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without need of signature, the benefit of article 14 (a) 2 which validates the seizure of Japanese property subject to its jurisdiction. The treaty preserves, in full, the rights of China as one of the Allied victors in this war. Final clauses

Chapter VII contains clauses which are largely matters of protocol. Of these, article 23, dealing with ratification, gives those signatories to the treaty which have been actively concerned with the occupation a special position, for 9 months, regarding the bringing of the treaty into force. But after 9 months all of the Allied Powers stand on an equal footing as regards bringing the treaty into force as between themselves and Japan.

GOOD PEACE NOW OR BETTER PEACE NEVER Such, in broad outline, are the main aspects of the treaty that awaits our signature.

It contains, no doubt, imperfections. No one is completely satisfied. But it is a good treaty. It does not contain the seeds of another war. It is truly a treaty of peace.

. We may hear a suggestion that we should not now complete, by signature, this product of a year's negotiation, but resort to new procedures, with new parties. It may be pretended that thereby we can gain greater unity and more perfection. At first that may sound plausible and tempting. It may seem to offer the partially dissatisfied a chance for great satisfaction.

In some Allied countries there are organized groups which urge that the treaty could be changed merely to benefit them, leaving everything else intact. If all of these proposals were to be brought together, it would be apparent that the cumulative effect would be destructive of any agreed peace.

Fortunately, there are also in most of the Allied countries those who see with truer vision. They know that this treaty is good to the point where it cannot be made better without its becoming worse. Better words might theoretically be found, but to seek these is to let escape what is now within our grasp. There come times when to seek the perfect is to lose the good. This is such a time.

There is greater unity now than we are apt to find if there is renegotiation. The treaty has been painstakingly built by the delicate processes of diplomacy, helped by an unusual display of self-restraint and good will. But it is not wise to assume that those qualities will be ever present and that differences can always be composed.

There is a larger measure of satisfaction now than we can ever get again. Delay will inevitably set in motion corroding forces and contradictory efforts which will block each other and frustrate the possibilities inherent in a common effort of good will.

In terms of Japan's future, delay would cost a price which makes petty all the sacrifices incident to present action. The great goals of victory will have been made unattainable.

It was our common hope that, out of the fiery purge of war there would rise a new Japan. That was no foolish hope. Japan has a great culture and tradition which are capable of producing distinctively, but no less authentically, those virtues which all nations and peoples must possess if there is to be a world-wide commonwealth of peace.

In order, however, that that potentiality shall become actuality, Japan needs free political institutions in a climate conducive to their vigorous growth; social progress; an equal administration of justice; an awareness of human dignity; a sense of self-respect; of respect for others.

Above all, Japan needs the will to live at peace with others as good neighbors.

All of this is possible if we make peace now. It becomes impossible, or at best improbable, if Japan's long-deferred hopes are now blasted.

There are in Japan new-born institutions of freedom. But they will not flourish if military rule continues indefinitely to be supreme.

Dignity cannot be developed by those who are subject to alien control, however benign.

Self-respect is not felt by those who have no rights of their own in the world, who live on charity and who trade on sufferance.

Regard for justice rarely animates those who are subject to such grave injustice as would be the denial of present peace.

Fellowship is not the mood of peoples who are denied fellowship.

The United States which, since the surrender, has directed the occupation on behalf of all the Allies, says solemnly to each of the Allies: Unless you now give Japan peace and freedom on such honorable terms as have been negotiated, the situation will rapidly deteriorate.

The surrender terms have served their every legitimate purpose. Under them "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.” To perpetuate that subjection which has existed for 6 years, into more years, would be to pervert the occupation into an instrument of imperialism and colonialism. The United States wants none of that, and we know that most of you want none of that.

It is time to end the subjection of the Japanese Government to Allied command. It is time to end the occupation and to recognize that, henceforth, it is the Japanese people who exercise complete sovereignty in Japan. It is time to welcome Japan as an equal and honorable member of the family of nations.

That is what the pending treaty will do. No nation is bound to sign the treaty. This is no conference that wields legal compulsion. The only compulsion is the moral compulsion of grave circumstances. They unite to cry aloud: Let us make peace.

12. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS, FEBRUARY 14, 1952 (Excerpt)

MAIN PURPOSES OF THE TREATIES

The Japanese Peace Treaty has as its principal purposes the termination of the state of war in the Far East and the restoration of Japan to the status of an independent, sovereign nation. The treaty contains provisions for such matters as security and territorial arrangements, trade and commerce, reparations, and property rights.

Accompanying the peace treaty are three collateral pacts which provide collective security arrangements for the Pacific. The first mutual defense treaty is between the United States and the Philippine Republic, a second deals with security measures between the United States and Australia and New Zealand, and the third is between the United States and Japan. These three pacts constitute an integral part of the peace settlement in the Far East.

A. THE SETTING

1. Background

Since the end of fighting in World War II, international tensions have mounted, with the result that peacemaking has become extremely difficult, if not impossible. In some cases, such as the abortive discussions relating to the treaties with Germany and Austria, the Soviet Union has deliberately blocked and sabotaged every major effort to bring about a settlement. The peace treaties with the former allies of Nazi Germany—Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Hungary, and Rumania -were concluded after long and laborious negotiations. Since then the U.S. S. R. has entered upon a period of complete noncooperation. It is against this background that negotiations for a peace with Japan have been carried on.

Great changes have taken place in the Pacific area since Japan signed the instrument of surrender on the battleship Missouri. In 1945 some of the major problems of the Allied Powers with respect to Japan were to complete the surrender of Japan's armies, take over control of former Japanese overseas possessions, liberate areas overrun by the Japanese during the war, generally restore order, and encourage the development of democratic principles in Japan.

These original tasks have been largely accomplished during the last 6 years, but new issues have arisen, principally growing out of the surge of new-found nationalism in the area which has been coupled with an urge for self-expression and independence.

1S. Exec. Rept. No. 2, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 2 Infra, pp. 873–875. 3 Infra, pp. 878-880. * Infra, pp. 885–886. 5 Treaties of Feb. 10, 1947; Treaties of Peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania, and Finland (Department of State publication 2743; 1947); summaries of the treaties of peace with Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, and Rumania appear in A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 460–466, 486, 492-493, 500.

The liquidation of colonial empires in the Far East has been accompanied by the emergence of new states, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan.' Behind the scenes in these countries, and even in the areas where western control still exists, such as in the Associated States of Indochina and Malaya, Soviet imperialism cloaked in the garb of national communism has been exploiting the generally unsettled economic and social conditions which follow war and the awakening of nationalism. The result is confusion and unrest in which aggression, subversion, and sabotage thrive. The Chinese Communist regime of Peiping is the main disturbing element in this regard. A free, prosperous, and democratic Japan could exert an important stabilizing influence in the Far East

Japan occupies a strategic position in the Far East; it has a large, energetic, and skilled population; it is the only industrial nation in the Far East; and it lies athwart the American defense line in the Pacific.

The committee believes that the occupation of Japan, under United States leadership, has been successful. As a result, Japan has emerged from her defeated and war-torn status to that of a nation slowly but steadily on its way to becoming self-reliant and a force for peace. Recognizing the dangers inherent in prolonged occupation, in June 1950, General MacArthur stated thathistorically, military occupations have a maximum utility of from 3 to 5 years. Thereafter the occupation assumes the character of “colonialism,” the occupation forces assume the complexion of entrenched power, and the people under occupation become restive ...?

Under these circumstances, and in spite of the almost certain obstructionism of the Soviet Union, the United States initiated the discussions for a treaty of peace with Japan over a year ago. 2. Negotiation of the treaties 3

The United States was given the sole responsibility of appointing a supreme commander for all the Allied Powers and directing the occupation of Japan. An obligation to bring the occupation to a timely end also fell upon the United States. To this end, the United States as early as 1947 made overtures for a peace treaty to be considered in the Far Eastern Commission. Persistent opposition from the Soviet Union, partly on the grounds that only the Council of Foreign Ministers, where the Soviet Union exercises a veto, should have urisdiction over negotiations, successfully blocked all efforts to negotiate a treaty until the fall of 1950. At that time, the United States entered into conversations with former Allied Powers outside the Soviet orbit for the purpose of determining if, in fact, a treaty could be concluded. Frequent consultations took place between the interested delegations during the session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in 1950.

1 The Republic of Korea proclaimed its independence Aug. 15, 1948; the Philippine Republic achieved its independence July 4, 1946; Indonesia became a sovereign state Dec. 28, 1949; Ceylon was granted dominion status within the British Commonwealth Feb. 4, 1948; and India and Pakistan became separate dominions in the British Commonwealth Aug. 15, 1947, India becoming a sovereign republic Jan. 26, 1950. 2 Made in conversation with Ambassador Dulles; reported in full, infra, p. 888.

See supra, doc. 11 and footnotes thereto.

Representatives of the British Commonwealth worked together to determine their individual and collective position on the basic principles of the treaty, while a mission dispatched by the President of the United States visited the capital cities of the 10 countries most directly concerned for an on-the-spot exchange of views. All recognized the importance of making peace promptly, and agreement was reached on many of the principal objectives. On January 11, 1951, the President designated Mr. John Foster Dulles as his special representative, with the personal rank of Ambassador, to conduct on behalf of the United States such further discussions and negotiations as would be necessary to bring to an eventual successful conclusion a Japanese peace settlement. The United States drew up the first draft of a treaty, embodying these objectives in March 1951,' and this was circulated among members of the Far Eastern Commission and other nations that had indicated their interest, including some of Latin America. In all, there was a total of 20.

An outgrowth of the conferences among the members of the British Commonwealth was a draft treaty prepared by the United Kingdom. In June, the two drafts were combined in a text jointly agreed upon by the United States and the United Kingdom and shortly thereafter circulated among the Allied Powers including the U. S. S. R.?

The middle of August was set as the deadline for incorporating changes.

Meanwhile, an exchange of treaty drafts and memoranda between the United States and the U. S. S. R. had formed an integral part of the negotiating process and, in addition, a number of consultations were held with the Soviet official, Jacob Malik, which subsequently, however, were broken off by the Soviet Union.3

The United States delegation to the Japanese Peace Conference held in San Francisco last September included a group of Senators and Congressmen. Senators Connally and Wiley were named as delegates for each of the four treaties. Alternate delegates for the Japanese Peace Treaty were Senators John J. Sparkman, H. Alexander Smith, Walter F. George, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, and Representatives James P. Richards and Robert B. Chiperfield. Alternate delegates for the security treaties with the Philippines and with Australia and New Zealand were Senators John J. Sparkman, H. Alexander Smith, Walter F. George, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, and Representatives Abraham A. Ribicoff and Walter H. Judd. Alternate delegates for the security treaty with Japan were Senators Richard B. Russell, Styles Bridges, John J. Sparkman, and H. Alexander Smith,

· The principles of the March draft were described by Mr. Dulles in his address of Mar. 31, 1951; ibid., Apr. 9, 1951, pp. 576-580.

? For the text of the draft treaty circulated in July 1951, see ibid., July 23, 1951, pp. 132 ff.

3 For the texts of the Soviet aide-mémoire of Nov. 20, 1950, and of the U. So aide-mémoire of Dec. 27, 1950, in reply thereto, see ibid., Dec. 4, 1950, pp. 881882 and Jan. 8, 1951, pp. 65–66. Regarding the Soviet Union's disruption of talks on a Japanese peace treaty, see the address by Mr. Dulles of Mar. 14, 1951; ibid., Mar. 26, 1951, pp. 483-485.

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