With regard to sea-going vessels, only a relatively small percentage of the present United States flag sea-going ships have a registered draft, fully loaded, of less than 26 feet. Certain practical considerations involved in operating sea-going vessels, however, tend to increase appreciably the number of such vessels that could transit the seaway if a 27-foot controlling depth were provided. The Maritime Commission has stated that under such practical operating conditions practically every type of vessel in the American merchant fleet, with the possible exception of very large trans-ocean ore carriers and supertankers, could transit the 27-foot seaway, and that with a deeper channel of about 30 feet approximately 80 to 85 percent of the United States merchant fleet could readily be accommodated with little or no restriction. Accordingly, and in view of the trend in American shipping to faster ships with deeper drafts, I suggest consideration of the advisability of authorization to provide for further increasing the project channel depth from 27 to 30 feet.

LABRADOR ORE

Because of the depletion of reserves of direct shipping and easily treated open-pit iron ores in the Lake Superior region, an increasing amount of the Nation's normal peacetime iron-ore requirements must be obtained from other sources. Although a part of these requirements undoubtedly will be met from new domestic sources, including improved methods for the processing of domestic low-grade ores, it is apparent that our steel industry will in future years be regularly importing foreign ores to an increasing extent and that this trend will be accelerated by the increased demands of the mobilization effort. In fact, the large steel companies are now going outside of the United States to obtain iron-ore supplies to provide for our future needs.

Among the several probable sources of foreign ores, the LabradorQuebec deposits are recognized as the most important new source now available within the North American continent, and one which would assume commanding importance in the event of war with the attendant difficulties of obtaining ore from off-continent sources. For peacetime commerce without the St. Lawrence seaway, small amounts only of Labrador ore likely would move up the existing St. Lawrence Channel to Lake ports. If the St. Lawrence seaway is constructed, a large proportion of the peacetime movement of such ore would be via the St. Lawrence to existing facilities at Lake ports, since the seaway would afford the most economical route for Labrador-Quebec ore shipment to the principal ore-consuming districts.

This seaway would provide a route for Labrador ore movement which would result in the least disruption of the steel industry and existing channels of traffic. It would most nearly permit the continued utilization of existing facilities representing very large investments, and which are the nuclei around which are built our major economic centers.

More importantly, however, the seaway in my judgment is essential to our long-range national security and defense, as it would afford a relatively protected inland route for Labrador-Quebec ore movement to continue to supply our great steel manufacturing and fabrication centers west of the Alleghenies.

The remainder of my statement, Mr. Chairman, deals with the status of plans, the construction schedule, and the breakdown of the amount of funds which we think would be required for operation in the initial stages of the project.

At this point I wish to call your attention to a map which we have prepared and which I consider of particular importance to this discussion.

Mr. Chairman, this [pointing] is a map of our northern border extending west beyond the Great Lakes and the port of Duluth and east to the Atlantic Ocean. It includes the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence waterway, and areas adjacent thereto in Canada and the United States. In 1892 there was discovered along the Mesabi Range, in the territory adjacent to Lake Superior, vast ore deposits rich in iron. That discovery came at a time when the United States was on the threshold of its greatest period of development. It came at a fortuitous time to stimulate and to contribute immeasurably to our economic and industrial expansion. In simple words this great deposit of iron ore was a godsend. Our industrial leaders and builders of that time were soon aware that it was essential to move that ore at the lowest possible cost to the areas where it could be processed-to the steelproducing areas west of the Alleghenies; from Ashtabula to Pittsburgh; to Toledo and Detroit; to the Chicago region and to Buffalo. In many respects a comparable situation confronts us today-the urgent need for the cheapest possible transportation of heavy-tonnage ore to these steel-producing centers. Then, as now, the answer was water-borne transportation.

In 1850 the State of Michigan had built a small lock at the Sault Ste. Marie providing egress from Lake Superior into the adjoining Great Lakes. Following the discovery and early development of the Mesabi iron ore deposits, it became apparent that those locks were inadequate for moving the rapidly expanding volume of tonnage. And it was self-evident that providing the necessary locking facilities imposed a greater financial burden than one State should be called upon to carry.

It was determined, therefore, that the project should be undertaken by the Federal Government. Consequently, in the early 1900's adequate locks were constructed to facilitate the movement of iron ore from the Mesabi Range deposits to the steel-making areas which I have enumerated. In the years since, those locks were built and rebuilt, and at the outset of World War II it was found necessary to build another and larger lock-the MacArthur lock-in this area of the Soo. This was necessary to provide free access to movements of vast quantities of ore to meet the increased demands of our national economy and the all-out prosecution of a successful global war.

Today we are in the state of proclaimed emergency, the duration and outcome of which are unknown to any of us. But the new and greater demands upon our productive capacity are apparent to all of us. This demand lends emphasis to a serious problem which confronts us. We find that this great deposit of rich iron ore on the Mesabi Range is being rapidly depleted. Various estimates on the remaining supply of Mesabi high-grade iron ore and the predicted rate of depletion cover a period of from 7 to 14 or 15 years.

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, I need not remind you that we are in the world market not only for iron ore but for many

other strategic materials, for the stockpiling of which the Congress has appropriated funds.

We can stockpile copper; we can stockpile some tin; we can stockpile some lead; and we can stockpile some of the other essential strategic minerals and materials. But the enormous tonnages involved in iron ore are such that we cannot expect to stockpile any amount to last us over a protracted period of emergency because the needed quantities would run into the hundreds of millions of tons. The low-grade iron ores in this area [pointing to Mesabi and adjacent regions on the map] are still in large quantity. These low-grade ores are being tested; ways of processing them are being developed and some processing plants are now being built. However, best current estimates are that it will take until 1960 before development and production can make available from this area more than 13,500,000 tons beneficiated ore. Furthermore, the utilization of low-grade iron ore requires the handling of a tremendous amount of volume iron-bearing rock. I understand it is necessary to handle 3 cubic yards to get 1 of usable ore, or a ratio of 3 tons to 1. This is entirely different from handling the high-grade Mesabi iron ore or the highgrade Labrador ore or the offshore ore from Venezuela, from all of which, I am informed, you get ton for ton.

I would like to interject another consideration at this point which I believe has direct bearing on the discussion. The continuing growth in population in the United States is little short of amazing. I have just been reading an article which quotes experts on predictions and estimates who state that this country will have an additional 14 million population by 1955. The results of the recent census show an expanded population of 20 million people during the 10-year period from 1940 to 1950. Certainly the United States is going to double its present population in the next 100 years—a 50-percent increase in 50 years; a 25-percent increase in 25 years. That, to me, means we must continue to expand our industrial development proportionately to take care of all our needs. We must provide houses, clothing, and all the other necessities of life and welfare for these additional millions. And most important, we must provide jobs for those people. And as you know, the backbone of the expansion of the future, just as in the expansion of the past, is steel.

In my humble opinion-and I have given the subject considerable study-if the United States ever fails to provide for the tonnage of ore necessary to keep our steel industry going and expanding, then we will have already become a secondary Nation-and we will be following the trail of other once-world-leading nations, which in the history of the world have gone down to virtual obscurity because wisdom and foresight were lacking. They failed to provide for the future; to insure against scarcities necessary to continued strength and expansion. They depleted their natural supplies of raw materials for industrial progress. And they were heedless of the expanding agricultural needs of their growing population. There came a time when those nations had to go abroad not only for raw materials but they had to go abroad also for the meat and bread to feed their own people. When that point in their history was reached they were already decadent nations.

Now, we can provide our meat and bread in this country to take care of double or treble our present population, with proper regard for

soil conservation and utilization. But we must take steps-and I believe immediate steps to insure that this industrial development of ours is going forward to meet the needs for jobs and manufactured products in this rapidly growing Nation.

May I remind you that although the rich Mesabi Range ore deposits were discovered in 1892, it was not until the early 1900's that locks of adequate size were provided in the Soo. We were not quick to foresee the rapidly expanding demand for this ore and the need to facilitate transport to the growing steel-producing areas. We have that experience behind us; we should profit from it now. As I have pointed out, the Mesabi high-grade ore deposit is running out, while the demand and the need for ore in the greatest steel-producing area in the world are soaring.

We already have a capacity, built or in building, to produce 117 or 118 million tons of steel a year in the United States. Last year we used only about 101 million tons of iron ore. But the requirement is stepping up year by year. By the time new mills are ready, 18 or 20 million additional tons of ore will be required. I am convinced that in 10 years our annual ore needs will have reached 125 million tons.

Even if the Mesabi Range could produce as it is producing today, there would not be enough to meet requirements unless we went abroad.

Mr. Chairman, if the United States is again involved in a world warand we must consider that as a possibility sometime and we must go abroad to get the iron ore to keep this great industrial area [pointing on the map to the steel-producing region adjacent to the Great Lakes] producing the products necessary for our national economy and also for the expanding needs of war; if we are reduced to bringing in that vast quantity of ore from abroad for both national and war needs, our chances of victory would be greatly jeopardized.

We can get some 80 million tons a year from here now [pointing to the Mesabi Range region] and that will last for a time. But remember, those deposits are dwindling. If the need expands, as some estimates have it, to 150 million tons in the not too distant future, we would have to go to the high seas to bring in the difference. Now then, you can bring your ore by ocean route from here [pointing to the Labrador deposits] or you can bring it up from the Venezuela deposits in South America. But if you were an enemy engaged in hostilities against the United States and you knew we needed urgently the steel that ore would produce, what would you do? You would try to sink those boats hauling the iron ore.

You may remember that during World War II we tried to transport bauxite from South America. We had eight boats engaged in that traffic and six of them were sunk by the enemy. Just think how much effort it would take to protect a continuing line of ore boats plying from Labrador and South America on the open and perhaps submarine-infested seas. World War II experience indicates that there would be the additional cost of bonuses for every member of the crew of every ore ship in that service during hostilities.

But even in normal times it goes without saying that we must seek the cheapest form of transportation to get the necessary iron ore into this inland steel-producing area. The transportation charges must be absorbed into the final cost of the finished product. I wish we might be assured that 200 million tons of iron ore would be available in the

United States annually. That would be a guaranty that we could continue our industrial expansion in the years to come; that there would be jobs for our expanding population and that our high standard of living would be maintained; that we could supply not only our national needs but could continue to export the surpluses of steel products to offset the transportation cost of ore from outside the United States.

The iron ore that is in this area here [pointing on map to QuebecLabrador deposits] has already been blocked out. It amounts, I am informed, to enough to take care of our needs for about 40 years and but 10 percent of the potential has been drilled. Again let me repeat that we must bring this ore in at the cheapest transportation cost.

That can be done. The way is clear, except for this bottleneck in here [pointing on the map to the 114-mile reach of the St. Lawrence River between Montreal and Ogdensburg, N. Y.]. In this same reach the Canadians built, many years ago, a series of small canals. They carried about 10,000,000 tons last year, which is approximately their capacity. Yet there has been a mounting increase in tonnage moving out of the Great Lakes along that seaway. Under the agreement to which I have previously referred in my statement, between the United States and Canada, the necessary work to be accomplished to free the seaway of bottlenecks and provide adequate channel capacity is divided equally between the United States and Canada. Canada started on her part of the work in good faith and long ago built the Welland Canal. Canada has plans ready to start working on other phases of the project for which she is responsible, and is waiting upon the United States to do likewise. In addition, Canada must eliminate a railroad bridge at Montreal and run the railroad under the river at the cost of many millions of dollars not included in the division of work under the agreement. And Canada is ready to do it.

The joint project, as you have seen, provides an adequate seaway from Seven Islands all the way into the Great Lakes, and ore boats can travel from Seven Islands to Duluth if necessary.

Ore boats which now operate between Duluth and Ashtabula could operate with equal facility between Ashtabula and Seven Islands and the distance is approximately the same. And if you can haul ore economically from Duluth to Ashtabula, it stands to reason that the same vessels can transport ore with comparable economy from Seven Islands shipping point for Labrador ore-to Ashtabula.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, we must be practical in considering this project. Let us consider what may happen in the event the United States does not undertake her part of this project. We have discussed the depletion of ore from the present Mesabi source. When the ore production on the Mesabi Range falls off 20 million tons or even 10 million tons, that means a shortage of just that much tonnage arriving at Ashtabula and other lake ports and a corresponding shortage at the steel mills of the area. Ore unloaded at Ashtabula goes by rail 126 miles to Pittsburgh. The decrease will be reflected in the tonnage carried by the railroads from port to mill. Every other port in the lake area which receives iron ore from Duluth will experience reduced handling work and the railroads will likewise suffer in loss of tonnage. Moreover, for every ton of steel produced in this area there are from 3 to 4 tons of limestone, manganese, and other materials which go into the making of steel, received into the region. That, too, will be