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dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger.
Last Saturday, a similar security treaty was signed by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.1
These treaties are initial steps toward the consolidation of peace in the Pacific. It is vital that Japan be included, as soon as possible, in appropriate security arrangements for keeping peace in the Pacific. This is necessary for her own protection and the protection of other countries. The peace treaty, therefore, recognizes that Japan, as a sovereign nation, must possess the right of self-defense and the right to join in defense arrangements with other countries under the United Nations Charter.
The development of regional arrangements for defense in the Pacific will mean that such Japanese defense forces as may be created would be associated with the defense forces of other nations in the area. Japan's security would not depend exclusively on Japanese forces but on interrelated security arrangements with other countries. The Japanese contribution, by itself, would not constitute an offensive threat. But Japanese forces, together with forces of other nations, would provide mutual security against threats to the independence of the nations of the Pacific, including Japan.
At present, of course, Japan is totally unarmed. In view of the open aggression taking place near Japan, the Japanese Government has requested the United States to enter into a bilateral treaty for Japan's immediate security. Under such a treaty, the United States would maintain armed forces in Japan for the time being as a contribution to international peace and to Japan's defense against attack. Security arrangments are essential in a world in danger. In the Pacific as in other parts of the world, social and economic progress is impossible unless there is a shield which protects men from the paralysis of fear.
But our great goal, our major purpose, is not just to build bigger and stronger shields. What we want to do is to advance, as rapidly as we can, the great constructive tasks of human progress. We in the United States respect and support the many new free and independent nations in the Pacific area and Asia. We want to see them grow and prosper, as equal partners in the community of independent nations of both East and West. We want to cooperate with them, to help them in their agricultural and industrial development. We wish to see these nations attain in dignity and freedom a better life for their peoples-for that is the road to world peace.
EQUALITY FOR JAPAN IN PARTNERSHIP OF PEACE
These countries have a rich historical and cultural heritage. Today, their people are experiencing great economic and social changes. They are stirred by a new zeal for progress and independence. Already, we
1 Treaty of Sept. 1, 1951; infra, pp. 878-880.
2 Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951; infra, pp. 885-886.
have seen some of the progress that can be made-progress in stamping out malaria, in building schools and training teachers, in growing more food, and creating new industries. Immense opportunities lie ahead if these countries can pursue their national destinies in a partnership of peace, free from the fear of aggression. Under this peace treaty, we believe Japan can and will join in this partnership of peace.
We look forward to the contribution which the new Japan, with its rich culture and its dedication to peace, can bring to the community of nations. We expect this contribution to grow over the years, for the signing of a peace treaty is but one part of the process of making peace. When aggression and war have severed relations between nations, many ties which bind one nation to the others are cut. Making peace is like repairing the many strands of an intercontinental cable; each strand must be spliced separately and patiently, until the full flow of communication has been restored. There is no other way to bring lasting peace than this slow and patient process, step by step, of mending and strengthening the cables of communication, of understanding between nations.
In this San Francisco Conference, we have the opportunity to take one vital step toward lasting peace. Our specific task here is to conclude the treaty of peace with Japan. That will be a great step toward general peace in the Pacific. There are other steps which need to be taken. The most important of these is the restoration of peace and security in Korea. With Japan returned to its place in the family of nations, and with the people of Korea secure, free, and united, it should be possible to find ways to settle other problems in the Pacific which now threaten the peace.
The United States has made clear on many occasions its desire to explore with other governments at the proper time and in the proper forum how this might be accomplished. There are many well established ways in which next steps can be explored, if there is a genuine desire for peace in all quarters. But these are not matters which can be dealt with in our present conference. We have come here to take a single step-but a step of the utmost importance.
The treaty now before us offers more than talk of peace; it offers action for peace. This conference will show, therefore, who seeks to make peace, and who seeks to prevent it; who wishes to put an end to war, and who wishes to continue it.
We believe this treaty will have the support of all those nations that honestly desire to reduce the tensions which now grip the world. I pray that we shall all be united in taking this step to advance us toward greater harmony and understanding.
As we approach the peace table, let us be free of malice and bate, to the end that from here on there shall be neither victors nor vanquished among us, but only equals in the partnership of peace.
11. STATEMENT BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT' AT SAN FRANCISCO, SEPTEMBER 5, 19512
THE PURPOSE IS PEACE
We have met here for a consecrated purpose. We shall here make peace. "Blessed are the peacemakers." But the most blessed of this peace are not those of us who assemble here. The foundation for this peace was laid by the many who gave up their lives in faith that the very magnitude of their sacrifice would compel those who survived to find and take the way of peace.
We are here to redeem, in some small measure, the vast debt we owe. That task is not a simple one. Victory usually gives power greater than should be possessed by those who are moved by the passions that war engenders. That is a principal reason why war has become a self-perpetuating institution.
The treaty before us is a step toward breaking the vicious cycle of war-victory-peace-war. The nations will here make a peace of justice, not a peace of vengeance.
THE OCCUPATION PREPARED THE WAY
True peace is possible because of what has been accomplished by 6 years of Allied occupation. That occupation was calm and purposeful. Japan's war-making power was destroyed. The authority and influence of those who committed Japan to armed conquest was eliminated. Stern justice was meted out to the war criminals, while mercy was shown the innocent. There has come freedom of speech, of religion, of thought; and respect for fundamental human rights. There has been established, by the will of the people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government, which we are happy to welcome here.
The Allied occupation goals set forth in the Potsdam surrender terms have been met, with the loyal cooperation of the Japanese people. It is now time to end that occupation, and make a peace which will restore Japan as a sovereign equal.
It is possible now to make that kind of a peace, to make this a peace of reconciliation, because the Japan of today is transformed from the Japan of yesterday.
The past is not forgotten or excused. Bitterness and distrust remain the sentiment of many. That is human. Those who have suffered less have no warrant to set themselves up as moral judges of those who have suffered more. But the time and the good use to which it has been put in Japan have somewhat healed the scars of war. New hopes have gradually displaced old fears. Now, by an effort of self-control which is perhaps unprecedented in history, the Allies present to Japan a treaty which shows no trace of angry passion.
1 John Foster Dulles.
2 S. Execs. A, B, C, and D, 82d Cong., 2d sess., Annex I.
3 Matthew 5: 9.
Allied declaration of July 26, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 49-50.
That is not merely an act of generosity toward a vanquished foe, it is an act of enlightened self-interest. For a treaty warped by passion often becomes a boomerang which, thrown against an enemy, returns to strike its authors.
For this treaty we are deeply indebted to the man who led the Allied Powers to victory in the Pacific. After that victory he devoted 51⁄2 years to service in Japan as supreme commander for the Allied Powers. As such he showed not only magnanimity, but strength without which magnanimity is counted weakness. He provided the occupation with moral leadership which has been the impulsion for the kind of peace we make. The present generation and generations to come owe much to General MacArthur.
ELEVEN MONTHS OF CONFERENCE
In framing the peace, the United States has taken an initiative. That was plainly our duty.
Some now find it expedient to disparage the role played by the United States in the Pacific War. None did so in the hour of victory. Then, by a unanimous Allied act, the United States was given the exclusive power to name the supreme commander for all the Allied Powers and to direct the occupation which would prepare Japan for the peace to come.' That Allied act put us in a position uniquely to judge when the Japanese were prepared for peace. It surely entitled us, indeed it obligated us, to take timely steps to bring our occupation responsibilities to their normal predestined end.
We first moved in this matter 4 years ago. In 1947 the United States proposed a preliminary conference of the governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission to consider plans for a Japanese Peace Treaty.3 That proposal was blocked by the insistence of the Soviet Union that the treaty could only be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers where the Soviet Union would have veto power. The Soviet Union continued stubbornly to adhere to that position.
Last year the United States decided to abandon the conference method, which afforded excessive possibilities of obstruction, and to seek peace through diplomatic processes which no single nation could thwart. That has been done with the hearty cooperation of most of the Allies and has resulted in a finished text.
The negotiations began about a year ago when the Allies principally concerned were gathering to attend the United Nations General As
1 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 60-63.
At the time of the first American proposals, the Far Eastern Commission included the following countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, the Philippines, India, Australia, New Zealand, France, the Netherlands, and Canada. After the establishment of Pakistan (Aug. 15, 1947) that country was also admitted to membership.
See the statement of July 16, 1947, by the Department of State; Department of State Bulletin, July 27, 1947, p. 182.
* See the American aide-mémoire of Aug. 12, 1957, to the Soviet Union; ibid., Aug. 24, 1947, pp. 395–396.
5 See President Truman's statement of Sept. 14, 1950; ibid., Sept. 25, 1950, p. 513.
sembly in New York. The various delegations principally concerned had frequent consultations at that time. Then came conferences at many capitals and many written exchanges of views. A United States Presidential mission' toured the globe, visiting 10 capitals of countries especially concerned. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom was exploring the problem within the Commonwealth, and its representative will tell you more of that."
The first round of discussions dealt with the question of whether it was time for peace and, if so, what basic principles should be applied. In this connection the United States outlined seven principles 3 which it felt ought to govern the framing of the treaty.
"PRINCIPLES FOR JAPANESE PEACE TREATY
"There is given below a brief general statement of the type of treaty envisioned by the United States Government as proper to end the state of war with Japan. It is stressed that this statement is only suggestive and tentative and does not commit the United States Government to the detailed content or wording of any future draft. It is expected that after there has been an opportunity to study this outline there will be a series of informal discussions designed to elaborate on it and make clear any points which may be obscure at first glance.
"The United States proposes a treaty with Japan which would end the state of war, restore Japanese sovereignty, and bring back Japan as an equal in the society of free peoples. As regards specific matters, the treaty would reflect the principles indicated below:
"1. Parties. Any or all nations at war with Japan which are willing to make peace on the basis proposed and as may be agreed.
"2. United Nations.-Membership by Japan would be contemplated.
"3. Territory.-Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea; (b) agree to United Nations trusteeship, with the United States as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands; and (c) accept the future decision of the United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, and the United States with reference to the status of Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin, and the Kuriles.
This mission was headed by Mr. Dulles, who had been appointed Consultant to the Secretary of State, effective Apr. 19, 1950 (ibid., June 26, 1950, p. 1062), and had subsequently been assigned "responsibilities in the Department concerning a Japanese peace settlement" as announced by the Department of State June 7, 1950 (ibid., June 19, 1950, p. 998). The scope of the mission was announced by the President in a statement released to the press, Sept. 14, 1950 (ibid., Sept. 25, 1950, p. 513), and its completion was announced by the White House in the statement, released Jan. 11, 1951, designating Mr. Dulles Special Representative of the President (ibid., Jan. 29, 1951, p. 185).
2 See the address by Kenneth C. Younger, British delegate at the San Francisco conference, delivered at the Second Plenary Session, Sept. 5, 1951; Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan Record of Proceedings (Department of State publication 4392; 1951), pp. 88-97.
3 S. Execs. A, B, C, and D, 82d Cong., 2d sess., Annex II, pp. 21-22; this U.S. Memorandum to the Governments on the Far Eastern Commission was first made public Nov. 24, 1950 (Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1950, p. 881).