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33. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
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RELATIONS, JANUARY 25, 1955 1

The committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Ex. K, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) and the protocol thereto signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, reports both instruments to the Senate, and recommends that its advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date.

1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TREATY AND PROTOCOL

This treaty constitutes an important step in the evolution of United States policy to create a system of collective security in the Western Pacific area. It is the latest addition to the protective network of mutual defense treaties which have been concluded by the United States with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, and Korea.2

Designed to promote security and to strengthen the fabric of peace in southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, the treaty is intended to deter aggression in that area by warning potential aggressors that an open armed attack upon the territory of any of the parties will be regarded by each of them as dangerous to its own peace and safety (art. IV, par. 1). In such circumstances the parties agree to meet the common danger in accordance with their constitutional processes. They also agree to consult on measures to be taken for the common defense, whenever the territorial integrity or political independence of any of the parties is threatened in any way other than by armed attack, or by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area (art. IV, par. 2). Internal subversion directed from without would be an example of one such fact or situation calling for consultation.

The treaty is thus a mechanism for collective defense against both open armed attack and internal subversion, and it is in this latter respect primarily that it differs from the previous bilateral and trilateral security treaties in the Pacific. As with the Korean Mutual Defense Treaty (Ex. A, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) and similar defense treaties, the parties to the treaty reaffirm their solemn obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations (art. I). The treaty pledges them to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, and, further, to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability (art. II). It provides for cooperation in developing measures, including technical assistance designed to promote the economic progress and social well-being of the parties (art. III), for immediate consultation whenever their territorial integrity or political independence is threatened by other than armed attack or any fact endangering

1S. Exec. Rept. No. 1, 84th Cong., 1st sess.

2 Supra, docs. 19, 16, 13, and 23.

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the peace (art. IV, par. 2), and for the creation of a council to consider matters pertaining to the implementation of the treaty (art. V). Other articles define the area to which the treaty shall apply (art. VIII) and the circumstances under which other states may be invited to accede to its terms (art. VII). Finally, an understanding is incorporated in the text of the instrument itself by which the United States declares that the armed aggression referred to in article IV as dangerous to its peace and security would be Communist aggression.

The protocol designates the States of Laos and Cambodia and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam as states or territories for the purposes of article IV, thus bringing into play the obligations of the parties with respect to armed attack and indirect aggression against this addition to the "treaty area". At the same time those countries are made eligible for the kind of economic measures and technical assistance contemplated in article III of the treaty.

2. BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY

At the time that negotiations were begun in 1950 leading to the Japanese security treaty and to the series of separate security pacts in the Pacific area, it was hoped that a rather broad type of collective security arrangement might be worked out. It was not then possible to realize this goal, and further action on a multipartite protective umbrella over Southeast Asia had to be deferred as long as active hostilities continued in Indochina. The defense treaties with Japan, the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand, which were approved by the Senate on March 20, 1952, were not regarded as ultimate ends in themselves, but were expressly conceived as measures taken "pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security" in the Pacific area. Following an address by President Eisenhower on April 16, 1953, in which he advocated "united action for Southeast Asia", Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sought during the next year to complete a pact covering this area. Until after the Geneva armistice agreements 2 were concluded, however, circumstances made that impracticable.

In the course of hearings on the Korean Defense Treaty (Ex. A, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) the committee had stated its conviction that a multilateral agreement for the Pacific, comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty, would be desirable. Secretary Dulles, however, pointed out that substantial cultural, political, and geographical differences existed among the Pacific countries which distinguished this area from Europe and constituted serious obstacles to achieving the desired development at an early date. The committee acknowledged these difficulties but nevertheless expressed the hope that the Department of State would continue its efforts to encourage the nations of the Pacific to work together for their regional and collective selfdefense.3

After 4 months of negotiations between the United States and other

1 Supra, pp. 65-71.

* Cease-fire agreements of July 20, 1954; supra, pp. 750-785.

3 See supra, doc. 26.

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governments, it was announced on August 14, 1954 that upon the invitation of the Government of the Philippines, the Foreign Ministers of the Governments concerned had agreed to meet on September 6 to consider measures to further their common objectives. At the request of the President, two members of the committee, Senator H. Alexander Smith and Senator Michael J. Mansfield, accompanied Secretary Dulles to Manila as plenipotentiary delegates and, together with him, signed the treaty, the protocol and a "Pacific Charter" which was also adopted at the conference. The charter, a declaration of principles dedicating the signatory governments to the ideals of self-determination and independence, does not require ratification. The treaty and protocol were signed on September 8, 1954, and transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent on November 10, 1954.2

3. COMMITTEE ACTION

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Because the administration was particularly concerned that the last session of Congress should not close without some preliminary consideration being given to the treaty, the committee decided to act with unusual dispatch. Accordingly, the first public hearing was held on November 11, 1954, the morning after the President had transmitted the pertinent documents to the Senate. There was no intention to press for further action on the treaty at that time; but it was hoped that such a demonstration of the Government's continued interest in the pact would provide additional impetus to other signatories to proceed promptly with their own ratification. At the hearing of November 11, extended testimony was heard from Secretary Dulles on the various legal and political implications of the treaty, and, more briefly, from Adm. Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs speaking on behalf of the Department of Defense.

After the 84th Congress had convened, the committee considered the treaty in executive session on January 13, 1955, when additional testimony was received from the Secretary of State. This second appearance of Mr. Dulles was useful in bringing the committee up to date on events bearing upon the treaty since its transmittal to the Senate, and in reviewing for the committee and its two new members (Senators Barkley and Morse) the underlying conditions deemed by the Secretary of State to justify expeditious action.

A second public hearing was held on January 19.4 Hon. Hamilton Fish, former Congressman from New York, representing the American Political Action Committee, Miss Freda Utley, on behalf of the American China Policy Association, and Mrs. Agnes Waters appeared and were heard.

See the statement released to the press by the Department of State on this date; Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 264.

2S. Exec. K, 83d Cong., 2d sess.

See Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, on Executive K, 83d Congress, 2d Session. the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Protocol Thereto, Both Signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, part 1.

Ibid., Part 2.

On January 21, the committee agreed, by a vote of 14 to 1, to report both the treaty and the protocol to the Senate for final action.

The committee desires to commend the executive branch for its efforts to keep the committee thoroughly informed during the course of the negotiations. In the preliminary discussions as well as at the conference itself a spirit of cooperation was exhibited between the legislative and executive branches which contributed greatly to the satisfactory outcome of the proceedings.

4. SUMMARY OF TREATY PROVISIONS

The basic design of the treaty is similar to that of defense treaties previously concluded with Korea, the Philippines, and the ANZUS countries, but with several important differences.

In the preamble, the parties reaffirm their sovereign equality, their faith in the United Nations Charter, their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments and the intentions expressed in the Manila Charter to uphold the principles of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples. The reaffirmation of these principles is accompanied by a declaration that the parties will strive to promote self-government and to secure independence for all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities. The preamble further sets forth as the fundamental purposes of the treaty, coordination of the parties' efforts for collective defense and the preservation of security, warning potential aggressors that the signatories stand together. Thus the character of the instrument as a peaceful arrangement for defense against aggression is plainly marked.

Article I reproduces the undertaking found in other security treaties to settle any international disputes in which the parties may be involved, by peaceful means, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. This article takes cognizance of the status of all signatories as members of the United Nations.

Article II embodies the principle of the Vandenberg resolution (S. Res. 239, 80th Cong.) characteristic of the other mutual security treaties. It pledges the parties, separately and jointly, through self-help and mutual aid to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity not only to resist armed attack; but also

to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

This recognition of the dangers of subversion and indirect aggression introduces an element not found in the system of defense agreements which preceded the Southeast Asian Treaty; in none of the prior pacts is there a provision for countering subversion, although the Japanese Security Treaty does contemplate the use of United States forces to put down large-scale riots and disturbances instigated by an outside power (art. 1). Article II, therefore, seeks to stimulate positive action to defeat the erosive devices which international communism has utilized to destroy the freedom and independence of nations.

Under article III the parties agree to cooperate in developing economic measures, including technical assistance, designed to promote their economic progress and social well-being. This is accompanied by an undertaking to strengthen the parties' free institutions. No comparable provision appears in any of the previous defense treaties. It is founded upon the conviction that if the free nations can develop their internal stability through economic cooperation, the ground for Communist penetration will be rendered less fertile. However, the article does not commit the United States to a specific aid program, nor does it preclude continued economic cooperation with any country whose economic welfare is important to our own well-being and the stability of the treaty area.

5. OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE IV

Article IV contains the activating, operative core of the treaty. Paragraph 1 corresponds generally to article III of the Korean Treaty and article V of the Philippine and Australia-New Zealand Treaties in the recognition by each party that

aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety.

In such circumstance, each signatory agrees that

it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its con-
stitutional processes.
Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

The obligation of the United States under article IV, paragraph 1, is
limited by virtue of an understanding in the treaty to a Communist
armed attack. A significant difference likewise exists between the
corresponding article of the Philippine and the Australia-New Zealand
pacts, and the Southeast Asia Treaty in this respect: article V of the
first two treaties is limited in its application to an armed attack-

on the metropolitan territory of any of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

On the other hand, article IV of the treaty now being considered extends to what is described in the instrument as "the treaty area" (art. VIII), which is dealt with in more detail below. This "treaty area" may be enlarged by the unanimous agreement of the parties. Paragraph 2 of article IV incorporates the language of article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947.1 Paragraph 2 is worded as follows:

If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

1 Treaty of Sept. 2, 1947; supra, doc. 1.

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