and Representatives Overton Brooks and Dewey Short. Senator Pat McCarran and Representatives Karl Stefan and John J. Rooney served as observers.

The committee wishes to express its appreciation for the cooperative spirit in which the treaties were negotiated by the executive branch of the Government. Rarely, if ever, have committee members seen such legislative-executive teamwork as that which characterized negotiation of the treaties. The committee particularly desires to commend Ambassador Dulles for his outstanding contribution to the cause of world peace and bipartisan consultation.

Eleven months of exhaustive effort by the Allied Powers resulted in a treaty which manifested their desire for a just and lasting peace, and which manifested also a subordination of individual interests to the common good.

3. Committee action

January 12, 1951, marked the beginning of a series of meetings, nine in all, between Ambassador Dulles and members of the consultative Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee. The meetings continued at frequent intervals throughout the spring and summer, with Ambassador Dulles keeping the subcommittee currently informed of the progress of his negotiations with the Japanese and with the former Allied Powers, until the conclusion and signature of the peace treaty and related security pacts at San Francisco in September. Moreover, on several occasions, Ambassador Dulles discussed with the full committee specific problems that arose during the process of negotiations. Committee suggestions on these problems were instrumental in determining the final text of the treaties.

Upon the reconvening of the Congress after the fall adjournment, President Truman, on January 10, 1952, submitted the treaties with his recommendation that the Senate give them "early favorable consideration."

As a consequence, public hearings began on January 21,3 with statements by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Gen. Omar Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Ambassador Dulles. Ambassador Dulles returned on the following day to answer questions of committee members. Hearings continued on January 23 and 25, with private witnesses both in opposition to and support of the treaties. Among those offering testimony were representatives of various organizations as well as individuals expressing their own views. In addition, a number of statements were filed with the committee for the record.

At its executive session on February 5, the committee, by a vote of 13 to 0, agreed to report all the treaties favorably to the Senate. At that time committee members approved an interpretative statement making clear the position of the Senate with respect to the 1 Senators H. Alexander Smith, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, William F. Knowland, Walter F. George, and John J. Sparkman.

2 S. Execs. A, B, C, and D, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

3 See Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 2d Session, . . . January 21, 22, 23, and 25, 1952 (Washington, 1952).

Yalta agreement and the territorial provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty. The unanimous vote which the committee gave the four treaties reflected the close cooperation which took place between the committee and the executive branch throughout the negotiations.

4. United States aid to Japan

Beginning in 1946, the Congress each year has voted funds to combat disease and unrest in the areas occupied by the United States military forces and to help reconstruct the economies of the countries involved. Part of these funds have been allocated to Japan in the amounts given in the following table and for the broad general purposes indicated. As the table below indicates the United States has given in the neighborhood of $2 billion in total, or an average of over $300 million a year to help Japan with the deficit under which her economy has been operating.

The figures are as follows [Footnotes in original]:

U. S. GARIOA1 aid to Japan, United States fiscal years 1946 to 1951, inclusive

1 Government and relief in occupied areas.

Department of Army funds used to procure emergency food supplies for Japan; not specified as a "GARIOA" appropriation; partially estimated.

Expenditures (final).

Obligations as of Oct. 31, 1951.

'Obligations as of Dec. 31, 1951.

NOTE.-The above data do not include diverted military stocks or military surplus supplies released to the Japanese. A financial settlement has been made for certain of these materials and it is anticipated that a settlement covering the remainder will be negotiated with the Japanese. The fiscal year 1952 GARIOA appropriation did not include funds for economic aid for Japan but did include approximately $7 million for the reorientation program in Japan and the administrative costs related to the occupation of Japan.

5. Complementary agreements to be negotiated

Unlike traditional treaties of peace-which provide for the settlement of the chief areas of dispute between the contracting partiesthe Japanese Peace Treaty leaves a number of important subjects for future negotiation. The subjects are chiefly of an economic nature, and are discussed in section 11 (Economic Provisions) of this report, covering particularly commercial, maritime, fishing, civil aviation,

See the "Declaration of the United States Senate, March 20, 1952," printed at the end of the text of the treaty, supra, doc. 7.

claims, and related matters. In addition, it has been necessary for the United States and Japan to reach an administrative agreement with respect to the disposition of United States troops in Japan under the security treaty. It was agreed by the participating parties that the Japanese Treaty should be primarily an instrument for the termination of war and for the restoration of Japanese sovereignty. The committee is pleased to note that the executive branch of the Government promptly started negotiations on the important subjects referred to above. It understands that an agreement relative to fishing between Canada, the United States, and Japan has already been drafted and initialed and is ready for signature as soon as Japan regains sovereign authority to make treaties. It will also be noted in section 22 (Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan) below,3 that satisfactory progress is being made on the administrative agreement with Japan. The committee hopes the complementary pacts with Japan will be speedily concluded.

2

B. THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN

6. Nature of the treaty

Perhaps the most notable aspect of this treaty is that it is neither one of vengeance nor does it conform to the general pattern of postwar treaties normally imposed by the victorious upon the vanquished. It is a broad statesmanlike document which is remarkable for the self-restraint and good will of the victorious powers evidenced therein. The treaty takes into account the great culture and tradition of Japan. Furthermore it gives consideration to Japanese dignity and self-respect. The treaty is one in which Japan is given the opportunity to achieve peace and freedom while in turn it agrees to live in peace with others in a spirit of mutual respect.

7. Brief summary of terms of Japanese Peace Treaty

Preamble. The preamble proclaims that the signatory powers conclude the treaty as sovereign equals; it records that Japan intends to apply for membership in the United Nations, to conform to the principles of the Charter, to strive to realize the objectives of the Declaration of Human Rights made by the United Nations General Assembly, and with respect to trade and commerce, to conform to internationally accepted fair practices.

Chapter I. State of war terminated.-Article 1 formally ends the war between Japan and the Allies and recognizes full sovereignty of the Japanese people over the Japanese home islands.

Chapter II. Territorial provisions. (See sec. 9.)-Japan renounces all title to the territories the Potsdam Conference announced were to be taken from her, namely, Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, the Japanese-mandated islands, Antarctica, the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel Islands. Japan agrees to concur in any United States proposal for the placing of the follow

1 Infra, pp. 2406-2423.

2 Convention of May 9, 1952 (TIAS 2786); 4 UST 380.

3 See infra, pp. 893-896.

ing islands under United Nations trusteeship with the United States as the administering power: The Nansei Shoto, south of 29° north latitude, including the Ryukyu and Daito Islands; Nanpo Shoto, south of Sofu Gan, including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and Volcano Islands; and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Japanese property, the property and claims of its nationals in the ceded areas, and other property dispositions are to be the subject of special arrangements. Disposition of Japanese property under occupation directives is recognized as valid, and Japanese cables connecting the homeland with the ceded territory are to be divided between the Japanese and the territory in question.

Chapter III. Security. (See sec. 10.)-Japan agrees to live peaceably and in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, and to settle its disputes with other states by amicable means. In accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, this promise is not construed as depriving Japan of the right of individual and collective self-defense. Occupation forces are to be withdrawn 90 days after the treaty comes into effect, and all Japanese property supplied to the occupying powers for which compensation has not been made shall be returned to Japan within the same 90 days. However, foreign troops may be stationed in Japan under appropriate bilateral and multilateral agreements. All Japanese prisoners not yet freed are to be returned to their homes.

Chapter IV. Political and economic clauses. (See sec. 11.)-In this chapter arrangements are made for the reentry into force of certain of Japan's prewar treaties and conventions. The treaty itself is based on the principle that Japan's economy should be unrestricted. Agreements dealing with commercial, fishing on the high seas, and civil air transportation problems are to be negotiated and are not spelled out in the treaty. Pending the negotiation of these various treaties the Allies are entitled to receive most-favored-nation treatment on the basis of reciprocal privileges granted to Japan over a 4-year period.

Chapter V. Reparations, claims, and property. (See sec. 12.)-This chapter unequivocally recognizes that Japan is obligated to pay reparations for the damage and suffering it caused during the war. However, because of its limited resources, Japan is required to apply to reparations only those assets it has in surplus, namely, excess labor and unused plant facilities for the processing of raw materials. The seizure by the Allied Powers of Japanese property within their jurisdictions is validated, and Allied property confiscated in Japan is to be returned or compensation made therefor. Japanese property in neutral countries shall be turned over to the International Red Cross for the benefit of the families of former prisoners of war. Korea is recognized as independent by Japan and entitled to the Japanese property in that country. China is given the right to a treaty of peace with Japan on the same terms as the present treaty. China is also given the full benefits of the article covering reparations payments.

Chapter VI. Settlement of disputes.-Disputes over the interpretation and execution of the treaty are to be referred to the International Court of Justice.

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Chapter VII. Ratification, protocol, and final clauses. The treaty shall come into effect after Japan, and a majority of 11 specified states, including the United States, have deposited their ratifications. This procedure is outlined further below.

8. When the treaty takes effect

Article 23 provides that the treaty shall come into force when the instruments of ratification of Japan and of a majority of the following states including the United States have deposited their ratifications: Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Great Britain, and the United States. The treaty shall be in force for each subsequent ratifying state, from the date of the deposit of its ratification.

In the period before the treaty comes into force, the United States, as the principal occupying nation, will hold a special position in Japan. After ratifications are complete, however, all Allied Powers will stand on a footing of equality. The occupying forces of the Allied Powers are to be withdrawn within 90 days under the terms of article 6. That article also provides the basis for the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces on Japanese territory as the consequence of bilateral or multilateral agreements. Finally (see sec. 5), the supplementary agreements noted elsewhere in this report will each contain their own effective dates.

9. Territorial provisions

Chapter II makes provision for the territorial arrangements between Japan and the Allied Powers. Japan surrenders sovereignty over the territory which representatives of the great powers at the Potsdam Conference agreed should be taken from it. Article 8 of the proclamation defining the terms of the Japanese surrender adopted at Potsdam on July 26, 1945,' states:

The terms of the Cairo declaration 2 shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.

Article 2 of the peace treaty states, in effect, that Japan surrenders all rights, claims, and title to all those former Japanese territories which are not a part of the four main home islands, to wit, Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, Kurile Islands, that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905,3 the islands it held under the League of Nations Mandate System, any part of the Antarctic area, the Spratly Islands, and Paracel Islands. It is important to remember that article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeed Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory. During the negotiation of the treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve

1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 49–50.

2 Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943; ibid., p. 22.

3 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, pp. 824-828.