not readily lend themselves to the creation of a treaty force, in being and in place. Primary reliance is placed on the agreement of the eight signatories to treat any armed aggression in the treaty area as a common danger to each party, calling for action on its part. That pledge will, we believe, work powerfully to deter aggression. In the China area the situation is somewhat less ominous than it was. We hope that the Chinese People's Republic will respond to the manifest will of the world community that armed force should not be used to achieve national objectives. The record of this Communist regime has been an evil one. It fought the United Nations in Korea, for which it stands here branded as an aggressor. It took over Tibet by armed force. It became allied with the Communist Viet Minh in their effort to take over Indochina by armed force.3 Then, following the Indochina armistice, it turned its military attention to the Taiwan (Formosa) area. intended to take this area by force and began active military assaults on its approaches, which assaults, it claimed, were a first step in its new program of military conquest. It This constituted a major challenge to principles to which the United States is committed by our charter. It was also a direct and special challenge to the United States itself. We have a distinctive relationship to these islands, a relationship which is reinforced by a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China covering Taiwan and Penghu [the Pescadores]." At this point, on January 24, 1955, President Eisenhower asked the Congress of the United States for authority to use the armed forces of the United States in the defense of Taiwan and Penghu and related areas which the President might judge as appropriate to that defense.? After full hearings in the House and the Senate of the United States, the requested authority was granted. In the House the vote was 409 to 3, and in the Senate the vote was 85 to 3. The authority terminates whenever peace and security of the area are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise.8 I am convinced that this timely warning, given with solid, virtually unanimous, national concurrence, served to prevent what could have been a dangerous miscalculation on the part of the Chinese Communists. Thereafter the Bandung conference was held. There again the peace-loving nations-many of them members of the United Nations 1 See infra, pp. 2608-2609. 2 See United Nations Bulletin, Dec. 15, 1950, pp. 675–676. 3 See infra, pp. 2363-2372, and Report of Senator Mike Mansfield on a Study Mission to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations print, 83d Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 1-15. Infra, pp. 750-785. 5 See infra, pp. 2481-2510. Infra, pp. 945-949. 7 Infra, pp. 2483-2486. 8 See the Congressional Joint Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955; infra, pp. 2486-2487. The Afro-Asian conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, Apr. 18-24, 1955; for the final communiqué of the conference, see infra, pp. 2344-2352. made clear to the Chinese Communists their adherence to our charter principle that states should refrain in their international relations from the threat of force. From the site of the Bandung conference, Mr. Chou En-lai proposed direct discussions with the United States, a proposal which I promptly indicated was acceptable to the United States so long as we dealt only with matters of concern to the two of us, not involving the rights of third parties. That reservation applies particularly, so far as the United States is concerned, to the Republic of China, to which we are loyal as to a long-time friend and ally. Shortly thereafter the Chinese Communists released 4 and, later, the other 11 of the United States fliers of the United Nations Command whom it had been holding in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. This release had been sought by resolution of this General Assembly adopted last December. The outcome justified the confidence which the United States had placed in the United Nations and our restraint in the use or threat of our own national power. Some 15 months ago the United States had started talks with the Chinese People's Republic at Geneva with regard to getting our civilians home. As a result of the Bandung statement made by Mr. Chou En-lai and my reply, these talks were resumed last August, to deal first with the topic of freeing civilians for return and then with other practical matters of direct concern to the two of us." All Chinese in the United States who desire to return to their homeland are free to do so. They have always been free to do so except for a few who were temporarily prevented by restrictions arising out of the Korean war. The Chinese People's Republic has now declared that all Americans on the China mainland have the right to return and will be enabled expeditiously to exercise that right." For the favorable trend of events to which I refer, thanks are due to many. Our Secretary-General worked assiduously to bring about the release of United States fliers of the United Nations Command.7 Other governments and individuals were helpful in this and other matters. The will of the world community may have operated to avert another war, the scope of which could not surely be limited. Last year I spoke of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We had gone through a period of disappointing negotiations to secure the participation of the Soviet Union in the program presented to you by President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953.9 In the face of a negative Soviet attitude, we had resolved nevertheless to go ahead. 1 See infra, pp. 2496-2503. The 4 fliers were released May 31, 1955, and the remaining 11, Aug. 1, 1955; see infra, pp. 2713-2714. Infra, pp. 2711-2712. See infra, pp. 2512-2513. See infra, pp. 2516-2517. 7 See report by the Secretary-General, Sept. 9, 1955; infra, pp. 2713-2714. See Secretary Dulles' address of Sept. 23, 1954, before the opening meeting of the Ninth General Assembly; supra, pp. 92-100. 'Infra, pp. 2798-2805. Last September I mentioned four activities which we promised to commence immediately. Since that time, we have made good progress in each of these fields. The negotiations for establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency have led to the preparation of a draft statute establishing such an agency.1 An International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held with outstanding success last month at Geneva.2 This conference was so successful that the United States will again propose a similar conference to be held in 3 years or earlier if the increasing development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy will so warrant. The first reactor training course at our Argonne National Laboratory is nearing completion, and an enlarged course is about to begin. Distinguished doctors and surgeons from other countries are visiting our hospitals and research establishments where atomic energy is used for the cure of cancer and other diseases. The Soviet Union is now taking a more cooperative attitude, and we gladly note the recent offer of Premier Bulganin to set aside fissionable material for the work of the proposed International Agency when it comes into existence.3 Much has happened, we see, to give reality to the vista of hope which President Eisenhower portrayed when he spoke to our Eighth Session. The United States also plans at this session to propose the establishment of an international technical body on the effects of atomic radiation upon human health. It would be composed of qualified scientists who would collate and give wide distribution to radiological information furnished by states members of the United Nations, or specialized agencies. The United States is itself giving much study to this matter. We believe that properly safeguarded nuclear testing and the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy do not threaten human health or life. But this is a subject of such transcendent concern that we believe that all available data should be sought out and pooled under United Nations auspices. On July 21st of this year, at Geneva, the President of the United States took still another major initiative. Dealing with disarmament, and addressing himself for the moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, he proposed that, as a beginning, each of our two nations should provide the other with information as to its military establishments and with facilities for unrestricted aerial reconnaissance of the other. 1 See the Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 24, 1955, pp. 666–672. 2 For a summary of the results of this conference, held at Geneva, Aug. 8-20, 1955, see infra, pp. 2826–2832; also the U. N. Secretary-General's report, Sept. 14, 1955 U.N. doc. A/2967). See Marshal Bulganin's statement of July 18, 1955; The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), p. 37. 4 See infra, pp. 2841-2843. The logic of this proposal is simple and clear. Major aggression is unlikely unless the aggressor can have the advantage of surprise and can hope to strike a blow which will be devastating because unexpected. But the preparation of an attack of such magnitude could hardly be concealed from aerial inspection. Aerial inspection would not, of course, detect everything. We do not think of it as itself a final comprehensive system of inspection. But aerial inspection would detect enough to exclude the greatest risk. Because it would do that, it would open the way to further steps toward inspection and disarmament which we all, and I emphatically include the United States, want to see taken. Long experience makes it apparent that, when there is a sense of insecurity, when there is an ominous unknown, then arms seem needed and limitation of armament becomes virtually unattainable. Reductions of armament occur when fear is dissipated, when knowledge replaces exaggerated speculation, and when in consequence arms seem less needed. It was, I believe, immediately sensed by all that, if the United States were to permit Soviet overflights of its territory and if the Soviet Union were to permit the United States overflights of its territory, that would go far to show that neither had aggressive intentions against the other. Then, as President Eisenhower pointed out in his plea at Geneva, it would be easier to move on to a comprehensive, scientific system of inspection and disarmament. The essence of the President's proposal was that it would, as a beginning, do what is required of a beginning; namely, make it more possible to take subsequent steps. I hope that the sentiment of this General Assembly will make clear that this beginning should be made as simply as may be and as quickly as may be. From such a beginning can come, and I believe will come, solid advance toward our charter goal of reducing the "diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources." Then we can realistically look forward to fulfilling the desire close to the hearts of all our people-a desire voiced by President Eisenhower at our recent meeting in San Francisco-that more of this earth's resources should be used for truly constructive purposes, which would particularly benefit the underdeveloped areas of the world. It was 10 years ago last month that the fighting stopped in World War II. We have lived through the subsequent decade without another world war. That is something for which to be profoundly thankful. But true peace has not been enjoyed. There have been limited wars; free nations have been subverted and taken over; there has been the piling up of armament, and the rigidities of position which are imposed upon those who regard each other as potential fighting enemies. That phase may now be ending. I believe that all four of the Heads of Government, who were at Geneva, wanted that result and that each contributed to it. In consequence, a new spirit does indeed prevail, with greater flexibility and less brittleness in international relations. Some find it interesting to speculate as to which nations gained and 1 See supra, pp. 360-364. which lost from this development. I would say that if the "spirit of Geneva" is to be permanent, then all the world must be the gainer. The "summit" meeting, if it is to be bistoric rather than episodic, must usher in an era of peaceful change. It will not be an era of placidity and stagnancy, in the sense that the status quo, with its manifold injustices, is accepted as permanent. It will be an era of change, and it will have its strains and its stresses. But peoples and governments will renounce the use of war and of subversion to achieve their goals. They will accept orderly evolution toward the realization of legitimate national aspirations. They will develop wider economic intercourse among themselves. They will increasingly respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. And human effort will be dedicated to what is creative and benign, The United Nations, too, will change. Given good will and mutual confidence, many provisions of the charter will gain new meaning and new vitality. Let us together strive that the next decade shall be known as the healing decade of true peace. 66. ADDRESS BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS,1 JANUARY 13, 1956 2 Just a few weeks ago the General Assembly concluded its tenth, and perhaps its most momentous, session. High on the list of accomplishments was its action in enlarging the membership of the United Nations from 60 to 76 countries. This expansion of the organization's membership brings new vitality and new voices to the task of creating and maintaining peace with justice among nations. The United States must now assess the implications for its foreign policy of a United Nations in which European representation has been increased, the voice of Asia and the Middle East has become strengthened, the number of so-called uncommitted countries has been enlarged, and the proportionate numerical strength of the Latin American group reduced. This means new problems, but it also means a new challenge to our diplomacy-a new opportunity to develop policies that will advance our own interests and those of the international community. 5 The President in his state of the Union message stated the cardinal aim of our foreign policy: "the waging of peace, with as much resourcefulness, with as great a sense of dedication and urgency as we have ever mustered in defense of our country in time of war." In charting our course in a newly revitalized United Nations we must search out and understand the new forces at work. 1 Francis O. Wilcox. 2 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 23, 1956, pp. 111–117. Held Sept. 20-Dec. 20, 1955. See supra, p. 337. Supra, pp. 129–133. |