Imagini ale paginilor

basis so as to make some compensation for the hardships which were suffered by individual soldiers as a result of the Japanese violations of the Geneva conventions relating to prisoners of war. The United States has indicated that because our own citizens, who suffered as prisoners of war under the Japanese, have already received some compensation out of Japanese assets, equity dictates that comparable indemnification shall first be made to the citizens of other countries, before further compensation is made to Americans.

Allied property in Japan is to be returned and, where this cannot be done for practical reasons, compensation will be paid in blocked yen. Japanese legislation to that effect is now pending in the Diet.

13. Damage suffered by United States citizens

Witnesses, representing several types of American claimants against Japan, appeared before the committee to point out that adequate provision had not been made for the compensation of American citizens who had suffered damage and injury from Japanese actions during the The main examples cited were the confiscation of private bank accounts of servicemen in the Philippines and the seizure of property in China.

The committee is, of course, much concerned that just compensation be secured in deserving cases. As a result of committee interrogation, and pursuant to the study of memoranda filed by the State Department, it now appears that the total of potential claims (as noted in the section above) against Japan is in an amount well in excess of $100 billion. This amount, of course, includes the claims of all our allies as well as our own. It would obviously be impossible for Japan to pay more than a very small fraction of such a huge amount; nor could American claimants expect preferential treatment.

In determining how to handle the problem of claims, the negotiators agreed upon the following basic principles:

1. Adequate compensation by Japan is impossible;

2. Japan should make such compensation both in form and amount as are feasible;

3. Reparations for war losses is a governmental matter to be settled between governments; and

4. It is the duty and responsibility of each government to provide such compensation for persons under its protection as that government deems fair and equitable, such compensation to be paid out of reparations that may be received from Japan or from other sources.

Because of the limited ability of Japan to pay its legitimate claims, our allies in the treaty waive their claims and those of their nationals in the same way that we do. There are, however, certain compensations provided for in the treaty. Japan agrees to negotiate with the Allied Powers to provide services-mainly by way of labor and plant facilities wherever possible as reparations. Article 14 (a) 2 authorizes the Allied Powers to retain and use for reparation purposes Japanese public and private property subject to their jurisdiction. Article 15 returns Allied property within Japan to the owners,

and article 16 transfers Japanese assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries to the International Red Cross.

These provisions do not give a direct right of return to individual claimants except in the case of those having property in Japan. As representatives of the executive branch pointed out, individual remedies must be provided elsewhere.

Japanese property vested by this country as of October 1, 1951, is approximately $84 million. Certain debt claims of United States citizens and others are still payable under the Trading With the Enemy Act. All in all the Office of the Alien Property Custodian has turned over $120 million to the War Claims Commission, of which amount the latter has paid out $52 million under the War Claims Act. This leaves a substantial amount available subject to allocation by the Congress.

In its memorandum of January 31, 1952, to the committee, the State Department said that

Allied Powers in whose territory United States nationals sustained property losses may make such United States nationals eligible to receive such compensation as they are able to provide for war losses. It does not appear, however, that American nationals who sustained losses in the territories of any of the Allied Powers can expect to receive compensation commensurate with their losses. Accordingly, United States nationals, whose claims are not covered by the treaty provisions or by the legislation of other Allied Powers, must look for relief to the Congress of the United States.

Congress has provided that the proceeds of the liquidation of Japanese assets in the United States are to be paid into a trust fund in the United States Treasury known as the war claims fund, which is available for the payment of war claims as provided by the War Claims Act of 1948 (Public Law 896, 80th Cong., 2d sess.), as amended.3

The War Claims Commission has recommended to the Congress that its powers be extended to include payment of claims resulting from damages caused by the illegal actions of enemy powers during World War II. If these recommendations are enacted into law, they will serve to meet in part, at least, some of the many and varied claims of American citizens against Japan.

14. The peace treaty and Korea

While the Japanese Peace Treaty intimately affects Korea in many ways, it contains only brief references to that country. The most important is found in article 2, in which Japan recognizes the independence of Korea. The most extensive is found in article 21, which states that Korea is to enjoy the benefits of articles 2, 4, 9, and 12 of the treaty. The latter provisions place Korea on a parity with the Allied Powers with regard to postwar trading, fishing, commercial, and maritime arrangements. Thus, even though Korea is not a signatory of the treaty, it is to all intents and purposes a treaty power. Korea was acquired by Japan early in the twentieth century and

1 Act of Oct. 6, 1917; 40 Stat. 411-426.

2 Act of July 3, 1948; 62 Stat., pt. 1, p. 1240.

Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eightysecond Congress, Second Session, p. 147.


was made an integral part of the Japanese Empire both politically and economically. In the Cairo declaration Korea was promised independence but when the war came to an end the arrangements for receiving the surrender of the Japanese soldiers split the country along the thirty-eighth parallel. Since then Korea has at no time been united, and at the present moment it is overrun with_military forces as a result of the aggression launched upon South Korea in June 1950.

The Japanese Peace Treaty is an expression of the Allied Powers that they seek to make good their promise of freedom and independence for Korea, and that they agree to assist the United Nations in suppressing the aggression against the Republic of Korea. Japan in her commitments both in the peace treaty and in the security pact, as well as in the exchange of the Acheson-Yoshida notes,' agrees to continue to assist the United Nations in its efforts to suppress aggression in that country.

Finally, Japan surrenders to the Republic of Korea the very considerable property of Japan in Korea.

15. Relation of Japan to Nationalist and Communist China

In visualizing the future role of Japan in the Far East it is, of course, important to know the intention of the Japanese Government with respect to the National Government of China and the Chinese Communist regime. In a letter written to Ambassador Dulles on December 24, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida expressed the desire of his Government to conclude as soon as legally possible a treaty with the National Government so that normal relations could be restored between the two Governments. At the same time he outlined the various hostile acts which have been committed against Japan by the Communist regime in China and which make treaty relations with that regime impossible. The committee believes the Yoshida letter-even though it is not a formal agreement-constitutes a clear-cut statement of Japan's determination not to recognize the Communist regime under existing circumstances. Pertinent excerpts from the Prime Minister's letter (which is printed in full on p. 9 of the committee hearings) are reproduced here for the information of the Senate:

The Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political peace and commercial intercourse with China which is Japan's close neighbor

My Government is prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude with the National Government of China, if that Government so desires, a treaty which will reestablish normal relations between the two Governments in conformity with the principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace. The terms of such bilateral treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of the National Government of the Republic of China. We will promptly explore this subject with the National Government of China.

As regards the Chinese Communist regime, that regime stands actually condemned by the United Nations of being an aggressor 3 and, in consequence, the United Nations has recommended certain measures against that regime, in which

1 Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 22. 2 Infra, p. 896.

3 General Assembly Res. 498 (V), Feb. 1, 1951; infra, pp. 2608-2609.


Japan is now concurring and expects to continue to concur. more, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance concluded in Moscow in 19501 is virtually a military alliance aimed against Japan. In fact there are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime in China is backing the Japan Communist Party in its program of seeking violently to overthrow the constitutional system and the present Government of Japan. In view of these considerations, I can assure you that the Japanese Government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime of China. 16. Japan's trade with the Soviet bloc

[ocr errors]

Japan's controls over exports of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc are more restrictive than similar controls imposed by other nations of the free world with the exception of Canada and the United States. Although these controls were imposed initially by the Japanese Government at the direction of SCAP,2 responsibility for administration of the control system is being rapidly turned over to the Japanese Government. Upon the coming into force of the treaty, the determination of export-control policies will, of course, be the sole responsibility of the Japanese.

It is impossible to state definitely at this time what degree of controls on the export of strategic materials to Communist countries will be maintained by the Japanese Government in the post-treaty period. There is every reason to believe, however, that the Japanese Government will continue to cooperate with the other nations of the free world in maintaining such controls as long as the necessity for them exists. On two recent occasions Prime Minister Yoshida has expressed officially the willingness of his Government to cooperate with the free world in this regard. In responding to the United Nations General Assembly resolution of May 18, 1951,3 which called for action by governments to embargo the shipments of certain military and strategic items to Communist China, the Prime Minister voluntarily replied that his Government was imposing restrictions on trade with China which met the requirements of the U. N. resolution and that in carrying out the purposes of the United Nations embargo his Government was prepared to consult on the matter with other cooperating countries. Referring to the United Nations embargo, Mr. Yoshida stated in his letter to Mr. Dulles of December 24, 1951:

As regards the Chinese Communist regime, that regime stands actually condemned by the United Nations of being an aggressor and, in consequence, the United Nations has recommended certain measures against that regime, in which Japan is now concurring and expects to continue to concur when the multilateral treaty of peace comes into force.

1 Infra, pp. 2463-2465.

2 Supreme Commander, Allied Powers.

3 Res. 500 (V); infra., pp. 2614-2615.

On January 17, 1952, Mr. Yoshida stated in a note to Secretary Acheson that his Government was cooperating with the United States policy with respect to export controls as set forth in Public Law 213,

Eighty-second Congress (Battle Act). The Senate will recall that this act provides for the cessation of United States military, economic, and financial aid to countries which export strategic materials, arms, ammunitions, and implements of war, petroleum, and items of strategic significance to nations threatening the security of the United States. Accordingly, Japan would suffer the loss of United States aid as the result of exporting any such materials to Communist-dominated countries.

In view of these and other indications that the Japanese Government intends to cooperate with the United Nations and the United States, the committee feels that it is reasonable to assume that Japan can be relied upon to continue to cooperate with other governments in restricting exports of strategic and military goods to Communist China and other parts of the Soviet bloc after the coming into force of the peace treaty.

17. Attitude of the U. S. S. R. toward the Japanese Peace Treaty

Although the U. S. S. R. sent a delegation to the San Francisco Conference in September 1951,2 neither the U. S. S. R. nor any of its satellites joined with representatives of the other nations to give generous support to an instrument designed to readmit Japan to its proper place in the family of nations. It became obvious, as the conference progressed, that the Soviet delegates were intent upon doing everything possible to sabotage the conclusion of a satisfactory treaty.

Among the arguments advanced by the U. S. S. R. in opposition was the charge that the treaty does not provide for guaranties against the rebirth of militarism in Japan in such a way that a repetition of Japanese aggression would not be possible. Effective guaranties could only be assured, declared the U. S. S. R., by restrictions on the size of the various components of the Japanese armed forces.

The U. S. S. R. further took the position that the treaty should contain assurances that the territory of Japan would not be used to maintain foreign military bases. It argued that without such specific assurances the treaty does not serve the purpose of reestablishing Japan's sovereignty and, in fact, "contradicts the interests of the maintenance of peace in the Far East."

The Soviet delegate also complained of undue leniency in dealing with the subject of Japanese reparations.

With respect to territorial questions, the Soviet Union strongly urged that Formosa, the Pescadores, the Paracel Islands, and other territories wrested from China by the Japanese should be turned over to the present Communist Chinese Government. The U. S. S. R., itself, laid claim to South Sakhalin and adjacent islands, as well as to the Kurile Islands, but rejected the provisions making possible future United States trusteeship over the islands of Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Parece Vela, Marcus, and Daito, which were severed from the Japanese empire after World War II.

1 Act of Oct. 26, 1951; infra, pp. 3101–3105.

2 See Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, San Francisco, September 4-8, 1951 (Department of State publication 4392; 1951).

« ÎnapoiContinuă »