2

is one of the members of the Palestine Conciliation Commission' as well as the United Nations Commission for the Rehabilitation of Korea. Greece has recently been elected to the Security Council.3 Our own relations with them have been traditionally friendly and have been becoming increasingly close since our programs of aid were initiated in 1947. Fundamentally we share the same aspirationsthe creation of conditions in which we and other nations can be free from coercion tyranny. We are finding an ever-growing community of interests as we come to know and understand each other better.

To sum up, I believe that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, while representing an extension of our formal security arrangements, provides a more than compensating increase in the security of this country and of the North Atlantic community as a whole. It is a case of mutual benefits. Their strategic location, their military capabilities and determination, their active support of the principle of collective security, their increasingly successful efforts in strengthening their free institutions, their record of support of the principles of the United Nations Charter and the mutually satisfactory and close relationship which we have enjoyed in recent years are factors which lead inescapably to this conclusion. In the interest of maximizing the defensive strength of the free world through the integration of their strength into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Greece, the "cradle of western democracy," and Turkey, the "easternmost bastion of western democracy," should be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.

11. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, JANUARY 21, 1952 1

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey (Ex. E, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), signed at London on behalf of the United States on October 17, 1951, report the protocol to the Senate and recommend that its advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date.

1. PURPOSE OF THE PROTOCOL

This protocol, when approved by all parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, will authorize the United States, on their behalf, to extend an invitation to Greece and Turkey to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. The protocol redefines and modifies the description of the area to which the North Atlantic Treaty is applicable, thereby adapting the provisions of article 6 to the new situation resulting from the proposed accession of Greece and Turkey to the treaty.

1 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 851–853.

2 See infra, pp. 2576-2578.

3 Elected for the 2-year term, Jan. 1, 1952-Dec. 31,
S. Exec. Rept. No. 1, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

1953,

2. COMMITTEE ACTION

On January 10, 1952, the President requested the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the protocol. Five days later, the committee met with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Gen. Ómar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in executive session to consider the matter. Their unclassified statements are printed in the appendix of this report for the convenience of the Senate. At the close of the meeting on January 15, 1952, the committee voted without a dissent to report the protocol favorably to the Senate.

3. BACKGROUND

Before the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty on July 21, 1949, it received the President's assurance delivered by the Secretary of State during the hearings on the treaty that-

in his judgment the accession of new members to this treaty creates in regard to each new member coming in in effect a new treaty between the United States and that nation, and that therefore the President would consider it necessary to ask for the advice and consent of the Senate before himself agreeing to the admission of a new member.2

Greece and Turkey have for some time desired to become members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The valuable contribution that these countries could make to the collective defense of free Europe has long been recognized by the United States. After the NATO structure was established, the North Atlantic Treaty Council, in September 1950, took steps to associate Greece and Turkey with the appropriate phases of planning work for the defense of the Mediterranean. Although the two countries accepted this association, it was not deemed sufficient for the maximum contribution and security of both Western Europe and Greece and Turkey.

In the spring of 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the best interests of the United States would be served by the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The best way to integrate the defensive strength of these countries with that of NATO was explored by members of NATO during the spring and summer of 1951. At its meeting in Ottawa, in September 1951, the North Atlantic Treaty Council decided that this should be effected by the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty. This protocol is the implementation of that decision and, in accordance with the President's assurance, it is now before the Senate for its advice and consent.

1 Statements of Jan. 15, 1952; supra, docs. 9 and 10.

2 Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, on Executive L, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, The North Atlantic Treaty, part 1, p. 26.

4. ROLE OF CONGRESS

Congressional initiative

The committee wishes to remind the Senate of the long record of congressional expressions urging the integration of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic defense community. These began in 1948 when the committee held its hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty. The principal official comments in recent months include the following: (a) Senate Concurrent Resolution 18 (82d Cong., 1st sess.), April

4, 1951:

9. It is the sense of the Congress that consideration should be given to the revision of plans for the defense of Europe as soon as possible so as to provide for utilization on a voluntary basis of the military and other resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece, but not exclusive of the military and other resources of other nations.1

(b) Report of the Green subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee on United States Economic and Military Assistance to Free Europe, August 13, 1951:

The committee does not feel itself competent to make a definitive recommendation as to the method whereby Greece and Turkey might be brought into a more satisfactory working relationship with the North Atlantic group. It does believe, however, that there should be no delay in moving, either through the pact organization or by means of a Mediterranean pact, to bring Greece and Turkey fully into plans for an integrated defense, not only of the Mediterranean area, but also of the European area. Until such time as there is a clear understanding of the part Greece and Turkey should play in the event of aggression, the defenses of the free world are incomplete. 2

(c) Report on Mutual Security Act of 1951, August 17, 1951:

The joint committee takes this opportunity to endorse the comment of the Green subcommittee with respect to the desirability of integrating the defense plans of Greece and Turkey with plans for the defense of Europe. The subcommittee reported as follows:

"The subcommittee was concerned that neither Greece nor Turkey has yet been fully integrated into European plans for the defense of Europe. Both of those nations desire to become full-fledged partners in the North Atlantic Treaty, and their membership would undoubtedly increase the combined defensive strength of the member states. At the same time, of course, their admission to membership would increase the obligations of each of the other members.

"The committee does not feel itself competent to make a definitive recommendation as to the method whereby Greece and Turkey might be brought into a more satisfactory working relationship with the North Atlantic group. It does believe, however, that there should be no delay in moving, either through the pact organization or by means of a Mediterranean pact, to bring Greece and Turkey fully into plans for an integrated defense, not only of the Mediterranean area, but also of the European area. Until such time as there is a clear understanding of the part Greece and Turkey should play in the event of aggression, the defenses of the free world are incomplete."

Consultation

Not only was congressional interest largely responsible for the United States initiative in pressing for the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, but the Senate, through the Foreign Relations Committee, was consulted before the North Atlantic Council at its Ottawa meeting agreed to this step. Assistant Secretaries of State George W. Perkins and George C. McGhee appeared before the Foreign Relations Consultative Subcommittee on Europe on September 6, 1951, to discuss this matter. The full committee informally considered the problem further on September 17, and the United States pushed forward with the proposal at the Ottawa meeting.

5. PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOL

The protocol is clear and simple. Article I provides that when all present signatories to the treaty have notified the United States of their acceptance of the protocol, the United States shall invite Greece and Turkey to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty as modified by article II of the protocol. The treaty will become operative for Greece and Turkey on the day that they deposit their instrument of accession with the United States.

Article II of the protocol amends article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty which defines the area to which the treaty applies, in three important respects: (1) Turkey is added to the North Atlantic Treaty area, as defined in article 6 of the treaty. Since a part of Turkey is in Asia it was necessary to change the description in article 6 which had been confined to Europe and North America. (2) The Eastern Mediterranean Sea is also added to the area. The obligations of the treaty apply, however, only so far as forces, vessels and aircraft of the contracting parties in that area are concerned. According to the testimony of the Secretary of State, this change was necessary because previous interpretation of the area, given to the Senate during the North Atlantic Treaty hearings, restricted the area to the western Mediterranean.2 Since Greece and Turkey are located on the eastern Mediterranean, it was necessary to redefine the area and eliminate any doubt as to the area covered. (3) The last change in article 6 makes it clear that if in the future the occupation forces in Europe of any of the parties cease to be occupation forces (as in Germany, Austria, or Trieste, for example), but still remain on European soil, the North Atlantic Treaty will still be operative in the event they should be attacked. This amendment of article 6 at this time will make an amendment to the treaty unnecessary in the event of an agreement with any occupied country which might end the occupation but permit United States troops to remain stationed there.

1 The Consultative Subcommittee on Europe was made up of the following four Senators: J. W. Fulbright, Tom Connally, Alexander Wiley, and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

2 See Secretary Acheson's statement of Apr. 27, 1949; Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, on Executive L, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, The North Atlantic Treaty, part 1, pp. 59–60.

Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as amended by the protocol, is as follows (new material in italic, omitted material stricken through):

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack (1) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the territory of Turkey, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aireraft in this area of any of the Parties (ii) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article III provides that the protocol shall enter into force when all the signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty have notified the United States of their acceptance.

During hearings on the protocol the question was raised as to whether an attack on British forces in Egypt would bring the North Atlantic Treaty into operation. The exchange between Senators Gillette and Hickenlooper and Secretary Acheson was as follows:

Senator GILLETTE. Then would the Suez area be considered as covered if there is an attack on the forces which have been stationed there from the period that is covered in your language here?

Secretary ACHESON. This refers to occupation forces in Europe. Any forces here [pointing to Egypt and the Suez Canal on the map] would not be occupation forces and would not be in Europe.

Senator GILLETTE. That is a definite construction.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Any forces, any British forces or other forces, guarding the Suez Canal would not be considered occupation forces, and an invasion or attack on them would not invoke the treaty.

Secretary ACHESON. It would not invoke the treaty. They are not occupation forces and not in Europe.

The question then arose as to whether an attack on British forces off the Egyptian coast would be an attack "on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the parties . . ." in the "Mediterranean Sea." The Secretary of State in response indicated that the interpretation which the committee gave to article 6 in its report on the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948 [1949],' would be applicable. That report stated:

In view of the purpose of the treaty to deter armed attack, the area covered by the treaty was deliberately described in general terms rather than defined by lines on a map. The committee agrees that this general description is preferable, for it would seem inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty to provide that article 5 would come into operation in the event of an attack, for example, upon ships or aircraft at a given point but not if the attack occurred a few miles away. If there should be any doubt as to whether or not an armed attack has taken place within the area specified in the treaty, each party would decide for itself, in the light of the facts surrounding the particular situation and the significance of the

attack.

6. NEW COMMITMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES

The only new commitment undertaken by the United States under this protocol is contained in the extension of the area in which an 1 Supra, pp. 837-838.