marines, and atomic capabilities. This vast empire dominates the central Eurasian land mass extending from the River Elbe in Germany to the Pacific. From within an orbit of 20,000 miles, it could strike by land at any one of approximately 20 states of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and by air it could strike the North American Continent. 3. Nor is the threat only military. It also commands a political apparatus which operates in every country of the world, seeking to capitalize upon all of the discontents and unsatisfied ambitions which inevitably exist in greater or less degree throughout the free world. 4. The threat is virtually unlimited so far as time is concerned. Soviet communism operates not in terms of an individual lifetime so that the threat will end with someone's death. It operates in terms of what Lenin and Stalin called "an entire historical era." To meet that military threat requires on our side a strategy which is both well-conceived and well-implemented. This military defense must be within the capacity of the free world to sustain it for an indefinite time without such impairment of its economic and social fabric as would expose it to piecemeal seizure from within by the political apparatus of communism. This calls for thinking and planning which is imaginative; which takes maximum possible advantage of the special resources of the free nations; and which is steadily developed and adapted to changing conditions. The fundamental aim of our national security policies is to deter aggression and thereby avert a new war. The essentials of this problem may be briefly summarized as follows: 1. The free nations can achieve security only by a collective system of defense. No single nation can develop alone adequate power to deter Soviet bloc aggression against its vital interests. By providing joint facilities and by combining their resources, the free nations can achieve a total strength and a flexibility which can surpass that of any potential enemy and can do so at bearable cost. This collective security concept is the most highly developed in NATO. But it [is] also embodied in the Rio Pact of 1947 2 and, in more limited form, in various security arrangements in the Far East. The Turkey-Pakistan agreement marks the beginning of applying the collective security concept in the Middle East. The United Nations is moving in the same direction, as shown by its "Uniting for Peace" Resolution.5 2. In organizing their collective defense, the free nations should not attempt to match the Soviet bloc man for man and gun for gun. The best way to deter aggression is to make the aggressor know in advance that he will suffer damage outweighing what he can hope to gain. Thus an aggressor must not be able to count upon a sanctuary status for those resources which he does not use in committing aggression. 3. To apply this deterrent principle the free world must maintain and be prepared to use effective means to make aggression too costly to be tempting. It must have the mobility and flexibility to bring collective power to bear against an enemy on a selective or massive basis as conditions may require. For this purpose its arsenal must include a wide range of air, sea, and land power based on both conventional and atomic weapons. These new weapons can be used not only for strategic purposes but also for tactical purposes. The greatest deterrent to war is the ability of the free world to respond by means best suited to the particular area or circumstances. There should be a capability for massive retaliation without delay. I point out that the possession of that capacity does not impose the necessity of using it in every instance of attack. It is not our intention to turn every local war into a general war. 4. The magnitude and duration of the present danger and the need for flexibility of means to deter that danger make it vital to the United States, as never before, that it have firm allies. A firm alliance depends not merely upon documents, although these may be important. There must also be trust, understanding, and good will as between the free nations. This implies not merely military commitments, but good economic and cultural relations as well. It is not charity on the part of the United States to be concerned with the economic_health of other nations which help to support the basic strategy I describe. Neither is their good will a matter to which we can be indifferent. All of this means that foreign policy has assumed, as never before, a vital importance for the security of the United States. In the long haul the United States has a profound interest in insuring that its allies and the uncommitted areas of the free world are able to maintain viable economic and political systems. That is why our foreign economic policy means so much to our own security. 21. A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE: Address by the Secretary of State Before the United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 19541 I come to this opening of the Ninth General Assembly with a deep sense of the significance of this occasion. This annual gathering of the representatives of 60 nations represents mankind's most hopeful effort to achieve peace with justice. Here is made manifest the close interdependence of today's world and, also, the vast opportunity for constructive results which lie in good partnership efforts. The people of the United States believe wholeheartedly in the purposes and the principles set out in the charter of the United Nations. 1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 471–477. That document marks a milestone in the understanding of the nature of peace. It recognizes that peace is not a passive concept but a call to action. It is not enough to dislike war and to denounce it. War has been hated throughout the ages. Yet war has been recurrent throughout the ages. One reason is that men have never put into the winning of peace efforts comparable to those which they put into the winning of a war. Mankind will never have lasting peace so long as men reserve their full resources for tasks of war. To preserve peace and to do so without the sacrifice of essential freedoms require constant effort, sustained courage, and at times a willingness to accept grave risks. That is the true spirit of peace. During the past year many nations have actively worked together on behalf of a just and durable peace. There have been moments when, it seemed, the scales between general war and peace were precariously balanced. That hazardous equation still exists. But at least we see the hazard and strive to shift the balance in favor of peace. The efforts of the past year are not to be appraised merely by whether they in fact produced concrete settlements. The making of intelligent, resolute, and united efforts for just settlements has itself contributed to peace. It shows a dynamic spirit and a vigilance which are a warning to any potential aggressor. In the past, peace has often been lost by default. That, let us resolve, shall not happen again. I cannot, of course, now touch on all of the manifold activities which have recently occurred within and without this organization. I shall focus mainly on political efforts with which my own country was associated as an active partner. Let me first speak of the Organization of American States. The inter-American system rests on a long tradition of cooperation for freedom and peace in this hemisphere. Faithfulness to that tradition, and pride in it, have served to spare this hemisphere from such wars as have tragically ravaged Europe and Asia during the last century and more. Last March the Caracas Conference of the American States decided and declared that if international communism gained control of the political institutions of any American State, that would be a danger to the peace and security of them all and call for collective action to remove the threat.1 However aggressive communism may be judged elsewhere, we of this hemisphere, with no exception, know that its intrusion here would open grave conflicts, the like of which we have not known before. In Guatemala there developed an identifiable threat to the peace. and security of this hemisphere. The American States exchanged views about this danger and were about to meet to deal with it collectively when the Guatemalan people themselves eliminated the threat.2 In this connection, there was occasion for the United Nations to apply the principles of our charter which, while affirming the uni See Res. No. 43, Mar. 28, 1954, infra, pp. 1300-1302. versal jurisdiction of this organization, call for the use of regional arrangements before resort to the Security Council (articles 33 and 52). These provisions had been hammered out in the course of debate at San Francisco, when our charter was adopted. The American States at that time urged that their tested relationship should be coordinated with, and not totally replaced by, the United Nations, which they felt might prove undependable because of veto power in the Security Council. So it was decided to make regional association a major feature of the United Nations peace system. This year the Organization of American States showed anew that it is ready, able, and willing to maintain regional peace. Thereby, the provisions of the United Nations Charter have been vindicated and the foundation for peace in the American Hemisphere has been solidified. Last year I said here that "the division of Germany cannot be perpetuated without grave risks."1 In an effort to eliminate that risk, I went to Berlin last January to confer with the Foreign Ministers of the other three occupying powers. We there joined with Britain and France in presenting a proposal for the unification of Germany through free elections, to be supervised by the United Nations or some comparable impartial body. The Soviet Union. countered with proposals which added up to an extension of the Soviet orbit to the Rhine. Accordingly, the dangerous division of Germany still persists. But, I may add, something else persiststhat is our resolve, in the spirit of peace, to end the cruel injustice being done to Germany. Last year I also spoke of an Austrian treaty as being long overdue. I pointed out that as between the occupying powers there was "no substantial item of disagreement." At the Berlin Conference the three Western occupying powers eliminated the last vestige of disagreement by accepting the Soviet version of every disagreed article. It seemed, for a fleeting moment, that the Austrian treaty might be signed. But then the Soviet Union improvised a new condition. It said that it would not free Austria from Soviet occupation until a German peace treaty was concluded. There cannot be a German peace treaty until Germany is united. So Austria continues to be an indefinitely occupied nation. Nevertheless, here again, we do not accept as final the denial of justice to unhappy Austria-the first victim of Hitlerite aggression and the object of the 1943 Moscow pledge of freedom and independence.3 The three Western Powers, constant in the spirit of peace, have again within recent days urged that the Soviet Union sign the Austrian state treaty as a deed which, far more than platitudinous words, will show whether other matters can fruitfully be discussed. 4 1 Address of Sept. 17, 1953; infra, pp. 350–359. 2 For materials on the Berlin Conference, see Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954) and infra, pp. 1850-1871. 3 Declaration of Nov. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11 4 See Western Powers' note of Sept. 10, 1954; infra, pp. 1875-1877. 1 The problem of peace in Europe has become more complicated because of the recent setback to the consummation of the European Defense Community. That concept came from recognition that the best guarantee of permanent peace in Europe was an organic unity which would include France and Germany. Also, if this unity merged the military forces of these two and other European countries, that would assure their nonaggressive character. Such forces would clearly be unavailable except as the whole community recognized the need for defensive action. The votes of Communist deputies more than accounted for the parliamentary majority which in one country shelved the EDC. Thus, they acted to perpetuate European divisions which have recurrently bred wars. However, the free nations concerned do not accept with resignation the perpetuation of what, historically, has been the world's worst fire hazard. They are alert to the peril and are working actively to surmount it. Last year when I spoke here about Korea,2 I was able to report an armistice. That, I said, was not because the Communist aggressors loved peace, but because they had come up against an effective military barrier. I went on to say, "The Korean political conference, if the Communists come to it, will afford a better test." It took 7 months of arduous negotiation to bring about the political conference.3 When it occurred at Geneva, the United Nations side proposed the unification of Korea on the basis of free all-Korean elections to be supervised by the United Nations. This proposal was rejected by the Communist side. They insisted that the United Nations must itself be treated as an instrument of aggression and be debarred from any further activity in Korea. This counterproposal, insulting to the United Nations, was unanimously rejected by those who proudly hailed the Korean action of the United Nations as the first example in all history of an international organization which had in fact acted effectively against armed aggression. The United States does not believe that the unification of Korea must await another war. We have exerted all the influence we possess in favor of a peaceful solution of the Korean problem, and we have not lost faith that this solution is possible. 5 At the Geneva Conference the belligerents in Indochina also dealt with the problem of peace. An 8-year conflict of mounting intensity was brought to a close. We can all rejoice that there has been an end to the killing. On the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that several hundred thousand in North Viet-Nam have at their desire been transferred to non-Communist areas, and that there still remain millions unwillingly subject to an alien despotism. In 1 See infra, pp. 1200-1201. 2 See infra, pp. 350-359. See infra, pp. 2673-2686. For documents on the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, see infra, pp. 2685-2693 and 2695-2701. For the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, see infra, pp. 2372-2398. See cease-fire agreements of July 20, 1954; infra, pp. 750-787. |