, specifications, and design analysis have been completed. The plans and specifications are sufficiently complete to permit advertising for bids for the construction of the dam and its flanking earth dikes. Nine years have elapsed since the completion of the survey. The plans and specifications for all early-period construction features of the entire dual-purpose project can be brought up to present-day standards and practices in about 6 months' time. CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE On an expedited schedule, with adequate funds, materials, and labor, and no serious delaying factors, the International Rapids section development can be completed within 4 years after commencing actual job construction, to the extent of providing a 27-foot navigable channel and installing initial units in the powerhouse. The second major work item in which the United States is involved is the deepening of the Great Lakes connecting channels. This deepening can be essentially accomplished within the period required for completion of the international section construction. Required United States funds for the development outlined in the 1941 agreement are estimated as follows: OPERATIONS WITH INITIAL APPROPRIATION OF $34,000,000 The operations to be accomplished in the international section on an expedited schedule with an initial appropriation of $34,000,000 are as follows: A. To accomplish preliminary work items: Administrative facilities (Seaway Village) __ Relocation of highway and railroad between Rooseveltown Extension and improvement of North Grass River Road. Total, preliminary items. Present estimate $2, 000, 000 687, 000 949, 000 444, 000 488, 000 166, 000 67, 000 1, 750, 000 733, 000 7,284, 000 B. To initiate construction of main features; (priority P-1 items): Total fund requirements, first year. 34, 000, 000 TIME REQUIRED FOR THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS TO START WORK ON THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION The international section project involves heavy dam and powerhouse construction and extensive dredging. Work on that section should therefore be initiated without delay. In view of the detailed planning already carried out for that development by the Corps of Engineers, we are prepared to start construction thereon within 90 days after funds are made available, subject to the understanding that the "Commission" provided for in the 1941 executive agreement to supervise the work in the international section need not approve the plans and specifications for the preliminary work involved in the first year's construction program. (The documents attached to General Pick's statement are as follows:) GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AND POWER PROJECT COST ESTIMATES On December 1950 price levels for development providing a 27-foot channel depth contemplated in the 1941 agreement. Also corresponding estimates for developments to depths of 30 and 35 feet Estimate of cost of St. Lawrence seaway and power project, Duluth to Montreal (December 1950 cost levels) 1 Division of cost by work items between Canada and the United States as shown conforms to that used in connection with consideration of previously proposed legislation to ap 2 Based upon available hydrographic data and office studies. No soundings or borings taken. No detailed studies made regarding St. Clair River compensating works, or the In connection with this estimate for a 35-foot project the following is quoted from letter of the Department of Transport, "The estimate of cost of this project is far from the same Lowering of scattered submerged rock shoals is involved here. Meager hydrographic data available thereon. No soundings or borings taken. Estimates therefore should not be Estimates based on detailed survey data and exhaustive planning and are considered reliable (see enclosure la for breakdown and further notes). GENERAL NOTE.-Cost estimates shown above were prepared jointly by the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, and the Canadian Department of Transport, Ottawa, Canada. |