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up today's Soviet policy out of Mr. Molotov's own mouth, instead of by guess or by theory.
It amounted to this:
To hold on to East Germany;
To permit its unification with West Germany only under conditions such that the Communists would control the election machinery through all Germany;
To maintain Soviet troops indefinitely in Austria;
To offer Western Europe, as the price of Soviet "good will", a Sovietcontrolled Europe which would exclude the United States except in the nominal role of an "observer" along with Communist China.
I have referred to the efforts of the Western Ministers to require Mr. Molotov to expose Soviet policies in their reality. That effort gave drama to every meeting of the four. There was another aspect which carried, too, its drama. That was the effort of Mr. Molotov to divide the three Western powers.
Mr. Molotov occasionally complained that he was at a disadvantage because we were three to his one. But from his standpoint, that was an advantage. It is much easier to divide three than it is to divide If Mr. Molotov had achieved that division, he would have won the Conference. In that respect, he failed totally. The Conference ended with a greater degree of unity between the three Western powers than had existed when the Conference began.
The alien peoples under Soviet rule can know that nothing that happened in Berlin has made less likely the unification of Germany, or the liberation of Austria and indeed the restoration of freedom to Poland, Czechoslovakia and the other satellite countries. At Berlin I did not conceal my views in this respect. In my closing remarks to the three other Foreign Ministers I said, "We do not believe that the peoples of Germany or Austria or for that matter of other neighboring nations need to bury their hopes." 1
I am confident that in saying this I expressed the abiding sentiments of the American people.
The Governments of France and Britain rejected, without hesitation, the Soviet proffer of European "peace" at a price which would have meant Western European disunity in the face of the huge consolidation of Soviet power.
Thus it came about that, in relation to Europe, much has been revealed. The Soviet has offered its alternatives to Western planning
1 Statement of Feb. 18, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), p. 210.
and they are so repellent that there seems no choice but to proceed as planned. Certainly, that is the United States' conviction.
I had two private talks with Mr. Molotov about advancing President Eisenhower's atomic energy plan. We have agreed on the next procedural step which will involve communication between Moscow and Washington through the Soviet Embassy in Washington. I should note in this connection that the Berlin Conference adopted a resolution to exchange views on limitation of armament as contemplated by a United Nations Resolution of last November.3 It was, however, made clear that these talks would not replace, or cut across, the independent development of President Eisenhower's atomic energy plan.
We dealt also with the matter of peace in Korea and Indochina.
We wanted a political conference on Korea because we felt it a duty to ourselves, the Korean people and the United Nations to seek to replace a Korea divided by an armistice with a Korea united in peace. The Korean Armistice recommended such a conference with the Communists. But for over six months, the Communists had blocked agreement upon either the time or place or composition of that conference. As far back as last September, in agreement with President Rhee of Korea, the United States had proposed that the conference be held at Geneva. That proposal had been rejected. We proposed, also in agreement with President Rhee, that the conference should be composed of Communist China, Soviet Russia, North Korea, and, on the United Nations side, the Republic of Korea, and the 16 United Nations members which had fought in Korea. This proposal had been rejected. The Communists insisted that a group of Asian "neutrals" should be present and that Soviet Russia would be among these "neutrals" and so not bound by conference decisions.
We were able at Berlin to settle all these matters. It was agreed that a conference will be held at Geneva, as we had long ago proposed, and that the composition will be precisely that which the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the United Nations General Assembly had sought. There will be no Asian "neutrals" there.
Some profess to fear that the holding of this conference will imply U.S. recognition of Communist China. That fear is without basis. Those throughout the world who suggest that the prospective Geneva conference implies recognition are giving the Communists a success which they could not win at Berlin. The resolution adopted at Berlin explicitly provides-I shall read the text "It is understood
1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 479–480. Res. No. 84, Feb. 18, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting Res. 715 (VIII), Nov. 28, 1953; General Assembly, Official Records, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17 (Á/2630), pp. 3-4.
*See article IV of the armistice agreement; infra, p. 742.
See communication of Sept. 23, 1953; Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1953, p. 486.
See proposal of Dec. 8, 1953; infra, pp. 2678-2680.
that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded." 1
I had told Mr. Molotov flatly that I would not agree to meet with the Chinese Communists unless it was expressly agreed and put in writing that no United States recognition would be involved.
My basic position with reference to Communist China was made clear beyond the possibility of misunderstanding.
In my opening statement (January 26), I said, "I should like to state here, plainly and unequivocally, what the Soviet Foreign Minister already knows-the United States will not agree to join in a fivepower conference with the Chinese Communist aggressors for the purpose of dealing generally with the peace of the world. The United States refuses not because, as is suggested, it denies that the regime exists or that it has power. We in the United States well know that it exists and has power because its aggressive armies joined with the North Korean aggressors to kill and wound 150,000 Americans We do not refuse to deal with it where occasion requires . . It is, however, one thing to recognize evil as a fact. It is another thing to take evil to one's breast and call it good."
That explains our non-recognition of the Communist regime and also our opposition to its admission to the United Nations.
I adhered to that position without compromise. It is that position which is reflected in the final Berlin Conference Resolution. Under that Resolution the Communist regime will not come to Geneva to be honored by us, but rather to account before the bar of world opinion
The Berlin Resolution also touches on Indochina. It says that "the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor .. in restoring peace in other parts of Asia," and it concludes that "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also be discussed at the conference."
This portion of the Resolution was primarily and properly the responsibility of France. The United States has a very vital interest in developments in this area and we are helping the French Union forces to defeat Communist aggression by helping them out with grants of money and equipment.3
But the French and peoples of the Associated States of Indochina are doing the actual fighting in a war now in its eighth year. They have our confidence and our support. We can give counsel, and that counsel is welcomed and taken into account. But just as the United States had a special position in relation to the Korean armistice, so France has a special position in Indochina.
I recognize, of course, that the Soviet Union would not have accepted 100 percent our terms for the Korean Political Conference, unless it expected to benefit thereby. But so do we.
I can think of some Soviet benefits that we would not like and should prevent. But I do not wholly exclude the idea that the Soviet Union might in fact want peace in Asia.
We can hope so, and we shall see. In the meantime, we shall keep on our guard.
There is, however, no reason why we should refuse to seek peacefully the results we want merely because of fear that we will be outmaneuvered at the conference table. No informed observers believe that we were outmaneuvered at Berlin.
We need not, out of fright, lay down the tools of diplomacy and the possibilities which they provide. Our cause is not so poor, and our capacity not so low, that our Nation must seek security by sulking in its tent.
Berlin gave the free nations up-to-date, firsthand, post-Stalin knowledge of Soviet intentions. That knowledge was not reassuring. It shows that the free nations must remain steadfast in their unity and steadfast in their determination to build military strength and human welfare to the point where aggression is deterred and the ideals of freedom are dynamic in the world.
We must continue to hold fast to the conviction that the peoples and nations who are today not the masters of their own destinies shall become their own masters.
If we do all of this, not belligerently but wisely and soberly; if we remain ever-watchful for a sign from the Soviet rulers that they realize that freedom is not something to be frightened by but something to be accepted, then we may indeed, as these eventful coming months unfold, advance the hopes for peace of the world, hopes so eloquently voiced by President Eisenhower last April and again last December, 2
In all of this we Americans have a special responsibility.
Over recent years the fearful problem of dealing with Soviet expansion has brought many to a truly disturbing emotional and moral state. In a sense brains have been washed to such an extent that many are tempted to trade principles of justice for some sense of momentary respite.
Our ultimate reliance is not dollars, is not guided missiles, is not weapons of mass destruction. The ultimate weapon is moral principle.
George Washington, in his Farewell Address, called upon our Nation to observe justice toward all others. "It will," he said, "be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation to
1 Supra, pp. 65-71.
Infra, pp. 2798-2805.
give to mankind the too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice. . . . The experiment, at least, is recommended."
That recommendation has, in fact, guided us throughout most of our national life, and we have become the great Nation which Washington foresaw. This is not the moment to forsake that guiding principle. It is not a moment to flee from opportunities because we fear that we shall be inadequate. If what we stand for is right, why should we fear?
There are some in Europe who would have us forsake our friends in Asia in the hope of gain for Europe. There are some in Asia who would have us forsake our friends in Europe in hope of gain for Asia. We dare not be critical of them, for they are subject to strains which we are spared by our fortunate material and geographical position. Indeed, there are some Americans who would have us sacrifice our friends both in Asia and in Europe for some fancied benefit to ourselves.
I do not argue that American foreign policy should be conducted for the benefit of others. American foreign policy should be designed to promote American welfare. But we can know that our own welfare would not really be promoted by cynical conduct which defies moral principles. In a world in which no nation can live alone, to treat our friends unjustly is to destroy ourselves. We must stand as a solid rock of principle on which others can depend. That will be the case if we follow George Washington's advice and continue to be a people who are guided by "exalted justice."
20. PEACE WITH FREEDOM AND SECURITY: Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 19, 1954 2
I am glad to discuss with you the present state of our foreign policy and its relation to our military programs.
The central goal of our policy is peace with freedom and security. The menace of Soviet bloc despotism, which now holds in its grip one-third of the world's peoples, presents the most serious danger that has ever confronted us. The main aspects of this threat are apparent.
1. The Soviet rulers seem to feel secure only in a world of conformity dominated by them. Partly, no doubt, they are driven by lust for power. But to a considerable extent, I believe, they are driven by fear of freedom. To them freedom is a threat to be stamped out wherever it approaches their world.
2. The Soviet bloc possesses what is in many ways the most formidable military establishment the world has ever known. Its great strength is manpower, but also it is strong in terms of planes, sub
1 Address of Sept. 17, 1796; James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, vol. I (Washington, 1896), pp. 213–224. 2 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 29, 1954, pp. 464-465.