Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them. The committee believes, however, that this would have been an unwise course to pursue. It might have raised differences among the Allies which would have complicated and prolonged the conclusion of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as South Sakhalin, and the Kuriles.

Committee interpretation of article 2.-Some witnesses before the committee complained that the peace treaty, in leaving the future status of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles uncertain, in effect gives validity to the Yalta agreement that sovereignty over these areas. should pass to the Soviet Union. The committee does not subscribe. to this thesis, even though South Sakhalin and the Kuriles are now under Russian occupation. The peace treaty neither affirms nor denies the validity of Yalta in this regard. Certainly it does not in any way imply recognition of Russian sovereignty over the territories in question.

In this connection, it should be noted that the Soviet Union is not an original signatory to the treaty nor can it now accede to the treaty. It is explicit in the treaty (art. 25) that it does "not confer any rights, titles or benefits" upon any state which did not sign the treaty, and that the right, title, and interest of Japan is not diminished or prejudiced in favor of such a nonsignatory. Consequently the Soviet Union cannot claim any rights under the treaty. Nevertheless, in order to avoid any doubt or confusion, the committee agreed that ratification by the United States should be made subject to the following statement:

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty of peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951. As part of such advice and consent the Senate states that nothing the treaty contains is deemed to diminish or prejudice, in favor of the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or the Allied Powers as defined in said treaty, in and to South Sakhalin and its adjacent islands, the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, the island of Shikotan, or any other territory, rights, or interests possessed by Japan on December 7, 1941, or to confer any right, title, or benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet Union; and also that nothing in the said treaty, or the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification thereof, implies recognition on the part of the United States of the provisions in favor of the Soviet Union contained in the so-called Yalta agreement regarding Japan of February 11, 1945.

There remains some question as to what the Kurile Islands include, especially whether they include the Habomai Islands and Shikotan. The latter are now occupied by troops of the Soviet Union. It is the view of the United States Government that these islands are properly a part of Hokkaido and that Japan is entitled to sovereignty over them. Some question also arose during the hearings as to the disposition of the Ryukyus which includes the important United States military base at Okinawa. It was agreed in article 3 that Japan would concur

1 See the "Agreement regarding Japan" of Feb. 11, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 33-34.

with any recommendation which the United States might make for a future United Nations trusteeship agreement, with the United States as the sole administering authority over Nansei Shoto, south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto, south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and the Volcano Islands), and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the establishment of such a trusteeship the United States will continue to exercise jurisdiction over these territories and their inhabitants.

Some question has also been raised as to the ability of Japan to support its 80,000,000 people if it is confined in the future to the four main homeland islands. The State Department pointed out the following:

A clue to the correct answer is the fact that, when Japan had a vast colonial empire into which the Japanese could freely emigrate, few did so Japanese, like other people, prefer to live at home. So far as emigration is concerned, the territorial clauses of the treaty do not establish restraints greater than those which 98 percent of the Japanese people voluntarily put upon themselves.1

It is well to keep in mind, in this connection, that the surrender terms promised the Japanese "access to raw materials" and "participation in world trade relations." These promises can be realized only so long as the parties to the treaty make them possible. The Japanese people are industrious, inventive, and self-reliant. The conditions of the present territorial status of Japan are, the State Department assured the committee, ".. no cause for alarm." 2

10. Security provisions

Chapter III of the treaty deals with the general problem of security. Under article 5 Japan agrees to abide by the principles incorporated in article 2 of the United Nations Charter: to settle its international disputes by peaceful means; to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations; and to render every assistance to the United Nations in any action which that organization may undertake in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. While these provisions prohibit Japan from resorting to force as an instrument of national policy, they do not deprive that country of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as recognized in article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In article 5 of the treaty the Allied Powers reciprocally agree to be similarly guided by article 2 of the Charter in their dealings with Japan.

Article 6 stipulates that the occupation of Japan shall end 90 days after the treaty comes into force. But granting independence to an unarmed Japan would constitute an empty gesture unless some means of protecting that independence were also assured. Consequently, this same article provides that foreign armed forces may be retained or stationed in Japanese territory pursuant to agreements which may be made between Japan and one or more of the Allied Powers. The terms are clear that such military forces as are stationed in Japan

1 In Ambassador Dulles' statement of Sept. 5, 1951; supra.

2 Ibid.

473

will have only such status as Japan chooses to grant them. This article is the base for the United States security arrangements with Japan as set forth in the security' treaty which accompanies the Japanese Peace Treaty.

In some quarters it has been argued that Japan would not voluntarily enter into security arrangements with the United States, particularly with respect to the retention of American troops on Japanese soil. Any such arrangement, the argument runs, would not be in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese people. The executive branch sampled public opinion widely in Japan and found that a large majority of the Japanese people favored a continuing security relationship with the United States. The vote in the Japanese Diet on both the peace treaty and the security pact clearly reflect this view. The committee is satisfied with these assurances.

In recommending ratification of the treaty the State Department points out that in the world of 1952 it would be a fraud to grant Sovereignty to Japan accompanied only with the token right of individual self-defense, as was proposed by some of the negotiating powers. The security of the Pacific area is being developed on a collective basis, and any nation which would try to deny Japan the right to that collective security would be a "conniver at aggression." The security provisions of the peace treaty are consistent with the security arrangements now being built in the Pacific region, with the dignity and selfrespect of the Japanese, with the interests of the United Nations, and with the objectives of Allied far-eastern policy.

The committee was interested in the question of any possible limitations on the Japanese to engage in atomic research or in the construction of atomic installations. The peace treaty does not prohibit or even refer to such research. On questioning by the committee, Ambassador Dulles indicated there was no intention to place any restriction whatsoever on Japan in this respect. Some committee members expressed the view that any such restriction would be impractical if not unwise as an interference with Japanese sovereignty. Obviously, however, the United States would be very much concerned if such research turned in the direction of weapons of destruction. 11. Economic provisions

Like the rest of the treaty, chapter IV, which deals with trade and commerce, contains generous provisions with respect to Japan. No restrictions are placed upon its economy. No limitations are imposed upon its right to trade with other nations. Japan is thus given full opportunity to maintain its economy on a stable basis.

In chapter IV of the treaty it is agreed that each Allied Power will notify Japan of the prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan which the former wishes to continue. It is also agreed that mostfavored-nation treatment should be available to the Allied Powers for a 4-year period on the basis that similar treatment is accorded to Japan.

Japan renounces several advantages which it had acquired prior 1 Infra, pp. 885-886.

'Ambassador Dulles' statement of Sept. 5, 1951; supra.

to September 1, 1939. Among these are rights under the Montreux Convention with respect to the Turkish Straits,' rights as a creditor of Germany, and rights under the Bank for International Settlements.3 These are rights which accrued to Japan as a victorious power in World War I. In addition, Japan renounces any special interests and rights in China, including such benefits and privileges as were conferred upon it by the protocol terminating the Boxer Rebellion signed at Peiping September 7, 1901.4

An important segment of Japan's economy is fishing on the high seas, an occupation pursued by many Japanese. Prior to the Second World War a number of controversies over fishing rights arose between Japan and other fishing countries, especially the United States and Canada. Under article 9 of the peace treaty Japan agrees to negotiate with the interested Allied Powers bilateral and multilateral agreements governing fishing and the conservation of fish in the high

seas.

Another economic problem dealt with in chapter IV of the treaty is trade. In addition to the most-favored-nation treatment referred to above, Japan agrees for the 4-year period mentioned to conduct its trade on an individual competitive basis and to make all external purchases and sales of Japan state enterprises, solely on a commercial basis. It also declares its readiness to enter promptly into the negotiation of treaties with the Allied Powers, placing trade, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis. These are important commitments, if one recalls that Japan was making substantial inroads upon British and American trade in the pre-World War II period.

Another important commitment contained in the treaty is that Japan will enter into negotiations with the Allied Powers in order to reach agreement covering civil aviation. Again in this respect Japan promises to accord the Allied Powers and their nationals mostfavored-nation treatment with regard to traffic rights and privileges, and complete equality of opportunity in the operation and development of their air services.

These are liberal clauses. They promise Japan a real opportunity for economic recovery, provided it lives up to its announced intention in the preamble of conforming to internationally accepted fair practices and provided also that the Allied Powers accord to Japan in their domestic legislation the opportunities and possibilities of reasonable trade, thus giving Japan a chance to meet its own domestic requirements.

12. Reparations and debts

One of the most complicated and difficult problems relating to the Japanese peace settlement centers about the matter of reparations. During the war Japan inflicted damages upon persons and property that ran into many billions of dollars. It is estimated that the claims

1 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 173, pp. 213 ff.

2 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 132, pp. 411 ff.

3 Ibid., pp. 525-538.

4 Treaty Series 397.

held by various governments against Japan may total as much as $100 billion. The problem confronting those who negotiated the treaty, therefore, was to devise a formula that would make possible the settlement of some of these claims within Japan's capacity to pay while still maintaining a viable economy,

Article 14 (a) contains the unequivocal provision that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering it caused during the war. At the same time article 14 (b) states that, except as otherwise provided, the Allied Powers waive all reparations and claims against Japan.

These two sections recognize the limited Japanese economic capabilities with that country's resources reduced by the treaty to those of the four home islands. They respond to the fact that Japan has been unable during the period of occupation to meet the food and raw materials requirements of its economy by about $2 billion, which deficit the United States has made good. Obviously insistence upon the payment of reparations in any proportion commensurate with the claims of the injured countries and their nationals would wreck Japan's economy, dissipate any credit that it may possess at present, destroy the initiative of its people, and create misery and chaos in which the seeds of discontent and communism would flourish. In short, insistence upon the payment of claims for reparations in any substantial amount would be contrary to the basic purposes and policy of the free nations, the Allied Powers, and the United States in particular. It should be emphasized, however, that Japan agrees to pay such reparations as she can shoulder.

At present Japan has an industrial capacity which is not fully employed. Some of this capacity can be used to process raw materials which are possessed in abundance by several of the countries with reparations claims against Japan. Japan in addition possesses a substantial number of unemployed. These two elements combined can be utilized to make some restitution for war damages. The treaty, therefore, provides that Japan shall enter into negotiations with those Allied Powers which it occupied and damaged in order to make available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging, and other work. Japan can, therefore, make some small measure of restitution for the damage it has done.

The committee, while fully sympathetic with the claims of such countries as Indonesia and the Philippines, believes that the reparations provisions of the treaty are eminently fair. Past experience demonstrates that these countries stand a better chance of collecting a portion of their claims than they would if the treaty imposed reparations far beyond Japan's capacity to pay. In this connection it should be noted that where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they are to be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign-exchange burden upon Japan.

Japan also agrees that its property in neutral and ex-enemy countries shall be transferred to the International Red Cross to be used for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families. The purpose of this provision is to distribute these funds on an equitable