We see that duty dramatically defined as in Northern Viet-Nam hundreds of thousands are today abandoning their ancient homes to start life anew where they believe they will be free. We are seeing another exodus, such as took millions out of Communist East Germany and millions out of Communist North Korea.

Those of us who are free and strong and not yet instantly imperiled are bound in honor to prove that freedom can protect those who, at immense sacrifice, are faithful to freedom.

Let that be the dedication of our Conference.

31. ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

SEPTEMBER 15, 1954 1

1

Our quest for peace took us last week to Manila. There, eight nations met to create unity for security and peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific.

2

This unity was something that the United States had long sought. Four years ago I negotiated security treaties with Australia and New Zealand and with the Philippines. But we all knew that that was not enough; so these treaties called for "the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area." President Eisenhower, in his peace address of April 16, 1953, called for "united action" to meet the threat of aggression in Southeast Asia. Last March, I repeated that appeal.5

The President and I had hoped that unity could be forged in time to strengthen the negotiating position of the free nations during the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. However, this proved impracticable.

The Geneva outcome did, however, confirm the need for unity. So last week, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States met together. We negotiated as full and equal partners and in the end signed a treaty for defense against both open armed attack and against internal subversion.

The treaty provides that, in the case of aggression by armed attack, each of the countries will act to meet the common danger. A council is established for consultation with regard to military and other planning.

The treaty recognizes also the danger of subversion and indirect aggression. It deals with this difficult problem more explicitly than any other security treaty that has been made. In this respect, the

1 Delivered to the Nation over radio and television; Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 27, 1954, pp. 431-433.

2

Supra, doc. 16.

3 Supra, doc. 13.

Supra, pp. 65-71.

Address of Mar. 29, 1954; infra, pp. 2373-2381.

For documents relating to the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina,

see supra, pp. 750-788, and infra, pp. 2685-2693 and 2695-2701.

treaty represents an important forward step, because subversion and indirect aggression have been principal tools of international com

munism.

The treaty provides that if any party believes that the integrity of the treaty area is menaced by other than armed attack, the parties shall consult immediately to agree on measures which should be taken for the common defense. These measures will, of course, never involve intervention in the purely internal affairs of another state.

The United States was in a special position at Manila, because it was the only one of the signatories which did not have territorial interests in the treaty area. For the others, the pact was not only an anti-Communist pact but also a regional pact. Therefore, it dealt with any and all acts of aggression which might disturb the peace of the area. We stipulated on behalf of the United States, however, that the only armed attack in that area which we would regard as necessarily dangerous to our peace and security would be a Communist armed attack.1

Any significant expansion of the Communist world would, indeed, be a danger to the United States, because international communism thinks in terms of ultimately using its power position against the United States. Therefore, we could honestly say, using the words that President Monroe used in proclaiming his Doctrine, that Communist armed aggression in Southeast Asia would, in fact, endanger our peace and security and call for counteraction on our part.

2

The treaty recognizes the importance of economic welfare. But it does not commit the United States to any "handout" program. We agree to cooperate in the development of economic measures which will promote economic and social well-being. Congress this year had the vision to see that there might be special needs in Southeast Asia. So, by the Mutual Security Act,3 Congress has already provided a fund to be available in this area. Part of it will no doubt be spent to assist the free governments of Southeast Asia.

However, the treaty builds no economic walls. From an economic standpoint, such nations as Japan, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and India remain important.

The treaty area is defined as the territory of the member states in Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific. The protocol also extends the treaty benefits to Cambodia and Laos and the free territory of Viet-Nam. The Indochina armistice created obstacles to these three countries becoming actual parties to the treaty at the present time. The treaty will, however, to the extent that is practicable, throw a mantle of protection over these young nations.

4

This Manila Pact represents a considerable accomplishment. I

1 See the "Understanding of the United States of America" which follows article XI in the treaty text; supra, p. 915.

2 See President Monroe's message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1823; Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine (Department of State publication 37; 1930), p. x.

3 Act of Aug. 26, 1954; 68 Stat. 832-864. See also infra, pp. 3105-3140. * See chapter III of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and Cambodia (supra, pp. 757-759 and 769-771) and chapter II of the agree ment on Laos (supra, pp. 777-778).

would have been glad if it had come earlier. But it is definitely better now than never.

Of course, treaties are not self-operative. The signature of a treaty does not of itself have any miraculous effect. There have to be ratifications, and then there has to be a genuine will to carry out the treaty purposes.

I believe that the Manila Pact will, in fact, make a substantial contribution to preserve free governments in Southeast Asia and to prevent communism from rushing on into the Pacific area, where it would seriously threaten the defense of the United States.

We considered at Manila how to implement the treaty. One possibility was to create a joint military force. However, I explained that the United States' responsibilities were so vast and so farflung that we believed that we would serve best, not by earmarking forces for particular areas of the Far East, but by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power, plus strategically placed reserves.

This viewpoint was accepted. Thus, the treaty will not require us to make material changes in our military plans. These plans already call for our maintaining at all times powerful naval and air forces in the Western Pacific capable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places of our choosing. The deterrent power we thus create can protect many as effectively as it protects one.

In addition to agreeing to and signing the Manila Pact, there was also drawn up and signed a declaration known as the Pacific Charter. This proclaimed certain basic principles in relation to the right of peoples to self-determination, self-government, and independence.

This Pacific Charter was the idea of President Magsaysay of the Philippine Republic. He is a distinguished fighter for freedom against communism, and he felt it very important that our Manila Conference should make clear that we were seeking the welfare of the Asian peoples and we were not promoting "colonialism."

In my opening address to the Conference,' I emphasized that one of the most effective weapons of communism was to pretend that the Western Powers were seeking to impose colonialism on the Asian peoples. I said we must make it abundantly clear that we intend to invigorate independence. "Only then can the West and the East work together in true fellowship."

This Manila Conference faced up to that issue. It was the first conference where representative nations of Asia and of the West sat down together to work out a program of mutual security. The result was the Pacific Charter, which, in ringing terms, dedicates all the signatories to uphold the principles of self-determination, selfgovernment, and independence for all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities.

Whenever there arises in Asia a power that wants to conquer others, it adopts the motto: "Asia for the Asians." The Japanese, when they were dominated by the war lords, used that slogan. Today the Soviet and Chinese Communists have adopted it. They want to

1 Supra, doc. 30.

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OTANFUKU

prevent the free countries of Asia from getting the help they need to preserve their independence.

The Pacific Charter, on which the East and the West did meet, may well prove to be the most momentous product of the Conference. The Communists' attitude was shown, during the Conference, by vicious propaganda attacks and even more significantly by new military activity in a nearby area. Apparently they hoped to intimidate the members of our Conference and perhaps prevent some from signing the security pact.

Efforts to intimidate by violence are typical of the Communist technique. When the Korean armistice negotiations were reaching their climax, the Chinese Communists opened their bloodiest assault against the United Nations position in Korea. Once it had been agreed to discuss peace in Indochina, the Communist forces of Ho Chi Minh, backed by Communist China, opened their murderous assault on Dien-Bien-Phu. And as the Manila Conference opened, the Chinese Communists opened their artillery fire on Quemoy, an island which has been part of Free China ever since the end of World War II and which was only about 400 miles distant from the Philippines. This effort to intimidate the Manila Conference was a total failure. All of the participants signed the Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter with confidence that in so doing they were adding to their own security.

Now, the Soviet Foreign Office has just issued a lengthy statement denouncing the Manila Pact. It particularly complains of article 4, which provides for united resistance to armed attack and political subversion. The Soviet statement says that the Chinese Cominunists also do not like the pact.

The Manila Pact is directed against no government, against no nation, and against no people. It is directed only against aggression. The fact that the Communists find that objectionable is tragically revealing of their ambitions.

The United States at Manila impressively showed national unity. The three plenipotentiary delegates to the Conference were H. Alexander Smith, Republican Senator from New Jersey; Michael J. Mansfield, Democratic Senator from Montana; and I. Both Senators are members of the Foreign Relations Committee and are thoroughly familiar with Far Eastern matters. Thus the Executive and the Senate and both political parties took part in the negotiation and the consummation of the treaty. I am greatly indebted to the contribu tion which both Senators made to the successful outcome of the Conference.

The theme of our Conference was "greater security through greater unity." We need that unity not only as among nations but also within our own Nation. It is healthy to have two political parties which compete for the right to represent the Nation. It is also important that that competition should stop at the water's edge so

1 Statement published in Izvestia, Sept. 15, 1954; for an English translation of the text, see Supplement to The News, Oct. 1, 1954, pp. 5-7. Cf. the SinoSoviet joint declaration of Oct. 12, 1954; Documents on American Foreign Rela tions, 1954 (New York, 1955), pp. 324–326.

that, when we face others, we do so as a united nation. That has been our developing tradition, and the Manila Conference added to that tradition a new and a worthy chapter.

32. REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT, NOVEMBER 2, 1954 1

THE PRESIDENT,

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to the transmission thereof to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, a copy of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the protocol thereto, both signed at Manila September 8, 1954. There is also transmitted, for the information of the Senate, a copy of the Pacific. Charter signed and proclaimed at Manila on the same date. The charter is a declaration of principles and does not require the advice. and consent of the Senate.

At your request Senator H. Alexander Smith and Senator Michael J. Mansfield of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accompanied me to the Manila Conference as plenipotentiary delegates and signed, with me, the treaty, the protocol, and the Pacific Charter. I am greatly indebted to the contributions which they made to the successful negotiation of these instruments. This treaty is one in which the Executive and the Senate, through both political parties, cooperated all along the way.

The purpose of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is the creation of unity for security and peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific. Eight nations-Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States-participated in the negotiation as free and equal partners. It is a treaty for collective defense against both open armed attack and internal subversion. Although the United States has no direct territorial interest in Southeast Asia, we have much in common with the people and governments of this area and are united in the face of a common danger that stems from international communism.

As I stated in my address to the Nation on September 15,2 the unity envisaged by the treaty is something that the United States has long sought. In 1951, on behalf of the preceding administration, I negotiated security treaties with Australia and New Zealand, with the Republic of the Philippines, and with Japan. Since then a mutual defense treaty with Korea has also been concluded, subject to exchange of instruments of ratification. Each of these treaties has a continuing role in the development of a Pacific security system, and