In the event of no decision within a year after the treaty came into effect, the United Nations General Assembly would decide. Special rights and interests in China would be renounced.

"4. Security. The treaty would contemplate that, pending satisfactory alternative security arrangements, such as United Nations assumption of effective responsibility, there would be continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and the United States and perhaps other forces for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

"5. Political and commercial arrangements. Japan would agree to adhere to multilateral treaties dealing with narcotics and fishing. Prewar bilateral treaties could be revived by mutual agreement. Pending the conclusion of new commercial treaties, Japan would extend most-favored-nation treatment, subject to normal exceptions. "6. Claims. All parties would waive claims arising out of war acts prior to September 2, 1945, except that (a) the Allied Powers would, in general, hold Japanese property within their territory, and (b) Japan would restore allied property or, if not restorable intact, provide yen to compensate for an agreed percentage of lost value.

"7. Disputes.-Claims disputes would be settled by a special neutral tribunal to be set up by the President of the International Court of Justice. Other disputes would be referred either to diplomatic settlement, or to the International Court of Justice."

1

We found complete agreement to the urgency of prompt peace and general agreement as to the basic principles. So, in January of this year; the United States undertook to make the first draft of a text which would translate the agreed principles into treaty words. That draft was circulated last March, and was subjected to intensive study by over 20 countries. These included not only the Far Eastern Commission countries, but others which had expressed interest. The American states were kept informed, as was their due. Mexico had actively participated in the Pacific War, as had Brazil in the European War. All had made important political, economic, and moral contributions.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom produced a text of its own, drafted in the light of the Commonwealth conferences. Then in June, the United States and the United Kingdom combined their parallel efforts and jointly drafted a text to reconcile and reflect still more fully the different views that had been developed. This text was circulated to Allied Powers during the first half of July2 and was kept open for further changes until mid-August.

Throughout this period, the Soviet Union took an active, though reluctant, part. We had several conferences with Yakov Malik and our Governments have exchanged 10 memoranda and drafts.*

The principles of the March draft were stated by Mr. Dulles in his address of Mar. 31, 1951; Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 9, 1951, pp. 576-580.

For the text of the draft treaty circulated in July 1951, see ibid., July 23, 1951, pp. 132 ff.

3 Soviet Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

For the texts of the Soviet aide-mémoire of Nov. 20, 1950, and of the U.S. aide-mémoire of Dec. 27, 1950, in reply thereto, see the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1950, pp. 881-882, and Jan. 8, 1951, pp. 65–66.

Every nation which has constructively interested itself in the treaty can claim authorship of important parts of the present text. Also each of these nations can claim the equally honorable distinction of voluntarily subordinating some special interest so that a broad base of unity might be found. The Allied Powers have been conducting what, in effect, is an 11 months' peace conference participated in by so many nations as to make this treaty the most broadly based peace treaty in all history.

Any who are interested in studying the evolutionary processes which have been at work can compare our March draft with the present text. To make that comparison easy, a parallel-column document has been prepared for distribution here. It shows how our conference methods have worked.

The treaty remains, as first agreed, a nonpunitive, nondiscriminatory treaty, which will restore Japan to dignity, equality, and opportunity in the family of nations. But it has been found increasingly impossible to do justice to particular situations without violating these basic concepts.

I now turn to a consideration of the principal provisions of the text.

The preamble

THE TREATY TERMS

The preamble is an important part of the treaty. It affords the Japanese nation the opportunity to record intentions and aspirations which the whole world welcomes.

Japan declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations; to conform to the principles of the Charter; to adhere to the new ideals of human rights and freedoms which have become implanted in the Constitution and Legislation of Japan; and, in public and private trade and commerce, to conform to internationally accepted fair practices.

If Japan's intentions in these respects are sincere, which we believe, and if they are pursued with resolution, they will go far to restore good will between the Japanese and Allied people.

It may be asked why, if that is so, the treaty does not attempt to put the Japanese under legal compulsion in these respects. There are good reasons for not doing so. Japan, when it applies for membership in the United Nations, should do so because it wants to be a member, not because the Allies compelled it. Eighty million people cannot be compelled from without to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of their fellows. Fair-trade practices cannot be made a formal obligation when they have not yet been spelled out in international conventions. In general, treaty obligations should only be such as can be precisely formulated, so that the parties will clearly know just what are their rights and what are their duties. Where applicable conventions exist, Japan will voluntarily adhere to them, as set out in the declaration appended to the treaty.

1 San Francisco Conference doc. 17, "Comparative Study of the March 1951 Draft and the August 13, 1951, Text of the Japanese Peace Treaty", Sept. 6, 1951. (See footnote 1, page 76, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan :)

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Sovereignty restored

Chapter I ends the state of war, with consequent recognition of the full sovereignty of the Japanese people. Let us note that the sovereignty recognized is the "sovereignty of the Japanese people." Territory

What is the territory of Japanese sovereignty? Chapter II deals with that. Japan formally ratifies the territorial provisions of the Potsdam surrender terms, provisions which, so far as Japan is concerned, were actually carried into effect 6 years ago.

The Potsdam surrender terms' constitute the only definition of peace terms to which, and by which, Japan and the Allied Powers as a whole are bound. There have been some private understandings between some Allied Governments; but by these Japan was not bound, nor were other Allies bound. Therefore, the treaty embodies article 8 of the surrender terms which provided that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and some minor islands. The renunciations contained in article 2 of chapter II strictly and scrupulously conform to that surrender term.

Some question has been raised as to whether the geographical name "Kurile Islands" mentioned in article 2 (c) includes the Habomai Islands. It is the view of the United States that it does not. If, however, there were a dispute about this, it could be referred to the International Court of Justice under article 22.

Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam surrender terms or deny peace to Japan while the Allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty.

Article 3 deals with the Ryukyus and other islands to the south and southeast of Japan. These, since the surrender, have been under the sole administration of the United States.

Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of United States sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should be restored completely to Japan.

In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual Sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority.

You will recall that the Charter of the United Nations contem

Allied declaration of July 26, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 49-50.

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plates extension of the trusteeship system to "territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War" (art. 77). The future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future civil status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan while affording the administering authority the possibility of carrying out article 84 of the Charter, which provides that

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security.

A peace which limits Japanese territory according to the Potsdam surrender terms, naturally leads one to ask, Can a growing population, now numbering over 80,000,000, survive on the Japanese home islands? A clue to the correct answer is the fact that, when Japan had a vast colonial empire into which the Japanese people could freely emigrate, few did so. Formosa, a rich, uncrowded land with temperate climate, attracted, in 55 years, a total Japanese population of about 350,000. Korea, under Japanese control since 1905, attracted a total Japanese population of about 650,000. In South Sakhalin there were 350,000 Japanese and in the Kurile Islands about 11,000. Japan's colonies helped assure Japan access to food and raw materials, but they were no population outlet. Japanese, like other people, prefer to live at home. So far as emigration is concerned, the territorial clauses of the treaty do not establish restraints greater than those which 98 percent of the Japanese people voluntarily put upon themselves.

Of course growing populations create problems in Japan and elsewhere. The Japanese will need to develop the capacity to perform services which others want, so that in exchange they can buy the food and raw materials they need. This calls for willingness on the part of the Japanese people to work hard, to work efficiently, and to work with creative imagination so that they can anticipate the economic wants of others. Each of the Allied Powers also has a responsibility. The surrender terms promised the Japanese "access to raw materials" and "participation in world trade relations." Peoples who are ready and willing to work and to create what others want, should have the means to do so. Under such conditions the present territorial status of Japan is no cause for alarm.

Security

Chapter III deals with security, a problem which has not been, and never is, automatically solved by victory. By article 5, Japan undertakes to live peacefully, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. We hope that Japan will promptly become a member of the United Nations. If this were certain, article 5 would be unnecessary. But, in the past, veto power has been used to block the admission of nations qualified for membership. So it is prudent to write into the treaty that, as provided by article 2 (6) of the Charter Japan will settle its international disputes by peaceful means; will refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force; and will give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.

These provisions completely meet the desire which some nations

have expressed that the treaty should bind Japan to peaceful processes and explicitly prohibit Japan from acting forcibly, alone or in coalition, against any other nation. There can be nothing more sweeping than the renunciation of offensive force expressed in article 5 (a) (ii) of the treaty.

In order, however, that this treaty, like the United Nations Charter, should make it perfectly clear that the prohibition against the use of force does not deprive Japan of the right of self-defense, subdivision (c) of article 5 contains a recognition that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses what article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations refers to as "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense." Article 6 of the treaty calls for ending the occupation not later than 90 days after the treaty comes into force. However, Japan, as contemplated by article 51 of the United Nations Charter, may enter into collective security arrangements, and these might, in part, be implemented by Allied elements which were in Japan when the treaty came into force. Accordingly, it seemed useful to make it clear that, under such circumstances, these elements would not have to be physically removed from Japan before they could serve as collective security forces. This would be a burdensome requirement, and a risky one for it would for a time leave Japan wholly defenseless, in close proximity to proved aggressors possessed of great military strength. To avoid that danger, article 6 provides that occupation elements now in Japanese territory may stay on for Japan's defense, if this is wanted by Japan.

These remaining military elements would, of course, have characteristics and powers very different from what they had as occupation forces. They would have only such status in Japan as Japan would voluntarily have given them.

The security provisions which we have reviewed are necessary if the treaty of peace is honestly to restore sovereignty to Japan. It has been suggested that the treaty ought to deny to Japan "the inherent right of collective self-defense" and permit only a token right of "individual self-defense."

That kind of a peace, in this present kind of a world, would be a fraud. To give a sovereignty which cannot be defended, is to give an empty husk. Indefensible sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. An undefended and indefensible Japan would be so subject to the menace of surrounding power that Japan would not in fact be able to lead an independent existence.

It has been suggested that a collective security arrangement with the United States, such as Japan is considering, would not be a free act or what the Japanese people really want.

That is not a suggestion which will command credence here. Nearly two-thirds of the delegations here are from countries which either have, or are about to have, voluntary association in collective security arrangements which include the United States. These delegations will assume, and rightly assume, that the Japanese people are like their own people, and like most free peoples, in wanting the collective security which may deter aggression.