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adjacent to the mainland of Communist China. On the other hand, there was little if any dissent from that part of the resolution which proclaimed the determination of the United States to protect Formosa and the Pescadores. It is this region to which the present defense treaty specifically applies. Under article VI of the treaty, the territorial area covered is defined, in respect of the Republic of China, as "Taiwan and the Pescadores." But article VI, as previously noted, also provides for an expansion of the treaty area, by stipulating that the commitment provisions of articles II and V "will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement. The significance of the phrase quoted has already been discussed.

The geographic scope of the present treaty is therefore narrower than that of the resolution. Apart from this important distinction, the essential difference between the resolution and the treaty is that by virtue of the latter the United States assumes as an international obligation certain commitments which the resolution deals with on a unilateral and voluntary basis. In that respect, however, the treaty, as has already been noted, does no more than formalize a policy which our Government has followed for several years, to maintain Formosa as an essential anchor of our western defense chain.

A further substantial difference between the treaty and the resolution resides in the fact that whereas the treaty remains in force indefinitely subject to 1 year's notice of termination (art. X), the resolution, by its own language, expires

when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

10. NEED FOR PROMPT RATIFICATION

It is common knowledge that the area for which protection is sought by this treaty is under a direct and immediate threat of Communist attack. Certain islands under the control of the Republic of China, not covered by the treaty, have been attacked by air and from the sea; and recently one of these islands fell to Communist invaders from the mainland. There is, therefore, cogent reason to expedite the Senate's action on the treaty, to the end that the Mao Tsetung regime may be deterred from reckless attempts to "liberate" Formosa in the face of our pledged word to help keep it from falling into unfriendly hands.

On January 14, the Legislative Yuan of the Chinese Nationalist Government ratified the treaty. The committee believes that for the Senate to delay giving its approval to this treaty, whose aims are solely defensive, would be unfortunate.

1 For congressional debate on the Formosa resolutions, see Congressional Record, vol. 101, pp. 601-602, 620-624, 627, 659-683, 719-720, 731-732, 735-769, 813852, 920-995.

11. CONCLUSIONS

Our Government has determined that it is in the national interest that Formosa and the Pescadores be kept in friendly hands, as an important anchor in the defensive chain from the Aleutians to Australia. It is, therefore, of great importance that this policy, which until now has been voluntary and unilateral, be supported by a concrete undertaking to take appropriate action to help defend Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack. By doing this in terms which cannot be misunderstood, it is hoped that the Communist military regime will be deterred from further attempts to aggrandize its position in the Far East at the expense of the free world. At the same time, the treaty will give further evidence of our intention not to abandon a wartime ally who fought valiantly in a long and exhausting struggle against a common foe. Finally, it is believed that the treaty, by putting the world on notice as to our intention, will contribute to the peace and security of a dangerous and sensitive zone.

For these reasons, the Committee on Foreign Relations urges the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty.

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MEMBERSHIP OF EUROPEAN REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

(Limited to active Arrangements documented in this Part)

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Part VI

EUROPEAN REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
[For membership chart see pages 966 and 967.]

The Western European Union

1. TREATY OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL COLLABORATION AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE (BRUSSELS TREATY), MARCH 17, 1948 1

1

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Belgium, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas,

Resolved

To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;

To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;

To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;

To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression;

To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

1 London and Paris Agreements, September-October 1954 (Department of State publication 5659; 1954), pp. 57-62. Entered into force Aug. 25, 1948.

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