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combating this hate campaign energetically with the facts of the situation.

The Soviet so-called "peace campaign" might be more persuasive, too, if our memories were so short that we forgot the Stockholm "peace appeal” of 1950-a peace appeal which was immediately followed by the Communist attack on Korea.

Peaceful trade has been another subject of the current campaign. Ostensibly called to examine world trade policies, a recent Moscow economic conference was used to unfold grandiose proposals for expanded trade.

The offers made by the President of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce linked machinery and herring, ships and lemons, ball bearings and textiles-à cunning mixture of consumer goods with items of strategic importance. By appearing to offer new markets, the Soviets seek to sow dissension and to secure strategic materials to build their war-making potential. The facts are, of course, that the consumer goods are available to them at any time they choose to purchase them and through normal channels.

Other pertinent facts, not advertised in Moscow, reveal current Soviet steps to halt trade between East Germany and Greece and the well-known, long-standing Soviet effort to starve Yugoslavia into submission by halting trade between that country and its neighbors.

The security controls, which we and other free governments have imposed over trade with the Soviet bloc, will continue to be necessary as long as the broad course of Soviet policy is directed toward the maintenance of a huge military machine.

In this connection, it is pertinent for us to note that the United States will increase immeasurably the attractiveness of this type of Soviet propaganda if we permit restrictionism here to shut out foreign goods. These restrictive practices will, of course, increase rather than lighten the burden on the American taxpayer.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has sent two notes to the British, the French, and ourselves concerning Germany.

In its first note, on March 10, the Soviet Government urged that the four occupying powers should discuss the German peace treaty. The treaty they had in mind would permit the creation of a German national army and prohibit Germany from associating in Western European defense. The treaty they propose would also freeze the frontiers along the provisional lines discussed at Potsdam.

The three Governments replied to this note on March 25,3 after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This reply pointed out that a peace treaty could only be discussed with an all-German Government and that the existence of an all-German Government depended on the holding of free elections in the whole of Germany. They called attention to the fact that at Potsdam it was decided that frontiers should be fixed in the peace treaty.

1 See the resolution adopted Mar. 19, 1950, by the Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress meeting in Stockholm; Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950 (London, 1953), p. 139. 2 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531. 3 Infra, pp. 1797–1798.

The three Governments, again on the basis of consultation with the Federal Republic, also made it clear that they were engaged in a great forward step toward building up the unity of Western Europe through a common defense policy and that they intended to continue to follow that policy.

In its second note, the Soviet Union repeated the negative positions it had previously taken and made no affirmative proposals regarding German unity or free elections. Instead, it continued to emphasize proposals of what ought to go into a German peace treaty, disregarding the necessity of having an all-German Government in order to have a peace treaty.

When it came to the question of free elections, the only proposal from the Soviet Union was that there be more discussion.

We and our allies have had considerable experience with the Soviet Union in discussing things, when there is no agreement on principles. We have found that discussion, under these circumstances, is a delaying action and a frustrating experience.

We cannot forget that these matters have been discussed repeatedly at great length with the Soviet Union. This was done in 1947 at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow ? and again in London;' in 1949, for weeks at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris;* and again for months at the Palais Rose in 1951.5

The main things that emerged from the Soviet discussion of elections and the creation of a government which would have jurisdiction over the whole of Germany are these:

First, the Soviet Union never has been willing to relax in any respect whatever its control over Eastern Germany. The Soviet Union would never even discuss Soviet ownership over a vast amount of East German industry.

Second, the Soviet Government was bending every effort to infiltrate into Western Germany.

And third, they insisted that every major exercise of power by an all-German Government should be subject to a Soviet veto.

These attitudes have never changed. An analysis of the first Soviet communication shows plainly that 1 Dated Apr. 9, 1952; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 26, 1952, pp. 819-820.

* For the texts of statements made by the Secretary of State at the Moscow Conference, held Mar. 10-Apr. 24, 1947, and his radio report to the Nation on the results of the conference, Apr. 28, 1947, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 541-551 and 97-106.

3 For the text of statements made by the Secretary of State at the London Conference, held Nov. 25-Dec. 16, 1947, and his radio report to the Nation on the results of the conference, Dec. 19, 1947, see ibid., pp. 568–573 and 106-110.

. For the text of the communiqué of June 21, 1949, of the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held May 23-June 20, 1949, see ibid., pp. 110-112.

Exploratory talks held by the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, Mar. 5-June 21, 1951. For the texts of the three Western Powers' notes of May 31 and June 15 on the progress of the talks and the three Western Deputy Foreign Ministers' declaration of June 21, 1951, see infra, pp. 1789-1793.

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the Soviet Government is making no commitment of any sort as to what kind of elections they are prepared to permit. There is no reason to believe that they wish to have a Germany any less under their control, and they do not make their position on this point any clearer.

Also, the Soviet Government continues to insist that a German Government shall be precluded at all times from associating itself with the great project of the unification of Western Europe.

The Soviet Union would like the Germans to think that there is a contradiction between unification of Western Europe and unification of Germany. There is not. Germany can be united and free as a full member of the free community of Europe. But a united Germany cut off from defense with and by the West could not be a free Germany. The German people have only to look across the curtain at their brothers in East Germany to see what the Soviet Union means by freedom.

We and our allies and the German people cannot forget the 7 years of fruitless negotiations with the Soviet Union to try to reach agreement on an honest basis for German Union. We cannot forget the Soviet walk-out from the Allied Control Council in Berlin, or the ruthless Soviet attempt to starve out the two million people of Berlin, or the Soviet termination of the quadripartite administration of the city of Berlin.

Across the border from Germany are the Austrians who were promised their independence in 1943.2 After 258 meetings between our deputies and the Soviet deputy, we and the Austrian people are still waiting for the Soviet Union to fulfill this promise.3

The Western Powers and the West Germans have made many proposals for free elections in Germany. The latest effort is being made through the United Nations, which set up a commission to investigate the possibilities of free elections throughout Germany.4 That commission was granted free access to all Western Germany, but it still waits in vain for permission to enter Eastern Germany.

In the light of all this we are entitled to ask for some tangible evidence that there has been a shift in the Soviet position.

Our keen awareness of the past will not prevent us from giving serious attention to these or any other Soviet proposals. Together with the British, the French, and the Germans, we are studying the latest Soviet note. Of course, I cannot attempt here to forecast the course of these considerations.

We are willing and eager to resolve any or all major frictions in the world by peaceful negotiation, when and if there appears to be any

1 For the story of the Berlin crisis of 1948–1949, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 934-939; also, The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions, 1948 (Department of State publication 3298; 1948) and Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents (Department of State publication 3556; 1950), pp. 202–274.

2 By the Three-Power Declaration on Austria, made at Moscow, Nov. 1, 1943; for text, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.

3 See infra, pp. 1822-1832. 4 See infra, pp. 1795–1809.

honest and reasonable basis for negotiations. We have given an earnest of this in our proposals for disarmament.

But we and our allies have made it clear that we cannot take a step backwards; we cannot jeopardize the emergence in Europe of the new era of cooperation which is replacing the rivalry and distrust of the past. And so we continue to give our full support to plans designed to secure the participation of Germany in a purely defensive European Community. For here is the true path of peace.

If any believe that the Western attitudes lack in initiative and are purely responses to Soviet stimulus, they must find here the refutation. Here they must see proof that we have been moving in the right direction. Here they must see on the Soviet side responses to the initiatives of the free nations in building soundly and strongly.

As we survey the world around us, we still must take cognizance of the basic facts in the present situation. We are still confronted with massive armed forces, backed by a huge military budget and powerful reserves. The military resources of the satellite nations are still being mobilized. The peoples of these countries are being kept in increasing isolation from the outside world and in calculated ignorance of the truth. The Communist international movement is still fostering insurrection and subversion wherever it can. And venomous hate continues to pour out of the vast Soviet propaganda machine.

There is only one way to hasten the day when we may hope for peaceful actions, not words, from the Soviet rules—and that is to push resolutely forward on our present course.

I repeat with undiminished belief what I said to you in 1947: This may be a long campaign. It will take nerve and steadfastness. We must be firm, and we must never close the door to agreement or discussion.

Above all, we must hold fast to our faith in freedom which shall some day prevail in all the world.

11. CONTINUITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CONDUCT

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Statement Issued on Conclusion of Talks Between the President and the President-Elect, November 18, 1952 ?

We have discussed some of the most important problems affecting our country in the sphere of international relations. Information with respect to these problems has been made available to General Eisenhower.

Under our Constitution the President must exercise his functions

1 See infra, pp. 2750–2760.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 850. President Truman and General Eisenhower met at the White House. After conferring by themselves, they met with Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Lovett, Secretary of the Treasury Snyder, and Mutual Security Director Harriman, and General Eisenhower's associates, Senator Lodge and Mr. Joseph E. Dodge.

until he leaves office, and his successor cannot be asked to share or assume the responsibilities of the Presidency until he takes office.

We have worked out a framework for liaison and exchange of information between the present Administration and the incoming Administration, but we have made no arrangements which are inconsistent with the full spirit of our Constitution. General Eisenhower has not been asked to assume any of the responsibilities of the Presidency until he takes the oath of office.

We believe, however, that the arrangements we have made for cooperation will be of great value to the stability of our country and to the favorable progress of international affairs.

We are confident that this meeting and that the arrangements we have made today for liaison and cooperation between the present Administration and the new Administration furnish additional proof of the ability of the people of this country to manage their affairs with a sense of continuity and with responsibility.

12. THE STATE OF THE UNION: Message by the President to the

Congress, January 7, 1953 (Excerpts)

I have the honor to report to the Congress on the state of the Union.

This is the eighth such report that, as President, I have been privileged to present to you and to the country. On previous occasions it has been my custom to set forth proposals for legislative action in the coming year. But that is not my purpose today. The presentation of a legislative program falls properly to my successor, not to me, and I would not infringe upon his responsibility to chart the forward course. Instead, I wish to speak of the course we have been following the past 8 years and the position at which we have arrived.

In just 2 weeks General Eisenhower will be inaugurated as President of the United States and I will resume, most gladly, my place as a private citizen of this Republic. The Presidency last changed bands 8 years ago this coming April. That was a tragic time: à time of grieving for President Roosevelt-the great and gallant human being who had been taken from us; a time of unrelieved anxiety to his successor, thrust so suddenly into the complexities and burdens of the Presidential office.

Not so this time. This time we see the normal transition under our democratic system. One President, at the conclusion of his term, steps back to private life; his successor, chosen by the people, begins his tenure of the office. And the Presidency of the United States continues to function without a moment's break.

Since the election I have done my best to assure that the transfer from one administration to another shall be smooth and orderly. From General Eisenhower and his associates I have had friendly and understanding collaboration in this endeavor. I have not sought to

1 H. Doc. No. 1, 83d Cong., 1st sess.; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 19, 1953, pp. 87–96.

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