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While the conversations between General MacArthur and Mr. Dulles were still continuing there occurred the armed attack of Communist forces on the Republic of Korea. This attack seemed to have, as its ultimate objective, the encirclement of Japan by Soviet power and an increased Soviet opportunity to subject Japan to its domination and eventual exploitation for aggression.

Following the return to Washington of the Secretary of Defense, General Bradley, and Mr. Dulles, the problem was further discussed between the Department of State and the Department of Defense with the result that on September 8, 1950, the President instructed that the United States should proceed to explore the possibility of a Japanese peace settlement which would include security provisions of the general character suggested by General MacArthur. The primary responsibility of negotiation in this matter was placed in the hands of Mr. Dulles.

In consultation with the Departments of State and Defense, Mr. Dulles prepared a seven-point statement of general principles, a copy of which is appended hereto,' which contemplated, among other things, that

pending satisfactory alternative security arrangements, such as United Nations assumption of effective responsibility, there would be continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and United States and perhaps other forces for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

At the time of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, these 7 principles were discussed with representatives of the 12 other nations which were members of the Far Eastern Commission 2 (including the Nationalist Government of China) and also with Indonesia and Ceylon, nations which were not members of the Far Eastern Commission because they did not have independent status at the time of the formation of the Far Eastern Commission, but which were applicants for membership and regarded as qualified for membership. The principles were also discussed with representatives of the Republic of Korea, a former Japanese colony which, in independence, was deeply concerned.

The Soviet Union registered strong objection, particularly to the security principle above referred to and some reservation was indicated by the Government of India. There was, There was, however, a large measure of acceptance of the seven principles and, in the light of that, Mr. Dulles was formally designated by the President on January 10, 1951, as his special representative for the purpose of conducting the negotiations necessary to conclude a peace settlement with Japan and related security arrangements with Japan and other Pacific countries.3 The purpose was not merely to end the war by a prompt and just peace but, to use General MacArthur's phrase, "to gain an indispen

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Supra, pp. 450-451.

2 Australia, Burma, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. For a complete study of the Far Eastern Commission, see The Far Eastern Commission, 1945 to 1952 (Department of State publication 5138; 1953).

3 See announcement of Jan. 11, 1951; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 29, 1951, p. 185.

sable initiative." We sought that Japan should become a vigorous and contributory member of the free world. Further, we sought to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific by security arrangements with Japan and other Pacific countries, such as the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, which were part of the Asian offshore island position in the West Pacific.

In January 1951, Mr. Dulles, representing the President, accompanied by Mr. John M. Allison and Mr. Robert Fearey of the Department of State, Mr. Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, and Col. C. Stanton Babcock, representing the Department of Defense, and John D. Rockefeller III, as an educational and cultural adviser, went to Japan as a peace mission.

On February 2, 1951, with the approval of the President, Mr. Dulles made a public address in Tokyo,' in which he pointed out to the Japanese the dangers of remaining unprotected under the disturbed conditions now existing in the world, emphasized Japanese responsibility for their own protection-particularly against indirect aggression of the subversive type-and pointed out the advantages of collective security. At the same time he stated that if the Japanese wished it the United States would "sympathetically consider" stationing certain of its armed forces in and about Japan to assist in Japan's defense. He emphasized that the arrangement must be entirely voluntary, saying:

That [stationing of United States forces] is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The United States is not interested in slavish conduct We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The choice must be Japan's own choice.

Reaction in Japan was highly favorable to this suggestion. Prime Minister Yoshida, in a public statement on February 11, 1951, said:

The Japanese Government and a preponderant majority of the Japanese people warmly welcome the Ambassador's invitation to a security arrangement with the United States for the protection of unarmed Japan by the stationing of United States armed forces in and about the country. We realize fully our responsibil ity to protect ourselves and defend our own land, and do what we can in this respect. When we recover our independence and join the councils of free nations as an equal member, the substance and scope of the Japanese contribution will be determined according to the extent of our economic and industrial recovery.

Early in the discussions with the Japanese it became evident that the Japanese Government recognized fully the necessity for the maintenance in and about Japan of United States armed forces. A tentative draft of agreement was quickly reached. During the following months this Tokyo draft was given intensive study both at Tokyo and at Washington, and it was finally perfected at San Francisco just prior to the signing of the Treaty of Peace. This enabled the security treaty itself to be signed shortly following the signature of the peace treaty.

The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in continuous touch with the negotiations and the final result fully met

1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 12, 1951, pp. 252–255.

their specifications as to what was necessary to enable the United States and Japan to cooperate to maintain international peace and security in the Japan area.

The Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees were consulted and were represented on the United States Delegation which dealt with this treaty.

The treaty itself is a simple document consisting of a preamble and four substantive articles. The preamble recites the circumstances which have led to the making of the treaty. The basic substantive article (art. I) grants the United States the right to dispose land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan.

The treaty imposes upon the United States no obligations. The reason for this was pointed out by Mr. Dulles in a statement issued in Japan on February 12, 1951. He then said that security treaties which involved commitments by the United States should embody the principle established by Senate Resolution 239, Eightieth Congress, the so-called Vandenberg resolution,' which calls for "continuous selfhelp and mutual aid" by all the parties to security arrangements joined in by the United States. Japan did not feel able at the present time to assume adequate commitments in that respect. However, as set out in the preamble of the treaty, it is expected "that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense."

Article I further provides that United States forces in and about Japan may be used not only for the security of Japan but "to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." This is an important provision which assures that any United States forces in and about Japan are not required to be set apart for a limited purpose only, but may be broadly used for the maintenance of peace and security in the entire Far East.

Article I further provides that United States forces in and about Japan may be used "at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.'

This provision established, it is believed, a precedent in recognizing the danger of indirect aggression, and in authorizing international measures against it. To a large extent, and particularly in the Far East, Soviet communism has used the method of indirect aggression and civil war. China was conquered by so-called civil war. The North Korean attack was alleged to be civil war. There are "civil wars" and "civil disturbances" in Indochina, Malaya, and elsewhere in the Far East. In all of these countries the insurrectionary forces have the moral and material backing of Soviet communism and could not be formidable without it. If the security of Japan should thus be assailed, United States forces could be utilized for the security of Japan. But this would only be at the express request of the Japanese Government, and the independent concurrence of the United States that the circumstances warrant this unusual action.

1 Resolution of June 11, 1948; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 197.

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The provision has great potential value and it is believed will constitute a deterrent which will make its actual invocation unnecessary. This is what the United States hopes.

Article II provides that Japan will not grant any military facilities to any third power without the consent of the United States.

Article III provides for administrative agreements to cover the disposition of the armed forces of the United States in and about. Japan. Such administrative agreements are now in the process of preparation. It is expected they will be completed before the security treaty comes into force.

Article IV provides for termination "whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States and Japan" there are satisfactory alternative provisions for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japanese area. Thus, on the one hand, there cannot be termination without the concurrence of the United States, which concurrence, it can be assumed, will not be unreasonably withheld. On the other hand, it is in the mind of the parties that the present bilateral arrangement is only an initial step in an evolutionary process of collective security. It is to be presumed that the United States would welcome developments which would reduce Japan's initial, almost total, dependence on the United States for security.

The security treaty is a grant by Japan of rights of a very broad character. It involves a significant commitment of Japan to the cause of the free world and it testifies to Japan's trust in the United States to be an honorable representative of the free world in its quest for collective security.

The security treaty between the United States and Japan presupposes the prior coming-into-force of the treaty of peace with Japan and the consequent restoration of Japan's complete independence. Article 5 of the peace treaty between the 48 Allied Powers and Japan contains the enabling clause, referred to in the preamble of the security treaty, whereby the Allied Powers recognize that Japan, as a sovereign nation, possesses the inherent right of individual and collective defense and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collectivesecurity arrangements.

Article 6 of the peace treaty is a further enabling article, which provides that the ending of the occupation shall not

prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under and in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements between one or more of the Allied Powers and Japan.

The United States delegation to conclude the United States-Japan Security Treaty consisted of the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, Senators Tom Connally, Alexander Wiley, John J. Sparkman, and H. Alexander Smith of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senators Richard B. Russell and Styles Bridges of the Senate

Armed Services Committee, and Representatives Overton Brooks and Dewey Short of the House Armed Services Committee.

22. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FEBRUARY 14, 1952 (Excerpt)1

Background

From the moment the war in the Far East came to an end the United States, as the principal occupying power, hoped to conclude satisfactory peace arrangements and withdraw our troops from Japan at the earliest practicable moment. Yet, as time went on and world conditions grew worse, it became increasingly apparent that this could not be done safely unless satisfactory provisions could be made to protect Japan against the threat of Communist aggression. If any doubt existed on this point prior to June 1950, it was dissipated by the attack upon the Republic of Korea. Clearly the complete withdrawal of American troops from disarmed Japan would leave a political and military vacuum that would seriously threaten our security interests in the Far East and constitute a real danger to world peace generally. Responsible officials in both Japan and the United States recognized this basic principle. Early in February 1951 Ambassador Dulles pointed out that the United States would "sympathetically consider" stationing some armed forces in Japan to assist in the defense of that country if the Japanese wished it. On February 11, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida responded affirmatively:

The Japanese Government and a preponderant majority of the Japanese people

he said

warmly welcome the Ambassador's invitation to a security arrangement with the United States for the protection of unarmed Japan by the stationing of United States armed forces in and about the country. We realize fully our responsibility to protect ourselves and defend our own land, and do what we can in this respect. It was agreed that this objective could best be achieved by the conclusion of a bilateral security pact between the United States and Japan simultaneously with the conclusion of the general treaty of peace. To this end article 6 of the peace treaty provides for the withdrawal of occupation forces as soon as possible. But it also makes possible the stationing of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory— under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.

1S. Exec. Rept. No. 2, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 19–22.

2 See Ambassador Dulles' statement, supra.

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