ARTICLE III The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific. ARTICLE IV Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. ARTICLE V For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. ARTICLE VI This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. ARTICLE VII The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time. ARTICLE VIII Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area. ARTICLE IX This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.1 ARTICLE X This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party_may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice. ARTICLE XI This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951. 17. STATEMENT TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT,2 JANUARY 7, 1952 (Excerpt)3 As indicated in annex 2, the United States conceived that the establishment of peace in the Pacific meant not only liquidating the old war but strengthening the fabric of peace as against the threat of new war. Of immediate concern were the Pacific nations whose people had been fellows in arms in World War II, namely, the Philip pines, Australia, and New Zealand. These nations, with Japan and the Ryukyus, were links in what is often called the Asian "offshore island chain" which marks the western rim of the Pacific. In the case of the Philippines there already existed a security arrangement with the United States in the form of a base agreement. There existed, however, no formal understanding as between the United States and Australia and New Zealand. The lack of this was felt the more acutely in Australia and New Zealand because these countries have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific area. Also, these nations felt that a security arrangement with the United States was the normal counterpart of a Japanese Peace Treaty which imposed no restrictions upon Japanese rearmament. It seemed eminently appropriate formally to register a sense of common destiny 1 All instruments of ratification were deposited Apr. 29, 1952. 2 John Foster Dulles. 3 S. Execs. A, B, C, and D, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 22-24. 5 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 869-881. 5 with these two nations of similar political traditions, which relationship had been demonstrated in common sacrifice and effort in two world wars. Mr. Dulles and the State Department members of his mission, which for this purpose now included Mr. Livingston Satterthwaite and Col. C. Stanton Babcock of the Department of Defense, visited Australia and New Zealand the latter part of February 1951, and they conducted at Canberra, Australia, 4 days of intensive discussion with the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. P. C. Spender, and the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs, Mr. F. W. Dodge. The result was the drafting at Canberra in February of a proposed security treaty substantially in the form of that which was later signed on September 1, 1951, after detailed consideration by the governments concerned, including, in the case of the United States, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate, and the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees of the House. The treaty consists of a preamble which sets forth the reasons for the making of the treaty and eight substantive articles. Article 4 constitutes the essence of the treaty. Thereby each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would 1 Article 5 stipulates that an armed attack on any of the parties includes an armed attack not only on the metropolitan territory of the parties but also on island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific. That would mean that there would be an "armed attack" on the United States, for the purposes of the treaty, if there were an armed attack on the trust territories-the former Japanese mandated islands-which the United States is administering; or if there were an armed attack on the Ryukyu or Bonin Islands over which the United States was exercising jurisdiction under the Japanese Peace Treaty; or if there were an armed attack upon armed forces which, under the United States-Japan Security Treaty, the United States might maintain in and about Japan. 2 Article 2 of the treaty embodies the language of Senate Resolution 239, Eightieth Congress, the so-called Vandenberg resolution, to the 1See excerpts from President Monroe's message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1823, in Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine (Department of State publication 37; 1930), p. x. Under article 3 of the Japanese peace treaty, supra, pp. 426–427. 3 Infra, doc. 19. Resolution of June 11, 1948; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. STANFORD effect that the parties will "by means of continuous and effective selfhelp and mutual aid" develop their capacity to resist armed attack. The treaty provides for a consultative relationship through a council. Any party may withdraw from this council on 1 year's notice. The treaty, as such, like the Monroe Doctrine, has no fixed duration because the essence of the treaty is recognition of a fact of presumable indefinite duration, namely, the fact that an armed attack upon one of the parties would be dangerous to the others. If ever this ceased to be the fact, then the basis for the treaty would disappear and the treaty itself could be terminated. It should be noted that the preamble to the treaty provides that it is designed to coordinate the efforts of the parties "pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area." Thus, like the United States-Japan Security Treaty, evolutionary developments are contemplated. It is understood by the parties that this treaty is designed as part and parcel of the Japanese peace settlement and the related program for creating peace and security in the Western Pacific area and presupposed the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.1 The members of the United States delegation to conclude the treaty were the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, Senators Tom Connally, Alexander Wiley, John J. Sparkman, H. Alexander Smith, Walter F. George, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Representatives Abraham A. Ribicoff and Walter H. Judd of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 18. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FEBRUARY 14, 1952 (Excerpt)2 Background As has been pointed out above, one of the main objectives of the United States in the postwar era has been to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Far East and elsewhere, so as to minimize the possibility of a third world war. In Asia we have considered it essential to the cause of the free world that those ocean countries marking the western rim of the Pacific should remain free and independent. Consequently, as an integral part of the peace settlement in the Far East, and in addition to the security treaty with Japan, our Government proceeded to negotiate security pacts with Australia and New Zealand, and with the Philippines. 1 These three countries deposited their instruments of ratification of the Japanese peace treaty Apr. 28, 1952 (the United States) and Apr. 10, 1952 (Australia and New Zealand), respectively. 2 S. Exec. Rept. No. 2, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 22-25. 3 In the Senate Committee's report on the Security Treaty with Japan, infra, doc. 22. The desire of Australia and New Zealand to establish some sort of security relationship with the United States is understandable. As a result of World War II, these countries feared the resurgence of Japanese aggression, and they were deeply concerned about the possibility of Japanese rearmament. Their natural inclination, therefore, was to think in terms of a peace treaty that would make such eventualities impossible. They could agree to a generous treaty, imposing no restrictions upon Japanese rearmament, only if the United States would formally express concern for their security and agree to stand with them in the event of an attack. The security treaty between the United States on the one hand, and Australia and New Zealand on the other, gave these countries the assurances they needed, and at the same time served the national interests of the United States. Provisions of the treaty 1 Like the Rio Pact and the [North] Atlantic Pact, the security treaty with Australia and New Zealand provides for consultation and, when necessary, appropriate action. Article III calls for consultation among the three parties whenever the territorial integrity, the political independence, or the security of any of them is threatened in the Pacific. Under this article there is no obligation to take any action as a result of the consultation contemplated. Article IV is the heart of the treaty. Under that article each of the signatories recognizes that— an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. The committee noted that the language of article IV, which is based upon the language of the Monroe Doctrine, is more general than the specific commitments contained in the Atlantic Pact. It is believed, however, that the formula which worked so well for so many years in the Americas will serve to meet the security situation which we now confront with respect to New Zealand and Australia in the Pacific. In view of the general language of article IV, the question naturally arises as to the type of action contemplated in the event an armed attack should occur. This problem was raised with Ambassador Dulles during the course of the hearings. He replied that each country would have to decide that question in the light of the fact that there is recognition that it is a common danger, and that each will act in accordance with its constitutional processes to meet that danger.3 1 Supra, doc. 1. 2 Supra, doc. 4. 3 Statement of Jan. 22, 1952; Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, Second session, on Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific, p. 62. |